# Will the pound be worth more than 1.35 US dollars on 31 December 2027?

> As of 16 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 38%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-16
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-12-31
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/lemma-glacier-stratus/will-the-pound-be-worth-more-than-1-35-us-dollars-on-31-december-2027
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/a0c91ffd-a239-4e40-989b-75a80803882d

## Forecast

- Yes: 38%
- No: 62%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast is **37.6% Yes and 62.4% No** for the pound being worth strictly more than $1.35 on the designated observation for 31 December 2027. Treat an at-or-below-threshold finish as the more likely outcome, not as a prediction of a large sterling decline. The decisive distinction is the final reference observation: an earlier move above $1.35 does not settle the question.

## Context
This forecast is dated 16 November 2026. Sterling starts near $1.32, below the threshold but close enough that ordinary currency movements can take it across. The latest verified Bank of England observation was 1.3238 USD per GBP for 12 November; the database’s 13 November publication date should not be confused with the observation date ([Bank of England database](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)). The ECB’s 13 November rates imply 1.32265824 USD per GBP, consistent with that starting level ([ECB reference rates](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html)).

The question uses Bank of England series XUDLUSS and requires a value strictly above 1.3500. Exactly 1.3500 resolves No. If there is no observation for the target date, the latest preceding published observation applies; the specified ECB cross-rate is the fallback. This is a wholesale reference-rate question, not a retail conversion quote or a test of whether sterling touches the threshold along the way.

## Evidence
The historical backbone is simple: a rise of this size is common enough to remain plausible, but history does not establish a reliable upward trend. From the ECB-derived starting point, sterling needs 2.0672% appreciation to reach 1.35. That gap is smaller than the annual variability seen across both recent and longer exchange-rate histories ([ECB starting rates](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html); [Bank of England history](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)).

The annual volatility history also shows why the latest quiet period should not be treated as permanent. The available calendar-year calculations are below. The 2016 figure is partial, and 2026 is year-to-date; all figures are annualized daily-return volatility, not annual currency gains or losses ([Bank of England historical series](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)).

| Year | Annualized volatility |
|---|---:|
| 2016 | 14.6% |
| 2017 | 8.8% |
| 2018 | 8.0% |
| 2019 | 8.8% |
| 2020 | 11.4% |
| 2021 | 6.6% |
| 2022 | 12.8% |
| 2023 | 8.5% |
| 2024 | 6.2% |
| 2025 | 7.4% |
| 2026, year-to-date | 6.3% |

Over broader windows, annualized volatility was 8.95% since 2010, 9.42% since 2016, 9.29% since 24 June 2016, and 7.15% since 2023. Shorter readings were quieter: 6.23% over the latest year, 5.46% over six months and 5.35% over three months ([Bank of England data](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)). These figures support allowing for larger moves than recent trading alone suggests. They do not say which direction those moves will take.

Historical returns over approximately 410 calendar days give a second perspective. At the comparable hurdle associated with a 1.322 starting rate, the recorded exceedance frequencies were 42.1% for windows beginning since 2000, 38.3% since 2010, 46.3% since 2016, 48.7% since 24 June 2016, and 61.1% since 2023 ([underlying Bank of England history](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)). These are historical frequencies at a slightly different starting threshold, not alternative forecasts for this question.

The apparent strength of the newest sample deserves less weight than its raw count suggests. Daily rolling windows overlap heavily. The post-2023 sample contains only about two to three independent horizons, compared with roughly fourteen to fifteen since 2010. Recoveries from depressed levels can dominate a short sample. The useful conclusion is that the outcome is sensitive to the currency regime, not that recent appreciation will persist.

The current price evidence points below the hurdle without establishing a lasting decline. The available Bank of England sequence was 1.3335 on 10 November, 1.3282 on 11 November and 1.3238 on 12 November ([daily observations](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)). The following day’s ECB observations were 1.1052 USD per EUR and 0.83559 GBP per EUR, implying the 1.32265824 cross-rate ([ECB reference rates](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html)). Differences between reference observations need not be errors: timing and measurement conventions differ.

Monetary policy provides no clean reason to expect sustained sterling appreciation. The Bank of England raised Bank Rate by 25 basis points to 4.00% on 5 November, with an 8–1 vote. September CPI inflation was 3.5%, and the Bank projected inflation near 5% around mid-2027, largely because of energy pressures ([Bank of England decision](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/november-2026)). Higher interest rates can support sterling. An inflation shock that requires those rates can also weaken purchasing power, demand and confidence.

