# Will the upper bound of the US federal funds target range be at or below 3.25% on 31 December 2027?

> As of 14 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 21%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-14
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-12-31
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/anemometer-nebula-calculus/will-the-upper-bound-of-the-us-federal-funds-target-range-be-at-or-below-3-25-on
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/d9662c16-0707-4c6c-8345-727e6ac1a20f

## Forecast

- Yes: 21%
- No: 79%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast is **20.8% Yes and 79.2% No** for a federal funds target-range upper bound at or below 3.25% on December 31, 2027. Plan around an upper bound above the threshold: persistent inflation, resilient employment and policymakers’ tightening preference outweigh the case for substantial easing. The decisive risk is an early downturn or sustained disinflation that produces enough cuts to meet the year-end condition.

## Context
As of November 14, 2026, the federal funds target range is 3.75%–4.00%. The October decision left it unchanged, with the implementation directive effective October 29. Both dissenters preferred an increase rather than a reduction ([FOMC statement](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm); [implementation note](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a1.htm)). The starting position therefore requires at least 75 basis points of net easing for Yes.

The question concerns the official upper bound effective at the end of December 31, 2027. Exactly 3.25% qualifies. A lower effective market rate, a qualifying midpoint or a temporary reduction earlier in the year does not. The official policy record is the determining evidence, with the upper-bound series providing verification ([FOMC records](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm); [FRED upper-bound series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU)).

## Evidence
History shows that substantial easing is possible over this horizon, but it also shows why cuts and a qualifying endpoint are different events. Across 35 complete November-to-next-December historical pairs spanning November 1990–December 2025, 16 began at a target or upper bound of at least 3.75%. Nine of those experienced at least 75 basis points of net easing, but only four ended at or below 3.25%. These counts use the historical target and upper-bound records ([historical target series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTAR); [upper-bound series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU)).

A separate annual reference class tells the same broad story. Among 15 twelve-month transitions starting between 3.75% and 6.50%, seven delivered at least 75 basis points of easing, while three finished at or below 3.25%. Neither sample is a direct probability estimate for this event. Adjacent observations share policy cycles, inflation regimes differ, and pre-1994 targets are reconstructed. Still, the distinction is useful: **a forecast of cuts is not a forecast of Yes** ([historical target series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTAR); [upper-bound series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU)).

Historical forecast errors provide the second anchor. The September projections report a 1.7-percentage-point root-mean-squared error for next-year short-term interest-rate forecasts, based on fall forecasts for 2006–2025. That is substantial uncertainty relative to the easing required here. But the benchmark mixes federal funds and Treasury-bill forecasts and uses quarterly-average outcomes, not this exact year-end upper bound. It supports taking a large policy reversal seriously without treating it as the central outcome ([September projection materials](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20260916.htm)).

The current policy baseline points away from qualification. The September projections contain 18 year-end 2027 midpoint assessments: eight at 4.375%, six at 4.125%, three at 3.625%, and one at 3.125%. The median implies a 4.25% upper bound if the present range width remains in place. Only the lowest assessment qualifies. These are conditional judgments about appropriate policy, not independent probability forecasts. Their narrow spread does not erase the much larger historical forecast errors ([September projections](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20260916.htm)).

Inflation explains much of that policy stance. September headline PCE inflation was 3.6% year over year and core PCE inflation was 3.1%; their monthly increases were 0.5% and 0.3%. The full supplied August–October CPI history also shows persistent monthly price pressure ([September PCE report](https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/personal-income-and-outlays-september-2026); [October CPI report](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_11102026.htm)):

| Monthly CPI change, seasonally adjusted | August 2026 | September 2026 | October 2026 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Headline | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.4% |
| Core | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% |
| Shelter | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.3% |
| Energy | 2.1% | 5.2% | 0.7% |

Policymakers’ comments reinforce the inflation signal. Governor Waller supported a December increase and said a larger move should be considered if core CPI remained around 0.3% or higher. Dallas Fed President Logan separately advocated further increases. These statements show a preference for restraint, not a binding promise about subsequent Committee decisions ([Waller speech](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20261110a.htm); [Logan remarks](https://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/logan/2026/lkl261110)). Further tightening would increase the easing needed later.

