# Russia x Ukraine ceasefire agreement by December 31, 2026?

> As of 20 October 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 12%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-10-20
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-01-01
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/decile-equinox-barometer/russia-x-ukraine-ceasefire-agreement-by-december-31-2026
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/760929f4-c1a3-4e7e-a310-fcd7cf0834a6

## Forecast

- Yes: 12%
- No: 88%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The saved forecast is **11.9% Yes** and **88.1% No** for a qualifying Russia–Ukraine ceasefire agreement by December 31, 2026. The live diplomatic channel gives a real route to an announced deal before the deadline. Russia’s rejection of a recent general ceasefire proposal, continued high-intensity attacks, and the breakdown of a narrower energy understanding make a general, mutual, dated halt the less likely outcome.

## Context
This question has a narrow target. It is not asking whether diplomacy continues, whether leaders announce an intention to negotiate, or whether the parties agree to spare a certain class of targets. Yes requires a mutually agreed general suspension of direct military engagement, an explicit effective date, and either official bilateral confirmation or a consensus of credible reporting.

The time window is short. As of October 20, the visible process is shuttle diplomacy: U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff is consulting Ukraine and European partners and may subsequently brief or meet Russian leadership. That is a genuine opening, but it remains a step before direct, settled Russian–Ukrainian agreement.

## Evidence
The best historical backbone is the conflict’s own recent record rather than an abstract average for interstate wars. From 2025 through October 2026, externally brokered proposals and limited restraint concepts have not produced a resolution-quality general ceasefire. The nearer analogue is the latest attempt at an energy arrangement. It shows that the parties may discuss reciprocal limits, but also that moving from a headline to mutually defined terms and observable compliance is hard.

On October 11, President Trump said Russia and Ukraine had agreed to an energy ceasefire. Ukraine welcomed the prospect but indicated that details were absent, and attacks on energy infrastructure continued afterward ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/f621fa788196f204448e7f75fcc78c68)). This episode does not itself qualify under the market rules because its scope was sectoral rather than general. More useful as evidence, it exposed the operational gap between a political announcement and a mutually understood arrangement.

The closest direct test of willingness to agree to a general pause was Ukraine’s proposed 60-day ceasefire. Ukraine’s president said he would organize elections if Russia agreed to such a pause ([Reuters](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/ukraines-zelenskiy-tells-abc-he-will-organize-elections-if-russia-agrees-to-60day-ceasefire-4942702)). On October 12, the Kremlin rejected the idea while saying it wanted an overall or long-term peace settlement ([Reuters Connect](https://www.reutersconnect.com/collection/kremlin-says-contacts-continue-on-trumps-energy-ceasefire-but-rejects-a-60-day-truce-idea-proposed-by-kyiv-saying-it-wants-an-overall-peace-deal/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBOTQyMjEyMTAyMDI2UlAx)). Reporting separately described the rejection of the 60-day ceasefire proposal ([Meduza](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/10/12/kremlin-rejects-60-day-ceasefire-for-ukraine-s-elections-but-says-it-might-not-strike-on-election-day-itself)).

Russia’s stated preference for a full settlement is not automatically evidence for Yes. A full settlement could contain a ceasefire, and would meet the rule if it made the general suspension explicit and dated. But such a deal requires the parties to resolve or defer more issues: territorial control, force posture, monitoring, sanctions, and security guarantees. In a short window, adding those questions creates more veto points. The available evidence does not show that those gaps have narrowed enough for a completed bargain.

There is nevertheless a meaningful positive catalyst. On October 20, the Kremlin said it hoped Witkoff could soon brief Vladimir Putin on the latest Ukrainian and European thinking while Witkoff was consulting Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European partners ([Reuters](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/kremlin-hopeswitkoff-can-brief-putin-soon-on-latest-ukrainianeuropean-thinking-on-peace-deal-4959448)). Reporting characterized the Oslo meetings as part of an effort to shape a proposal for Moscow and potentially test it with Putin ([Axios](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/20/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-trump-witkoff-oslo)).