The US side matters just as much. On 28 October the Federal Reserve maintained a 3.75–4.00% target range, described strong activity and elevated inflation, and recorded two dissenters seeking an increase ([Federal Reserve statement](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm)). The relevant comparison is therefore not a tightening UK against an easing US. Both economies face inflation pressure.

The projected growth–inflation mix leans against a strong sterling case, although the projections are not directly interchangeable. The Bank of England projected 4.0% CPI inflation and 1.0% four-quarter GDP growth in 2027 Q4 ([November Monetary Policy Report](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/monetary-policy-report/2026/november/monetary-policy-report-november-2026.pdf)). The Federal Reserve’s September projections showed 2.3% PCE inflation and 2.4% GDP growth for 2027 ([Fed projections](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20260916.htm)). Different inflation baskets, vintages and policy assumptions prevent a mechanical comparison. I read the contrast as a modest UK disadvantage, not a decisive exchange-rate signal.

Current UK activity provides counter-evidence to a strongly bearish view. GDP grew 0.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q2 and 0.7% in Q3. Computer programming and related activity grew 4.4% in Q3, with some AI and cloud involvement that could not be precisely quantified ([ONS GDP release](https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2026)). Yet Q3 business investment rose only 0.4%, and business intelligence indicated that much increased AI spending was operational rather than capital investment ([investment release](https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/businessinvestment/julytoseptember2026provisionalresults/pdf); [Agents’ summary](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/agents-summary/2026/october-2026)). Resilience is confirmed; a broad productivity boom is not.

Other domestic signals are mixed. Businesses reported stronger price intentions without accelerating expected wages ([Decision Maker Panel](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/decision-maker-panel/2026/october-2026)). House-purchase approvals fell from 54,800 in August to 53,400 in September, below the preceding six-month average of about 58,800 ([Money and Credit](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/money-and-credit/2026/september-2026)). The underlying current-account deficit improved from 1.8% of GDP in Q1 to 1.4% in Q2, excluding precious metals, but newer trade evidence weakened the case for durable external improvement ([balance-of-payments release](https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/balanceofpayments/apriltojune2026)). These are reasons for caution, not proof of a currency decline.

## What's non-obvious
**A No forecast is not the same as a bearish sterling forecast.** The pound can remain broadly stable, or appreciate without clearing the hurdle, and still resolve No. Starting below the threshold matters even when the required rise is modest. Conversely, historical volatility makes a Yes outcome substantial enough that a confident claim that sterling cannot reach the level would be misplaced.

The second overlooked point is that a rate increase is not a standalone currency advantage. Its cause matters, as does the response abroad. Energy-driven inflation can force higher UK rates while damaging real activity. The Federal Reserve can also remain restrictive. The evidence supports a mixed policy picture, not a simple story in which higher Bank Rate automatically carries sterling above $1.35.

## Uncertainties
Energy is the largest two-sided macroeconomic uncertainty. Falling costs would improve the UK inflation–growth trade-off and weaken a central reason for caution. Persistent or renewed energy pressure would do the reverse. Relative policy surprises, fiscal confidence and global risk sentiment can also outweigh the modest starting gap.

The market evidence is incomplete. Current aggregate institutional currency-hedging changes, matched-maturity forward and interest-rate curves, cross-currency basis, and a verified net sterling buying or selling impulse were not established. These data would help distinguish policy expectations from actual positioning. Their absence does not demonstrate a lack of support for sterling.

Historical inference is limited by overlapping observations, changing regimes and data that reflect the retrieved historical vintage rather than a complete archive of initial publications. Funding-market evidence available from July does not establish November stress ([Financial Stability Report](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-report/2026/july-2026/)). Near the threshold, reference-rate timing and corrections can determine resolution. None of these uncertainties changes the saved forecast: 37.6% Yes and 62.4% No.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-16 | 38% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [Exchange rates \| Bank of England \| Database](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp)
- [Euro exchange rates charts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html)
- [Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm)
- [GDP first quarterly estimate, UK - Office for National Statistics](https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2026)
- [U.S. Dollars to U.K. Pound Sterling Spot Exchange Rate (DEXUSUK) \| FRED \| St. Louis Fed](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSUK)
- [GBP to USD rate, converter and history \| exchangerate.dev](https://exchangerate.dev/exchange-rates/gbp-usd)

## The question

This question asks whether one British pound sterling (GBP) will be worth more than 1.35 United States dollars (USD) on 31 December 2027, as measured by the GBP/USD spot exchange rate published by the Bank of England. The forecast is made as of 16 November 2026 and concerns the exchange rate on the final calendar day of 2027.