Current employment conditions do not establish a recessionary trigger. October payrolls rose 165,000 and unemployment was 4.1%. Initial unemployment claims were 200,000 for the week ended November 7, and their four-week average was 195,250. Those readings do not show a layoff surge ([October employment report](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_11062026.htm); [claims release](https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf)). The New York Fed’s yield-curve model put the probability of recession in October 2027 at about 12%. That concerns one particular month, not the chance of any recession or financial shock before resolution ([recession model](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/capital_markets/Prob_Rec.pdf)).

Credit conditions are softer, but not frozen. The October bank-lending survey reported net tightening of 1.7 percentage points for large and middle-market business loans and 5.1 points for small firms, alongside weaker loan demand. Credit-line inquiries nevertheless increased on net. This looks more like vulnerability than a generalized seizure in lending ([October lending survey](https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos/sloos-202610.htm)). The financial-stability assessment also identified elevated hedge-fund leverage and private-credit redemption pressure, while describing banks as resilient and funding risks as moderate. Vulnerabilities can amplify a shock; they do not establish that one has begun ([Financial Stability Report](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20261113.pdf)).

There is a credible non-recessionary route to easing. Preliminary third-quarter productivity grew 3.6% annualized while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. That combination offers a mechanism for lower inflation without a collapse in employment. The counterweight is the inflation pipeline: October processed intermediate goods prices rose 0.4%, and intermediate services rose 0.6%. Producer prices do not pass through mechanically to consumer prices, but these readings argue against assuming that disinflation is already secure ([productivity release](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod2_11052026.htm); [producer-price release](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ppi_11132026.htm)).

Households provide another warning beneath the resilient headline data. September real disposable income fell 0.3%, real consumption was approximately flat, and the saving rate was 3.8%. These facts leave spending exposed to a weaker labor market. They are not, on their own, evidence of an economy-wide contraction ([personal income and outlays](https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/personal-income-and-outlays-september-2026)).

## What's non-obvious
The threshold is less forgiving than the phrase “three cuts” suggests. That description works only from the current starting rate and only if later increases do not offset the reductions. The event requires net easing and a qualifying final setting. A late shock, delayed response or subsequent reversal can produce cuts without producing Yes.

The other subtlety is the difference between policy disagreement and economic uncertainty. Only one September projection qualifies, but that does not make the outcome negligible. Policymakers can share similar baseline assumptions and still all be surprised by a downturn or inflation shift. Conversely, favorable productivity is a genuine easing channel, not proof that enough easing will occur. The evidence supports a meaningful minority chance of Yes while leaving No as the clear central judgment.

## Uncertainties
The largest unknown is the joint path of inflation and employment. Early demand weakness with falling inflation creates the clearest route to Yes. Supply-driven inflation creates the harder case: activity can weaken while the Fed keeps rates restrictive. Repeated productivity gains, sustained core-price moderation and broader labor deterioration would help distinguish these paths.

Inflation measurement also has a gap. Most October 2026 twelve-month CPI comparisons could not be published because October 2025 survey indexes were missing. Monthly readings remain usable, but annual comparisons based on interpolation are not equivalent to fully observed official data ([BLS CPI release](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_11102026.htm)). The persistence and source of the productivity improvement, and institution-level private-credit defaults, were not established by the evidence considered here.