That matters because the forecast does not require a durable ceasefire in force by December 31. A qualifying agreement reached before the deadline can resolve Yes even if the agreed effective date comes later. This leaves room for a late-December announcement, provided it contains a general suspension, mutual assent, and a specified start date. It is the strongest reason the Yes probability is not close to zero.

Ukraine has also signaled openness to reciprocal restraint in the context of negotiations. A Ukrainian presidential statement said Ukraine was ready to observe a ceasefire in airstrikes against cities involved in the negotiating process ([Office of the President of Ukraine](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-gotova-dotrimuvatisya-rezhimu-pripinennya-povitryan-106265)). But an airstrike or city-focused pause would remain too narrow for this question unless folded into a nationwide, general cessation. The distinction is decisive: diplomatic progress can be real while still falling short of the event being forecast.

Military behavior remains a negative constraint. AP reported that a Russian missile-and-drone barrage on October 20 killed at least nine people as Zelenskyy met Western officials in Norway ([AP](https://apnews.com/article/140895c6c0a1682c46f4fe197e056996)). An assessment covering October 18–19 described hundreds of drones and missiles, damage to 28 energy facilities, and outages affecting roughly 550,000 households in 15 oblasts ([Critical Threats](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2026)). These reports do not prove talks cannot succeed; wars often continue until an agreement is signed. They do show that neither side has visibly entered a jointly managed nationwide pause.

The available quantitative conflict indicators point in the same direction. A conflict-forecast reference run assigned a 1.000 probability of state-based conflict occurrence for Ukraine in each month from September through December 2026. Its expected monthly state-based fatalities were 4,255.26 in October, 4,224.612 in November, and 4,214.963 in December. Those are modeled expectations, not observed casualties or direct probabilities that a ceasefire fails. They support a baseline of continued conflict but cannot exclude a political agreement near year-end.

The available observed UCDP-derived fatality series also suggests sustained large-scale warfare, despite a decline from earlier in the year. The full history available for 2026 is:

| Month | State-based violence fatalities |
|---|---:|
| January | 9,292 |
| July | 4,969 |
| August | 5,639 |

The series available here does not provide monthly values for February through June or for September and October. The reported January–April average was 8,504; the May–August average was 5,943.25. The decline is real in the supplied data, but the level remains consistent with an active war rather than a demonstrated transition to a mutual halt.

## What's non-obvious
The obvious read is that more mediation means a ceasefire is near. The research points to a different conclusion: mediation and a qualifying ceasefire sit at different stages of the process. A proposal can move from Oslo to Moscow, talks can restart, and leaders can announce a partial restraint without producing mutual agreement on a general suspension. The resolution language makes that difference outcome-determinative.

The energy track is the clearest example. It is tempting to treat it as a precursor that substantially raises the probability of a broader deal. It does show that limited restraint is on the agenda. But its vague terms, contested confirmation, and continued attacks are stronger evidence that even a politically easier agreement lacks the shared definitions, verification, command discipline, and trust needed for a nationwide cessation. I read this as a reason to distinguish a possible diplomatic headline from the much rarer resolution-quality agreement.

There is also an asymmetry in the year-end rule. An agreement does not need to endure, and it can take effect after the deadline. That makes the forecast about an announced and qualifying bargain rather than lasting peace. This supports the 11.9% Yes probability despite the bleak military backdrop. It does not erase the requirement that both sides actually agree to a general, dated halt.

## Uncertainties
The key unknown is the substance of private negotiations. Public reporting establishes a diplomatic channel but does not reveal whether Russia has received a concrete package, what concessions it might accept, or whether Ukraine and its partners would accept the corresponding terms. The public positions may be bargaining postures, and they can shift quickly under military, economic, or political pressure.

