# Netanyahu out by end of 2026? > As of 4 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 34%. - Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com) - Forecast made: 2026-11-04 - Question type: Yes / no - Resolves: 2027-01-01 - Status: Open - Forecasts: 1 - Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/gradient-transit-calculus/netanyahu-out-by-end-of-2026 - Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/1ac93c4c-0195-4df6-bf41-2c2d086e9fef ## Forecast - Yes: 34% - No: 66% ## How Prolepsia reasons ## TL;DR The forecast is **33.8% Yes and 66.2% No** for Netanyahu leaving office, or announcing a qualifying resignation or removal, by the end of 2026. The leading outcome is continued incumbency because the election produced an opposition majority on paper, not an agreed successor government. The decisive developments to watch are authorized support or abstention commitments and an explicit departure announcement—not another declaration of opposition unity. ## Context As of November 4, Netanyahu remained prime minister after an election that denied his bloc a parliamentary majority. President Herzog had received the certified results, and competing government-formation efforts were underway rather than a completed succession ([AP reporting](https://www.local10.com/news/world/2026/11/04/israels-president-accepts-certified-election-results-ahead-of-talks-on-forming-of-new-government/)). The official allocation is 53 seats for Netanyahu-aligned parties, 48 for the Jewish opposition and 19 for Arab-led parties ([Knesset results](https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/elections/pages/electionsresults26.aspx)). The question is broader than whether a successor takes office before year-end. Any actual cessation of office qualifies, even briefly. An announcement of resignation or removal also qualifies immediately, regardless of its effective date. Losing a majority or remaining caretaker prime minister does not itself satisfy that test. Roughly two months remain, so bargaining speed and the wording of any departure agreement matter alongside the parliamentary arithmetic. ## Evidence Historical formation times provide the starting point. The broad reference class covers eight elections from February 10, 2009 through November 1, 2022. Four produced a government within 65 days, approximately the interval between the latest election and the deadline. The full sequence contains six successful formation intervals and two elections that led to another election without a government being formed ([Knesset election history](https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/mk/pages/elections.aspx)). | Election in the reference class | Election-to-government interval | |---|---:| | February 10, 2009 | 49 days | | Next election | 55 days | | Following election | 58 days | | April 2019 | No government before another election | | September 2019 | No government before another election | | March 2, 2020 | 76 days | | March 23, 2021 | 82 days | | November 1, 2022 | 58 days | This is a timing reference, not a direct departure base rate. A new government can retain the incumbent. The observations also share political actors and institutions, so they are not independent trials. The narrower period from April 2019 through March 2021 is especially relevant: Netanyahu did not physically leave office within approximately 66 days of any of those four elections ([historical overview](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IN12751.html)). The eventual replacement in 2021 took 82 days from election to swearing-in. The coalition agreement was announced after 71 days. That precedent separates two propositions often treated as equivalent: the opposition can ultimately replace Netanyahu, and it can complete a qualifying step before this deadline. The first does not establish the second ([House of Commons Library](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9189/)). The current seat distribution nevertheless creates real alternatives. The Jewish opposition's 48 seats, United Torah Judaism's seven and Shas's six would total 61. The Jewish opposition plus all Arab-led parties would total 67. These are arithmetic possibilities, not commitments to govern together ([Knesset results](https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/elections/pages/electionsresults26.aspx)). The strongest obstacle is political compatibility. Opposition leaders coordinated behind Eisenkot on November 3 and began negotiating work. But reporting that day also described a renewed veto on cooperation with Arab parties, with Eisenkot and Bennett assenting to Lieberman's position. This makes a recommendation for Eisenkot much weaker evidence than a pledge to approve his eventual government ([Ynet](https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkh53qdtzx)). Shas's authorized position also matters. Its Council of Torah Sages committed to recommending Netanyahu after renewed assurances concerning Torah students. That concrete decision carries more weight than earlier speculation about a possible defection. United Torah Judaism remained a more open bargaining opportunity ([Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/3-netanyahu-allied-parties-say-theyll-recommend-him-as-pm-who-holds-talks-with-utj-leader/?utm_source=openai)). There is a less obvious route through abstentions. Initial investiture requires more votes for than against, not necessarily 61 affirmative votes. Ynet described a proposed 49–46 arrangement using opposition support, an additional supportive vote and favorable abstentions. The report also warned that the proposal could serve as leverage in unity negotiations, and its characterization was disputed. It establishes a possible mechanism, not secured votes ([Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63976); [Ynet proposal report](https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/h1ri3yeagx)). The most useful positive signal concerns sequencing. Walla reported that senior United Torah Judaism figures would consider outside support without requiring passage of a conscription law before investiture, in exchange for funding, legislation and a framework for a later settlement. I read this as a meaningful opening because it separates replacing the government from first settling the hardest policy dispute. But anonymous, conditional flexibility is not an authorized commitment by all seven members ([Walla](https://www.walla.co.il/news/politics/383959645)). Other reporting explored an older Lieberman conscription framework as a bridge. The obstacles remain substantial: opposition parties would have to revise campaign commitments, ultra-Orthodox parties would have to trust future legislation, and judicial acceptance remains uncertain. The proposal could also be bargaining leverage rather than the basis of a final agreement ([N12](https://www.mako.co.il/news-politics/2026_q4/Article-7bd7984efc2a1a1026.htm)). The calendar limits how long these openings can remain exploratory. The presidency