Finally, timing limits the policy response. The official calendar lists no December 2027 meeting; scheduled dates are tentative, and unscheduled actions remain possible ([FOMC calendar](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm)). A sufficiently early shock can generate substantial easing. A late shock may leave too little time, especially after intervening hikes. Those uncertainties sustain the 20.8% Yes probability without displacing the 79.2% No forecast.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-14 | 21% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm)
- [Federal Funds Target Range - Upper Limit (DFEDTARU) \| FRED \| St. Louis Fed](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU)
- [Personal Income and Outlays, September 2026 \| U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)](https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/personal-income-and-outlays-september-2026)
- [Consumer Price Index News Release - 2026 M10 Results](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_11102026.htm)
- [Economic and monetary policy outlook - Dallasfed.org](https://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/logan/2026/lkl261110)
- [News Release](https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf)
- [recession model](https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/capital_markets/Prob_Rec.pdf)
- [A Look at the Wider Divide in Credit Card Delinquency by Income - Liberty Street Economics](https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2026/11/a-look-at-the-wider-divide-in-credit-card-delinquency-by-income)
- [Yield Curve and Predicted GDP Growth](https://www.clevelandfed.org/indicators-and-data/yield-curve-and-predicted-gdp-growth)

## The question

This question asks whether the upper bound of the target range for the U.S. federal funds rate, as established by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve, will be at or below 3.25% on December 31, 2027. As of November 14, 2026, the FOMC's target range is 3.75%–4.00%, following a 25-basis-point increase in September 2026 and a decision to leave rates unchanged on October 28, 2026. The upper bound is therefore currently 4.00%, meaning it would need to decline by at least 75 basis points (0.75 percentage points) to satisfy the question's threshold. The forecast concerns the target range in effect on December 31, 2027, rather than the lowest rate reached during 2027 or the effective federal funds rate observed in financial markets. The outcome will depend on monetary policy decisions made between November 14, 2026, and December 31, 2027. The Federal Reserve's October 28, 2026, policy statement confirms the current target range: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm

### How it resolves

The question resolves YES if the upper bound of the federal funds target range officially established by the FOMC and in effect at the end of December 31, 2027, is 3.25% or lower. It resolves NO if that upper bound is greater than 3.25%. The primary resolution source will be the Federal Reserve's official FOMC monetary policy statements and implementation notes, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's FRED series DFEDTARU (Federal Funds Target Range – Upper Limit), available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU, will serve as a secondary source for verification. The determining value will be the upper bound legally and operationally in effect at 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on December 31, 2027, regardless of when the most recent FOMC meeting occurred. A policy change announced before that date but scheduled to take effect after December 31, 2027, will not count. Conversely, any change effective on or before December 31, 2027, will count, even if the announcement occurred earlier. If the FOMC ceases to use a target range before the resolution date but adopts a single numerical federal funds rate target, that single target will be treated as both the lower and upper bound for purposes of resolution. If the Federal Reserve abandons numerical targeting of the federal funds rate entirely and no official successor target can be unambiguously identified, the question will be annulled rather than resolved YES or NO. If the primary source is temporarily unavailable, resolution will be delayed until an authoritative Federal Reserve record or the secondary FRED series establishes the relevant value. If authoritative information remains permanently unavailable, the question will be annulled.

### Fine print

The threshold of 3.25% is inclusive: an upper bound of exactly 3.25% resolves YES, while an upper bound of 3.50% resolves NO. The question refers specifically to the upper limit of the FOMC's announced federal funds target range, not the effective federal funds rate (EFFR), the midpoint of the target range, the interest rate on reserve balances (IORB), the discount rate, or any market-implied expectation of future policy rates. Only the target in effect on December 31, 2027, matters; temporary reductions below 3.25% earlier in the year do not qualify if the upper bound subsequently rises above 3.25% by the resolution date. December 31, 2027, is a Friday, and the target range in effect that day will be used even if no FOMC meeting or policy announcement occurs on that date. The reference timezone is U.S. Eastern Time. Any later retrospective correction to the official historical rate record may be considered if it establishes that the originally recorded value was erroneous, but subsequent policy decisions will not change the outcome.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