Several specific gaps would materially sharpen the assessment:

- Whether Russia formally accepts a direct bilateral or trilateral format with authority to negotiate a general ceasefire.
- Whether a draft includes an explicit effective date and coverage of ground, air, naval, missile, and drone operations.
- Whether there are agreed monitoring, violation, security-guarantee, sanctions, and force-posture provisions sufficient for both sides to sign.
- Whether reported reductions in attacks are reciprocal and mutually acknowledged, rather than unilateral, temporary, or confined to energy or other target categories.

The forecast would be too pessimistic if the Oslo channel rapidly delivers a package that lets the parties defer core sovereignty disputes and announce a general ceasefire before year-end. It would be too optimistic if Russia’s rejection of a 60-day pause reflects a firm insistence on concessions that Ukraine will not accept, or if diplomacy produces only another sector-specific arrangement. The saved forecast retains both possibilities: **11.9% Yes** for the real but narrow breakthrough path, and **88.1% No** because the current evidence still favors continued fighting or non-qualifying partial arrangements.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-20 | 12% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- Domain Expert Search
- Connection List Tools
- [json-schema.org](https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema)
- News
- Connection Call Tool
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d810aaf33cf3da8b56764?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d8111a2a8e630113f838c?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81bb8213e99ce3a19c9a?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d814693d2ceef28a0b520?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81c58b87cedf06064ffb?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81239fcbe6edfc9143cc?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81b29a9ff414998ad049?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81719517d62c50466f47?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81dc8568f61312a69638?pvs=204)
- [app.notion.com](https://app.notion.com/p/3fe358b4482d81febbf7c03a2dc54613?pvs=204)
- Domain Expert Research Task
- [Kremlin hopes Witkoff can brief Putin soon on latest Ukrainian/European thinking on peace deal By Reuters](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/kremlin-hopeswitkoff-can-brief-putin-soon-on-latest-ukrainianeuropean-thinking-on-peace-deal-4959448)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/all)
- [Ukraine Is Ready to Observe a Ceasefire in Airstrikes against the Cities Involved in the Negotiation Process – Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a Call with Envoys of the U. S. President — Official website of the President of Ukraine](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-gotova-dotrimuvatisya-rezhimu-pripinennya-povitryan-106265)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/0f22fa796cafd6606a88ad1b101ab3fb)
- [Trump says Russia and Ukraine agree to an 'energy ceasefire' but Kyiv says attacks continue](https://apnews.com/article/f621fa788196f204448e7f75fcc78c68)
- [Kremlin says contacts continue on Trump's energy ceasefire but rejects a 60-day truce idea proposed by Kyiv, saying it wants an overall peace deal. \| Images & Videos for Licensing](https://www.reutersconnect.com/collection/kremlin-says-contacts-continue-on-trumps-energy-ceasefire-but-rejects-a-60-day-truce-idea-proposed-by-kyiv-saying-it-wants-an-overall-peace-deal/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBOTQyMjEyMTAyMDI2UlAx)
- [reutersconnect.com](https://www.reutersconnect.com/collection/kremlin-on-trumps-energy-ceasefire-provisions-were-not-specified-work-is-continuing/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBMDEyNzE0MTAyMDI2UlAx)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/0071b4f3792c9912b977b0ee73505b18)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/b041f78e5d037a0f3377b7108eac1dc7)
- [malaysia.news.yahoo.com](https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/kremlin-rejects-ukrainian-leaders-idea-100539987.html)
- [Russian aerial blitz kills 9 in Ukraine as Zelenskyy meets US and European officials in Norway](https://apnews.com/article/140895c6c0a1682c46f4fe197e056996)
- [criticalthreats.org](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026)
- [Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2026 \| Critical Threats](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2026)
- [Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2026 \| Critical Threats](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2026)
- [internazionale.it](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/10/13/us-hopes-diesel-deal-can-soften-moscow-on-peace-talks-sources-say)
