# Will Red Sea container transits through the Suez Canal return to at least 75% of their 2023 level in any month of 2027?

> As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 94%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-17
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-12-31
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/perigee-omega-glacier/will-red-sea-container-transits-through-the-suez-canal-return-to-at-least-75-of
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/e94778e5-8a9d-4a1f-b9f4-d12e21bd05ba

## Forecast

- Yes: 94%
- No: 6%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast is **93.8% Yes and 6.2% No**. Current PortWatch data put the qualifying threshold at 437 container-ship passages in one 2027 month, against 409 passages in October 2026 ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)). The central takeaway is that a modest further recovery is enough; complete route normalization is unnecessary, and a prolonged security-driven withdrawal is the main threat.

## Context
The question measures completed container-vessel passages through Suez in both directions. It does not measure cargo tonnes, container capacity, unique ships or all commercial vessels. Only one calendar month in 2027 must reach 75% of the average 2023 month. A subsequent reversal would not undo a qualifying month, and a crossing during 2026 would not count.

As of November 17, 2026, traffic has moved close to that requirement. The latest observations extend through November 15, while named carrier announcements place further service conversions in December 2026 and early 2027. The recovery case rests on that combination of recorded passages and scheduled recurring services, rather than on a claim that the security crisis has ended ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/); [Maersk](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2026/11/16/structural-changes-ae1-ae2-ae3-gemini-trans-suez)).

## Evidence
The historical backbone shows a deep disruption followed by a slow recovery. PortWatch’s annual container-passage history is below. The 2026 entry is partial and must not be compared with complete years as though it were an annual result ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

| Year | Container passages | Coverage |
|---|---:|---|
| 2019 | 6,252 | Full year |
| 2020 | 5,728 | Full year |
| 2021 | 6,235 | Full year |
| 2022 | 6,939 | Full year |
| 2023 | 6,977 | Full year |
| 2024 | 3,198 | Full year |
| 2025 | 3,351 | Full year |
| 2026 | 3,069 | January 1–November 15 |

No month in the 34 completed months from January 2024 through October 2026 reached today’s qualifying threshold. That is evidence that low traffic can persist. It is not a reliable numerical failure rate for 2027: those months share the same crisis, and the routing decisions affecting the forecast period have changed. No sufficiently comparable set of independent recovery episodes establishes a defensible statistical base rate ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

Past returns also demonstrate reversibility. Maersk reversed its December 2023 return after an attack, and its March 1, 2026 advisory again rerouted ME11 and MECL because of escalating conflict. These cases support the security downside, but they are selected, related episodes rather than independent observations from which to calculate a failure percentage ([Maersk’s Red Sea operational updates](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2023/12/15/maersk-operations-through-red-sea-gulf-of-aden?sfmc_id=166153287&sfmc_id=273549290); [March 2026 rerouting advisory](https://www.maersk.com/~/media_sc9/maersk/Local%20information/Files/West%20Central%20Asia/Pakistan/overview/customer-advisory-re-routing-me11-and-mecl-service.pdf)).

The full monthly history supplied for the baseline and crisis years makes the recent change clearer. All entries below are container-vessel passages from the same PortWatch series; November 2026 covers only November 1–15 ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

| Month | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| January | 529 | 285 | 285 | 280 |
| February | 490 | 255 | 263 | 244 |
| March | 548 | 257 | 269 | 279 |
| April | 595 | 262 | 271 | 246 |
| May | 638 | 269 | 288 | 248 |
| June | 596 | 261 | 276 | 252 |
| July | 646 | 276 | 263 | 284 |
| August | 648 | 273 | 280 | 289 |
| September | 621 | 238 | 286 | 323 |
| October | 634 | 279 | 311 | 409 |
| November | 584 | 269 | 285 | 215, partial |
| December | 448 | 274 | 274 | Not yet observed |

The baseline calculation is decisive. The 2023 observations total 6,977 passages across 365 days, with no missing container observations. Dividing by twelve gives an average month of 581.4166667 passages. Taking 75% gives 436.0625, which rounds upward to **437 passages**. December’s lower traffic is included because the question explicitly uses the full calendar year ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

October 2026 therefore finished only 28 passages short. November’s first fifteen days recorded 215 passages, a pace corresponding to 444.33 over 31 days. That is a proximity check, not a completed monthly result or a prediction that the pace will persist. The same daily pace produces 430 passages over thirty days, so calendar length matters near the boundary ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)).

The strongest forward evidence is service-specific. Maersk’s November 16 announcement converts AE2, AE3 and AE1 to Suez in both directions. First Asian loading dates are December 4, December 20 and January 14, respectively. These are conditional operating schedules, not canal arrivals, but they provide a dated path to additional recurring passages during the forecast window ([Maersk](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2026/11/16/structural-changes-ae1-ae2-ae3-gemini-trans-suez)).

