# What will the WTI crude oil spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma be on 31 December 2026, in dollars per barrel?

> As of 23 October 2026, Prolepsia’s median forecast is 98.7, with an 80% chance it falls between 70.3 and 141.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-10-23
- Question type: Number
- Resolves: 2027-01-07
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/eclipse-vortex-omega/what-will-the-wti-crude-oil-spot-price-at-cushing-oklahoma-be-on-31-december-202
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/d48a83ac-2e46-4683-8903-a3f406610d28

## Forecast

- 10th percentile: 70.3
- Median: 98.7
- 90th percentile: 141

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast for the 31 December 2026 Cushing WTI spot price is a median of $98.7 per barrel, with a 10th percentile of $70.35 and a 90th percentile of $141.45. The central case is partial normalization as export workarounds, rising Cushing stocks and weak demand reduce the disruption premium. Use the full range for planning: depleted accessible inventories leave prices exposed to renewed supply losses.

## Context
The target is the nominal daily Cushing, Oklahoma WTI spot assessment published in EIA series RWTC, not a futures settlement or a monthly average. If EIA publishes no observation for December 31, the last earlier published price counts. The forecast date is October 23, 2026, leaving 69 calendar days to the target. ([EIA resolution series](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm))

The latest confirmed historical RWTC observation is $107.89 for October 20. A separate, faster EIA publication reports $104.27 for the October 22 close in its October 23 snapshot; that figure is not yet an observation in the historical RWTC table. The distinction matters: it supplies newer price evidence without changing the instrument used to resolve the question. ([RWTC history](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm); [EIA Daily Prices](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/prices.php))

## Evidence
The historical backbone gives little support to a strong seasonal price call. Across 40 annual windows from 1986–2025, measured from the last observation on or before October 20 to the last observation on or before December 31, exactly 20 years rose and 20 fell. The median simple return was −0.5960%. The negative average was driven disproportionately by large declines in 2008, 2014 and 2018. This is evidence that a substantial fall belongs in the range, not evidence of a dependable year-end decline. ([Underlying EIA price history](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm))

Broader calendar-matched historical returns also provide a weak directional signal. Their main value is as a reference for uncertainty. The many overlapping windows share most of their observations, so a large row count does not represent thousands of independent oil-market episodes. Current conditions also differ from the long-run average: the confirmed daily log-return volatility over 60 returns, July 28–October 20, 2026, is 3.825%. That supports a wide range even over the short remaining horizon. ([Underlying EIA price history](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm))

The recent volatility estimate has an important sensitivity. The official series records $95.88 on September 24, $85.23 on September 25 and $99.37 on September 28. Those sharp reversals materially raise short-window volatility. They remain official observations, but they argue against assuming that the most extreme recent fluctuations will persist unchanged. The right conclusion is broad uncertainty, not a mechanical extrapolation of either the rally or the latest volatility spike. ([EIA daily observations](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm))

The strongest local evidence for easing is at the delivery hub itself. Cushing inventories were 23.748 million barrels on September 18, 26.607 million on October 9 and 27.594 million on October 16. The full September 18–October 16 increase was 3.846 million barrels, including 0.987 million in the final week. Those estimates were published October 21. **National tightening is not the same as a Cushing squeeze.** ([EIA Cushing stocks](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?f=W&n=PET&s=W_EPC0_SAX_YCUOK_MBBL))

National commercial crude stocks, excluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, moved the other way: from 426.398 million barrels on September 18 to 412.517 million on October 16, a draw of 13.881 million barrels. That signals physical tightness. It does not, by itself, establish another price increase after the market has already responded. Historical checks of the inventory-price relationship found unstable predictive effects and no reliable improvement from treating inventory changes as a standalone forecasting rule. ([EIA national stocks](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WCESTUS1&f=W))

Supply adaptation is the next major reason for partial normalization. Kpler’s October 1 analysis put its defined non-Iranian regional crude-export aggregate, including bypass routes, around the pre-conflict level of 18.5 million barrels per day. Escorts, transfers and alternative routing can restore flows without a comprehensive political settlement. But clean-product loadings remained around half their pre-war level. Restored crude movements and restored fuel supply are different claims. ([Kpler analysis](https://www.kpler.com/blog/hormuz-normalisation-no-longer-needs-to-wait-for-a-deal-08156))

Shipping evidence does not show uninterrupted improvement. Lloyd’s October 22 publication covers October 5–11, rather than conditions on its publication date. It records 104 non-Iranian-linked transits versus 126 the preceding week: outbound movements fell from 68 to 51, while inbound movements slipped from 58 to 53. Adaptation is real, but these figures do not establish a smooth recovery. ([Lloyd’s List Intelligence brief](https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-22-october-2026))

The global inventory picture explains why supply setbacks still carry large upside risk. The IEA’s October 14 report estimated that September’s total observed inventories fell only 10 million barrels. Underneath that small net change, on-land stocks fell 113 million barrels while oil on water rose 103 million. It also put observed global inventories 509 million barrels below end-February. Cargoes at sea help future supply, but they are not equivalent to stock available for immediate use. ([IEA October Oil Market Report](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-2026))