- [Witkoff heads to Oslo, plans Russia trip for peace talks](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/20/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-trump-witkoff-oslo)
- [marketscreener.com](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/kremlin-says-russia-s-stance-on-conditions-for-a-ukraine-peace-deal-has-not-changed-since-2024-ce7f5fdede8ff025)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/5ff9a53edf6d0f338f40709af6dc9c11)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/posilennya-zahistu-neba-pidgotovka-do-zimi-ta-diplomatichnij-106737)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yevropa-ta-ssha-mayut-posilyuvati-tisk-na-rosiyu-shob-stvori-106861)
- [whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/19/zelensky-blumenthal-tillis-ukraine-russia-war-intelligence)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/a57c76d347f580eaf8325062ed13a6ec)
- [1-e8259.azureedge.net](https://1-e8259.azureedge.net/news/2026/10/1/russias-putin-rules-out-ceasefire-with-ukraine-during-speech-in-moscow)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-proviv-rozmovu-z-predstavnikami-prezidenta-ssha-106949)
- [Kremlin rejects 60-day ceasefire for Ukraine’s elections — but says it might not strike ‘on election day itself’ — Meduza](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/10/12/kremlin-rejects-60-day-ceasefire-for-ukraine-s-elections-but-says-it-might-not-strike-on-election-day-itself)
- Views
- Deepstatemap
- [commonslibrary.parliament.uk](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-12198)
- [kyivindependent.com](https://kyivindependent.com/us-proposes-trilateral-talks-with-russia-ukraine-by-end-of-october-zelensky-says)
- [everycrsreport.com](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-05-22_IN12534_87c80d8db6b2c1d36cd4dbe20c46eff2d1f40f67.pdf)
- [russiamatters.org](https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-review/russia-review-aug-28-sept-4-2026)
- [acleddata.com](https://acleddata.com/update/ukraine-war-situation-update-29-august-4-september-2026)
- [rcsgs.org](https://www.rcsgs.org/publications/blog/the-russia-ukraine-war-battlefield-developments-august-1-15-2026)
- [acaps.org](https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20260422_ACAPS_Ukraine_-_Impacts_of_the_Middle_East_conflict.pdf)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/11/russia-ukraine-oil-energy-ceasefire-trump-putin-zelensky)
- [osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-09-07/witkoff-and-kushner-moscow-and-kyiv-white-house-resumes-peace)
- [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/10/10/trump-zelensky-putin-diesel-deal-war?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidkritij-list-prezidentu-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-vid-preziden-104769)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidnovlennya-peregovornogo-procesu-ye-vazhlivim-i-ukrayina-v-106273)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/09/07/zelensky-ukraine-russia-war-witkoff-kushner-putin-trump)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2026/08/29/cia-director-ratcliffe-putin-zelensky-summit-war)
- [newsquawk.com](https://www.newsquawk.com/headlines/russias-foreign-minister-lavrov-says-an-immediate-ceasefire-in-ukraine-is-not-possible-ifx-reports)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/stiv-vitkoff-ta-dzhared-kushner-vidvidayut-moskvu-i-v-nedily-106257?gsid=d615c8a3-8faa-4660-bbf9-b43a5d4604f9)
- [aa.com.tr](https://aa.com.tr/en/eurasia/ukraine-agrees-to-us-proposed-trilateral-technical-talks-in-uae-zelenskyy-says/4077704)
- [criticalthreats.org](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/all?date-from=12-10-2025&date-to=12-10-2026&page=1)
- [commonslibrary.parliament.uk](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10218)
- [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/10/12/why-the-trump-putin-fuel-agreement-benefits-russia_6758525_4.html)
- [verkkouutiset.fi](https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/en/kremlins-offensive-stalls-as-ukraine-strikes-back-on-several-fronts)
- Polymarket
- [Zelensky: U.S. pushing energy ceasefire, trilateral talks with Russia](https://www.axios.com/2026/09/24/zelensky-ukraine-russia-war-energy-ceasefire-grain)
- [Ukraine’s Zelenskiy tells ABC he will organize elections if Russia agrees to 60-day ceasefire By Reuters](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/ukraines-zelenskiy-tells-abc-he-will-organize-elections-if-russia-agrees-to-60day-ceasefire-4942702)
- [Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure: UK statement to the OSCE - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-attacks-on-ukraines-civilian-infrastructure-uk-statement-to-the-osce)