For scale, three weekly services making a canal passage in each direction generate six passages per week once fully implemented. That is about 26 passages per average month, close to October’s shortfall. This is operating arithmetic, not a guaranteed net addition. Some legs can already be using Suez, sailings can be cancelled, and partner carriers’ names can refer to the same service ([Maersk](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2026/11/16/structural-changes-ae1-ae2-ae3-gemini-trans-suez)).

There is evidence beyond schedules. The Suez Canal Authority confirmed ONE Continuity’s completed passage on November 15 and said three further Premier Alliance services were scheduled to return. One completed passage is firmer evidence than an announced intention, but it still does not establish regular operation of an entire service network ([Suez Canal Authority](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Sca_15-11-2026.aspx)).

The opposing evidence is security-specific. JMIC’s November 12 assessment retained a substantial threat rating in the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb while rating the northern Red Sea and Suez threat moderate. Its latest reporting window contained no confirmed southern-sector attacks or disruptions. That lull supports continued operations, but it does not establish safety ([JMIC](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic_advisory_update_113_12-nov.pdf)). Reporting on further Houthi territorial gains near the strait adds to reversal risk, while the EEAS has acknowledged that naval-support requests exceed available ships ([Business Recorder](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40449280); [EEAS](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-escalation-houthi-attacks-and-implications-regional-security_en)).

## What's non-obvious
The question is easier to satisfy than a headline about “returning to normal” suggests. It requires neither all-carrier restoration nor a safe and stable route throughout the year. It requires one month above a fixed vessel-count threshold. The latest recorded pace is already close, so a limited number of genuinely incremental recurring services can matter more than broad management promises. The twelve months provide time for implementation and recovery, but they are not independent chances: the same security shock can affect all of them.

The measurement distinction also cuts against easy optimism. A survey found 24 of 46 Far East–Europe services using Suez in at least one direction, representing 63% of deployed capacity. Neither statistic measures the share of historical vessel passages restored. Larger ships can restore capacity without restoring counts, and one-way returns contribute less than two-way returns ([CLECAT’s account of Alphaliner](https://www.clecat.org/en/news/newsletters/alphaliner-63-of-far-easteurope-container-capacity)). Likewise, services calling at Red Sea ports can remain south of the canal and add no Suez passages at all ([MSC Zephyr route description](https://container-news.com/msc-expands-zephyr-service-into-red-sea/)). The forecast’s strength comes from the actual count gap, not from substituting these broader recovery indicators.

## Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is a correlated carrier retreat. Renewed attacks, broader targeting, unavailable escorts or insurance restrictions can affect several services together. Current November containership insurance quotations were not established, so dated premiums do not justify a claim that present coverage is either cheap or universally unavailable. The most useful operational confirmation would be repeated completed passages in both directions after the announced service conversions.

The net pipeline is also uncertain. Loading dates precede canal arrivals, directional rollouts can be staggered, and announced services can overlap with passages already present in the recent traffic count. Complete service-level schedules and subsequent passage records would distinguish gross announcements from genuine additions.

Finally, source consistency matters. PortWatch records 6,977 container passages in 2023, while the canal authority’s annual report records 5,847. The precise classification or detection explanation remains unresolved. PortWatch takes precedence when sufficiently complete, so the lower authority count must not be combined with a PortWatch comparison year ([PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/); [Suez Canal Authority annual report](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2024.pdf)). AIS-off operations and methodological revisions add uncertainty to recorded counts, even when daily coverage is complete ([MARAD](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-013-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks); [PortWatch methodology](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/data-and-methodology)). These are reasons to preserve the downside and apply consistent data at resolution, not reasons to replace the saved forecast.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-17 | 94% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [PortWatch](https://portwatch.imf.org/)
- [Gemini AE1, AE2 & AE3 Trans-Suez Route \| Maersk](https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2026/11/16/structural-changes-ae1-ae2-ae3-gemini-trans-suez)
- [SCA - ONE returns to the Suez Canal](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Sca_15-11-2026.aspx)
- [Microsoft Word - JMIC_Advisory_Update_113_FINAL](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic_advisory_update_113_12-nov.pdf)
- [Houthis seize ground on Yemen’s southern coast - World - Business Recorder](https://www.brecorder.com/news/40449280)
- [Statement on the Escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security \| EEAS](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-escalation-houthi-attacks-and-implications-regional-security_en)
- [CLECAT \| ALPHALINER: 63% OF FAR EAST–EUROPE CONTAINER CAPACITY RETURNS TO SUEZ ROUTE](https://www.clecat.org/en/news/newsletters/alphaliner-63-of-far-easteurope-container-capacity)
- [MSC expands Zephyr service into Red Sea - Container News](https://container-news.com/msc-expands-zephyr-service-into-red-sea)
- [2026-013-Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin-Houthi Attacks on Commercial Vessels \| MARAD](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-013-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks)
- [Drewry - Service Expertise - Red Sea Diversion Tracker - 17 Nov](https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/red-sea-diversion-tracker)