The same report contains meaningful downward pressure. The IEA projected fourth-quarter demand 2.5 million barrels per day below a year earlier and refinery runs rising from 81.3 million barrels per day in October to 84.6 million by year-end. These are projections, not completed outcomes. They support recovery and demand adjustment while leaving the market exposed to low inventory buffers. ([IEA October Oil Market Report](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-2026))

EIA’s October outlook supplies a consistent price anchor. Published October 6 with modeling completed October 1, it projects WTI averaging $97.00 in the fourth quarter of 2026 and $90.90 in the first quarter of 2027. It also projects global inventory withdrawals slowing from 1.9 million barrels per day in the third quarter to 0.7 million in the fourth. These are conditional quarterly averages, not December 31 assessments. They support easing without establishing that disruption ends before year-end. ([October STEO](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/oct26.pdf))

Policy relief falls within the relevant horizon. DOE’s September 29 solicitation offered an exchange of up to 40 million SPR barrels for November–December delivery. The IEA’s October 15 statement reported about 330 million barrels already released and about 100 million remaining. These measures can cushion scarcity, but an offered maximum is not a completed delivery, and remaining commitments are not automatically new supply on top of previously announced programs. ([DOE announcement](https://www.energy.gov/articles/united-states-energy-department-continues-execution-strategic-reserve-release-commitments); [IEA statement](https://www.iea.org/news/iea-governing-board-statement-on-energy-markets-and-security))

## What's non-obvious
The apparent contradiction between improving exports and persistent scarcity disappears once location and timing are separated. Oil can leave the Gulf while accessible on-land inventories keep falling. US stocks can decline while Cushing stocks rise. These distinctions explain why the central price can ease while the upper tail remains large. A headline about global tightness is not a one-for-one forecast for inland WTI.

There is also a double-counting trap in the normalization story. EIA’s October outlook already assumes improving export logistics. Treating every later sign of adaptation as a wholly new reason for another full price discount would overstate the bearish evidence. The opposite mistake is to translate every attack into lost production. The relevant question is whether an event causes a sustained reduction in delivered barrels, not whether it produces a dramatic headline.

## Uncertainties
The largest gap is the durability of export workarounds. More current, consistently defined measurements of crude and product deliveries would help distinguish sustained recovery from temporary rerouting. Shipping reports have publication lags, and estimates that include bypass routes cannot be directly compared with estimates limited to passage through the strait.

The physical consequences of attacks remain uncertain. AP’s October 22 report did not independently confirm Iran’s claim of seven damaged tankers. Such reports establish security risk, not a verified quantity of lost supply. Confirmed outage volumes, repair times and completed deliveries would be more informative than incident counts alone. ([AP reporting](https://apnews.com/article/2abebce2fca2c085e0e0ee717e42cf28))

Demand, emergency-release execution and the local spot-price premium are additional uncertainties. Faster recovery could produce a larger decline; sustained losses against depleted buffers could produce a sharp increase. Historical crisis samples contain few independent episodes, and agency projections depend on assumptions that can break. Those limits support retaining the saved forecast’s wide range rather than narrowing it around either the latest price or an institutional average.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-23 | Median 98.7, 80% range 70.3 to 141 |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel)](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm)
- [Hormuz reopening no longer hinges on a US-Iran deal Hormuz: Normalisation no longer needs to wait for a deal \| Kpler - Oct 01, 2026](https://www.kpler.com/blog/hormuz-normalisation-no-longer-needs-to-wait-for-a-deal-08156)
- [Strait of Hormuz Brief: 22 October, 2026](https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-22-october-2026)
- [Oil Market Report - October 2026 - IEA](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-2026)
- [Strait of Hormuz sees spike in oil tanker incidents amid rising tensions \| AP News](https://apnews.com/article/2abebce2fca2c085e0e0ee717e42cf28)
- [ir.eia.gov](https://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/summary.txt)
- [054](https://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/2/200.pdf)
- [The United States Energy Department Continues Execution of Strategic Reserve Release Commitments \| Department of Energy](https://www.energy.gov/articles/united-states-energy-department-continues-execution-strategic-reserve-release-commitments?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block)
- [More Oil is Flowing Through the Persian Gulf Than Before the War. Prices are Still High.](https://finance.yahoo.com/energy/articles/more-oil-flowing-persian-gulf-183858775.html)
- [G7 Leaders' Statement on global energy security and market stability - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/press/press-releases/2026/10/02/g7-leaders-statement-on-global-energy-security-and-market-stability)

## The question

The WTI spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma is the main US crude oil benchmark. EIA republishes the daily price. The attached files are EIA's daily WTI spot price history since 1986 and its weekly US crude oil stocks excluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve since 1982.

### How it resolves

Resolves to the Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, in dollars per barrel, for 31 December 2026, as published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (series RWTC, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/RWTCD.htm). If EIA publishes no price for 31 December 2026, the last price published for an earlier day counts.

### Fine print

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration; Refinitiv, an LSEG business.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.