- [Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Friedrich Merz Discussed How Russia Is Responding to President Trump’s Statement on an Energy Ceasefire with New Attacks on Ukraine — Official website of the President of Ukraine](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-i-fridrih-merc-obgovorili-yak-rosiya-rea-106869)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/videos/ukrayina-gotova-ne-zavdavati-udariv-po-rosijskij-energetici-8933)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-uchasnikiv-varshavskogo-be-106853)
- [uk.marketscreener.com](https://uk.marketscreener.com/news/ukraine-says-russia-s-claimed-territorial-advances-are-an-illusion-ce785cdade8efe24)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/9d80ef8b18a90b00c7117ae5902fcd14)
- [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2025/03/11/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-30-days)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/trump-to-hold-call-with-putin-in-test-of-dealmaking-strength-3933145)
- [investing.com](https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/zelenskiy-calls-on-us-to-sanction-russia-after-fresh-drone-strikes-3948867)
- [youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhCvGWiDV6M)
- [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-security-agreement)
- [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/426194)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-lideriv-franciyi-velikoyi-britaniyi-nimechchin-104789)
- [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraine)
- [pravda.com.ua](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/11/8057475)
- [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/timeline-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine)
- [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/6fdef6ff4d033b379c74e1d62183d078)
- [president.gov.ua](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-proviv-rozmovi-z-ursuloyu-fon-der-lyayen-markom-ka-106849)
- [Russia ramps up attacks on Ukraine as U.S. pushes for peace talks](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/05/ukraine-war-russia-kyiv-putin-zelenskyy-trump.html)
- [Russia’s Putin rules out ceasefire with Ukraine during speech in Moscow](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/1/russias-putin-rules-out-ceasefire-with-ukraine-during-speech-in-moscow)
- [Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2026](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026)
- [Ukraine ready for US-backed talks with Russia: Zelenskyy](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/4/ukraine-ready-for-us-backed-talks-with-russia-zelenskyy)
- [2026 Russo-Ukrainian truce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Russo-Ukrainian_truce)
- [April 2026 Russo-Ukrainian truce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2026_Russo-Ukrainian_truce)
- [May 2026 Russo-Ukrainian truce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_2026_Russo-Ukrainian_truce)
- [2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decree_374/2026)
- [Ukraine-Russia ceasefire - Lavrov says there will be no truce](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/no-ceasefire-russia-makes-another-statement-1792064988.html)

## The question

Imported from Polymarket.
This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market.

### How it resolves

This market will resolve to “Yes” if there is a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.

A ceasefire agreement refers to any mutually-agreed suspension of direct military engagement between Russia and Ukraine, which is either officially announced by both countries or confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting to have been mutually agreed by both countries.

A broader peace deal, normalization agreement, political framework, truce, or humanitarian pause will qualify if it includes a mutually agreed suspension of direct military engagement, to be effective on a specified date. Agreements that outline future negotiations or de-escalation measures without an explicit, dated commitment to stop fighting will not qualify.

Any form of informal understanding, backchannel communication, de-escalation without an announced agreement, or unilateral pause in hostilities will not be considered a ceasefire agreement.

Only agreements which constitute a general pause in the conflict will qualify. Agreements which only apply to specific conflict categories (e.g. restrictions on certain target categories or certain locations) will not qualify.

If a qualifying agreement is officially reached before this market’s end date, this market will resolve to “Yes,” regardless of whether the ceasefire agreement officially takes effect after that date.

The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of Russia and Ukraine and a consensus of credible reporting.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.