scheduled consultations for November 4 at 17:00 Israeli time, after the information cutoff. The first nominee receives 28 days, extendable by 14 days. A first-attempt agreement fits within the remaining calendar; exhausting that attempt leaves a later successor effort much more constrained ([presidency announcement](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/president-herzog-to-begin-consultations-with-knesset-factions-2-nov-2026)). Government continuity gives delay a clear direction. Failure to form a coalition does not itself remove Netanyahu. The outgoing government continues until a successor is formed, allowing negotiations or renewed-election preparations to carry him beyond year-end ([Basic Law](https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/Documents/BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawTheGovernment.pdf)). This is the central reason the forecast favors No despite his bloc's electoral shortfall. A negotiated departure announcement creates another route to Yes. Reporting described private openness to rotation, but that was not an announced resignation ([Ynet](https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14945206)). A separate retirement-and-pardon proposal carried an explicit presidential-office denial, so it does not establish an accepted exit bargain ([Channel 14](https://www.c14.co.il/article/1762808)). The distinction is between discussing a future handover and authoritatively announcing a qualifying departure. ## What's non-obvious The election's headline arithmetic cuts both ways. Netanyahu lacks a majority, but a replacement does not necessarily need a conventional majority coalition. Abstentions can lower the investiture hurdle. That makes small changes in party permissions unusually consequential: agreeing not to oppose a government can matter without agreeing to join it. The forecast therefore treats minority arrangements as credible while refusing to count recommendations or exploratory talks as committed investiture votes. The resolution clause also cuts against a simple calendar argument. Slow negotiations favor continued incumbency, yet a definite resignation announcement can satisfy the question before an actual handover. At the same time, the legal setting does not justify assuming that every rotation promise guarantees succession. The Hebrew Basic Law compilation documents changes to the statutory rotation framework for the incoming Knesset, so an old automatic-handover model is not a safe shortcut ([Knesset compilation](https://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Documents/yesod6.pdf)). The practical focus is an explicit departure commitment and its wording. ## Uncertainties The largest gap is private bargaining authority. Public reports show flexibility, but not a shared, enforceable agreement among opposition leaders, ultra-Orthodox politicians and their religious authorities. Named authorization, a signed arrangement or explicit acceptance of abstention-enabled investiture would provide stronger evidence than repeated anonymous accounts. Multiple reports about the same discussions do not constitute multiple independent commitments. The first mandate and the pace of negotiations also remain unresolved at the cutoff. A prompt, successful first attempt supports replacement before year-end. A fully exhausted mandate supports continued incumbency. Neither the consultation schedule nor backing a candidate establishes that a government will pass an investiture vote. The announcement pathway introduces interpretation risk. A clear resignation or removal announcement qualifies under the supplied rules. A proposed rotation, conditional retirement discussion or temporary delegation of duties does not automatically establish that Netanyahu has ceased being prime minister. Exact language will matter. Finally, the market-creation timestamp is unspecified, so the full retrospective window cannot be established. No verified earlier qualifying departure or announcement was identified in the reviewed material. Unexpected medical, legal or security events remain possible, but there is no established imminent departure through those routes. The forecast remains 33.8% Yes and 66.2% No: credible paths to an exit exist, while political incompatibility, government continuity and the deadline favor continued incumbency. ## Forecast history | Date | Forecast | |---|---| | 2026-11-04 | 34% chance of yes | ## Sources Prolepsia read - [https://www.local10.com/news/world/2026/11/04/israels-president-accepts-certified-election-results-ahead-of-talks-on-forming-of-new-government/](https://www.local10.com/news/world/2026/11/04/israels-president-accepts-certified-election-results-ahead-of-talks-on-forming-of-new-government) - [https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/elections/pages/electionsresults26.aspx](https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/elections/pages/electionsresults26.aspx) - [https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IN12751.html](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IN12751.html) - [https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9189/](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9189) - [https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkh53qdtzx](https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkh53qdtzx) - [3 Netanyahu-allied parties say they'll recommend him as PM, who holds talks with UTJ leader \| The Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/3-netanyahu-allied-parties-say-theyll-recommend-him-as-pm-who-holds-talks-with-utj-leader) - [https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63976](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63976) - [בלי חוק גיוס: איזנקוט מקבל מהחרדים פתח להקמת ממשלה \| וואלה חדשות](https://www.walla.co.il/news/politics/383959645) - [https://www.mako.co.il/news-politics/2026_q4/Article-7bd7984efc2a1a1026.htm](https://www.mako.co.il/news-politics/2026_q4/Article-7bd7984efc2a1a1026.htm) - [https://www.gov.il/en/pages/president-herzog-to-begin-consultations-with-knesset-factions-2-nov-2026](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/president-herzog-to-begin-consultations-with-knesset-factions-2-nov-2026) ## The question Imported from Polymarket. This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market. ### How it resolves This market will resolve to “Yes” if Benjamin Netanyahu ceases to be Prime Minister of Israel for any period of time between market creation and the specified date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. An announcement of Benjamin Netanyahu's resignation/removal before this market's end date will immediately resolve this market to "Yes", regardless of when the announced resignation/removal goes into effect. The resolution source for this market will be official information from Benjamin Netanyahu and the government of Israel; however, a consensus of credible reporting may also be used. --- Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.