## The question

This question asks whether monthly container-ship traffic through Egypt's Suez Canal will recover to at least 75% of its average monthly level in calendar year 2023 during any single calendar month from January 1 through December 31, 2027. The question is global in scope and measures container-vessel transits in both directions through the Suez Canal, rather than container cargo volumes or total commercial shipping traffic. The baseline is the average monthly number of container-ship transits during the full 2023 calendar year, including December 2023, when disruptions had already begun. The 75% threshold will be calculated from this baseline and applied consistently to all twelve months of 2027. The Red Sea shipping crisis began in late 2023, when attacks on commercial vessels by Yemen's Houthi movement prompted major shipping companies to reroute services around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that container ships accounted for approximately 43% of Suez Canal vessel transits in 2023 and documented a substantial reduction in shipping traffic following the attacks. According to the Suez Canal Authority, total vessel transits declined from more than 26,000 in 2023 to approximately 13,213 in 2024. During 2026, some container-shipping services began returning to the Suez route, although traffic remained below pre-crisis levels. IMF PortWatch data indicate that overall Suez Canal traffic averaged approximately 43 vessel transits per day in October 2026, compared with approximately 74 per day during 2023. Container-specific traffic has recovered more slowly than overall vessel traffic, and renewed security incidents continue to affect routing decisions. The forecast, made on November 17, 2026, concerns whether the recovery will be sufficiently strong for container-ship transits to reach at least three-quarters of their 2023 average monthly level in at least one month of 2027. Background sources include UNCTAD's Review of Maritime Transport 2024, IMF PortWatch's shipping transit data, and Suez Canal Authority statistics. Sources: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2024_en.pdf and https://portwatch.imf.org/ .

### How it resolves

The question resolves YES if, for at least one calendar month between January 1 and December 31, 2027, inclusive, the number of container-ship transits through the Suez Canal equals or exceeds 75% of the average monthly number of container-ship transits recorded during calendar year 2023. The primary resolution source will be the International Monetary Fund's PortWatch database, specifically its daily maritime chokepoint transit data for the Suez Canal, filtered to the container-ship vessel category. The 2023 baseline will be calculated by summing all container-ship transits recorded between January 1 and December 31, 2023, inclusive, and dividing that total by 12. The threshold will equal 0.75 multiplied by this average. For each month in 2027, the number of container-ship transits will be calculated by summing the daily container-ship transit counts reported by PortWatch for that calendar month. Because vessel transits are integer counts, the threshold will be rounded upward to the next whole transit when necessary. The question resolves YES if any one of the twelve monthly totals meets or exceeds this threshold. It resolves NO if all twelve monthly totals fall below the threshold. Both northbound and southbound transits count. Each completed canal passage counts as one transit, regardless of vessel size, container capacity, cargo load, or ownership. Only vessels classified as container ships in the source data count; tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo ships, and other vessel categories are excluded. The same PortWatch dataset and vessel classification methodology must be used for the 2023 baseline and the 2027 comparison whenever possible. Data will be evaluated after the full 2027 calendar year has ended, allowing until March 31, 2028, for the publication or correction of the necessary observations. If PortWatch becomes unavailable, ceases reporting the relevant vessel category, or contains substantial missing observations, official Suez Canal Authority container-vessel transit statistics may be used as a fallback, provided that comparable monthly or annual data are available for both 2023 and 2027. The fallback must use the same definition of container-ship transits for both periods. If the primary and fallback sources disagree, PortWatch takes precedence when its data are sufficiently complete and internally consistent. If neither source provides sufficient comparable data to determine whether any month crossed the threshold by March 31, 2028, the question will be annulled rather than assigned an unsupported YES or NO outcome. Source: https://portwatch.imf.org/ .

### Fine print

The term 'return' refers exclusively to the recovery of recorded container-vessel transit counts relative to the 2023 baseline. It does not require a return to pre-crisis security conditions, normal shipping schedules, freight rates, cargo tonnage, or container throughput measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). The question concerns vessel counts, not the carrying capacity of those vessels. The comparison uses the average calendar month of 2023 rather than the corresponding month of 2023, so seasonal differences in shipping traffic do not change the threshold. A single qualifying month is sufficient for YES; the recovery need not persist into subsequent months. Months are defined using UTC calendar dates, consistent with the timestamps in the primary dataset. A ship transiting the canal multiple times during a month contributes one count for each separately recorded completed passage. A temporary canal closure, renewed regional conflict, shipping diversion, or other disruption does not annul the question if comparable transit data remain available; such events affect the observed outcome. Any methodological revisions affecting the historical baseline and 2027 observations should be applied consistently. Published data should be evaluated using the most recent internally consistent release available by the resolution deadline. Later revisions will not ordinarily reopen the resolution.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