The GBP/USD exchange rate represents the number of US dollars equivalent to one British pound. For example, a rate of 1.3600 means that £1 is worth $1.36, while a rate of 1.3400 means that £1 is worth $1.34.

As of 13 November 2026, the most recent completed trading day before this question was formulated, GBP/USD was approximately 1.32, meaning the pound was trading below the proposed threshold of 1.35. During early November 2026, the exchange rate fluctuated around 1.32–1.35. The Bank of England raised its benchmark interest rate to 4.00% on 5 November 2026, amid concerns about UK inflation and economic conditions. Future movements in GBP/USD will depend on factors including monetary policy decisions by the Bank of England and US Federal Reserve, inflation, economic growth, and international financial market conditions.

The question concerns the exchange rate on 31 December 2027 specifically, rather than whether GBP/USD exceeds 1.35 at any point before that date. The primary reference will be the Bank of England's published daily spot exchange rate against sterling, available through its Interactive Statistical Database. Sources: Bank of England exchange rate database (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/rates.asp); historical GBP/USD exchange rates (https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-EXCHANGE-RATE-HISTORY.HTML). ([bankofengland.co.uk](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/rates.asp))

### How it resolves

The question resolves YES if the Bank of England's published daily GBP/USD spot exchange rate for 31 December 2027 is strictly greater than 1.3500 US dollars per British pound.

The question resolves NO if the published exchange rate is less than or equal to 1.3500 US dollars per British pound. A rate of exactly 1.3500 therefore resolves NO, while a rate of 1.3501 resolves YES.

The primary resolution source will be the Bank of England's Interactive Statistical Database, using its daily spot exchange rate for the US dollar against sterling (series XUDLUSS), expressed as USD per GBP.

If the Bank of England does not publish an exchange rate for 31 December 2027 because of a market holiday, an exceptional closure, or another reason, the most recent published daily observation preceding 31 December 2027 will be used. No observation dated after 31 December 2027 will be substituted for the target date.

The initially published rate for the relevant date will be used, without waiting for subsequent historical revisions. If that observation is subsequently corrected before resolution, the corrected figure will take precedence.

If the Bank of England's exchange rate database becomes permanently unavailable or the relevant observation cannot be retrieved, the European Central Bank's reference exchange rates will serve as the fallback source. The GBP/USD cross-rate will be calculated by dividing the ECB's USD-per-EUR reference rate by its GBP-per-EUR reference rate, using observations from the same date. The same rule concerning the most recent preceding available observation will apply.

If neither the Bank of England nor the European Central Bank provides sufficient data to determine the exchange rate, and no reliable historical record of the relevant observations can be recovered, the question will be annulled rather than assigned an arbitrary outcome.

The question will ordinarily be resolved once the relevant daily exchange rate has been published and verified, expected in early January 2028.

### Fine print

The exchange rate is measured in US dollars per one British pound (USD/GBP), not British pounds per US dollar. The measure is a wholesale market reference exchange rate, not a retail conversion rate offered by a bank, currency exchange service, or payment provider. Transaction fees, bid-ask spreads, and commissions are excluded.

The threshold is strictly greater than 1.35, not greater than or equal to 1.35. The exchange rate will be compared using the precision published by the designated source, without preliminary rounding to two decimal places.

Because the Bank of England publishes daily reference rates rather than continuous intraday prices, temporary movements above 1.35 during 31 December 2027 will not be sufficient for a YES resolution unless the designated reference observation also exceeds the threshold.

All dates refer to the UK calendar. The question is unaffected by any exchange rate movements occurring after the designated observation. If the British pound or US dollar is redenominated, replaced, or otherwise materially altered before the resolution date, the question will use any officially established conversion arrangements that preserve the economic meaning of one pre-change GBP in pre-change USD. If no reliable equivalent can be established, the question will be annulled.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
