# Will a UK law banning ransomware payments by public sector bodies be in force by 31 December 2027?

> As of 18 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 18%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-18
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-12-31
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/sample-thermal-asteroid/will-a-uk-law-banning-ransomware-payments-by-public-sector-bodies-be-in-force-by
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/5616dc90-b1d8-415b-8934-de7ea8f8a52a

## Forecast

- Yes: 18%
- No: 82%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
Probability of Yes: 18%. Probability of No: 82%. The decisive issue is whether an express ban covering a substantial class of public bodies is legally in force on 31 December 2027, not whether Parliament has passed one.

## Context
As of 18 November 2026, the Home Office was still developing its proposal to ban ransomware payments by public bodies and regulated critical infrastructure operators. The proposal had drawn broad support in consultation, but the latest direct ministerial update on the legislative route said none had been confirmed. The government had not committed to a timetable in its [September Lords update](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2026-09-07/debates/1032000D-B0E8-4AC3-B618-61FCAE6BF4B4/FinancialServicesAndMarketsBill%28HL%29) or the [follow-up letter](https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2026-0594/2026-09-18_-_07.09_TLM_Commitment_to_Baroness_Bennet.pdf).

The test is narrower than the original proposal in one sense and stricter in another. A Westminster measure covering a substantial class beyond central departments, such as English NHS trusts, can qualify even with limited emergency exceptions. But it must expressly prohibit direct or indirect payments and remain operative at 23:59 UK time on 31 December 2027. Administrative restrictions, reporting duties, and [sanctions limited to designated recipients](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware) do not meet that test.

## Evidence
The historical record separates getting a bill through Parliament from getting a policy into force. In the 2024–26 session, 54 of 63 introduced government bills received Royal Assent by session end. Among 29 non-hybrid bills in the previous King’s Speech programme with recorded assent, the median interval from first reading to assent was 295 days. That is a useful scheduling benchmark, not a passage rate for an individual proposal that has no confirmed bill. It also stops the clock at assent, before the event this question measures. ([House of Commons Library legislative review](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10314/))

Commencement can add substantial time. The main telecoms security duties took 318 days after assent to commence, and the connected-product security requirements took 510 days. Those are selected comparisons, not a representative sample. The faster cases show what it takes to beat that pace: the distinct National Security (State Threats) Act took 29 days from introduction to assent and commenced on assent, while the original Network and Information Systems Regulations took 101 days from consultation response to commencement with an existing legal route and a fixed EU deadline. The [government’s legislative guide](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guide-to-making-legislation/guide-to-making-legislation-html--2) normally allows at least two months between assent and substantive commencement, but there are exceptions. The question leaves 408 calendar days from the forecast date, so both legislative scheduling and implementation matter. ([Telecoms security provisions](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/31/notes/division/11/index.htm); [connected-product security materials](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2022/74/pdfs/ukia_20220074_en.pdf?utm_source=openai); [State Threats Act stages](https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/4140/stages); [NIS consultation](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-the-security-of-network-and-information-systems-directive))

The policy has support, but the timeline shows little public progress toward statutory text. The Home Office consulted from 14 January to 8 April 2025. Its 22 July response found 72% support and 23% opposition among the 231 respondents who answered the targeted-ban question. On an exemptions process, 43% were in favour and 40% were against among 229 respondents. Those are self-selected stakeholder views, not a measure of legislative readiness. In December 2025 the [Home Office said no final decision had been made](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-12-04/HL12700/). In January 2026, [Security Minister Dan Jarvis told a committee](https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/17086/pdf/) the government would legislate when parliamentary time allowed. On 7 September ministers said work continued. The 16 September letter then confirmed there was no agreed vehicle. That letter is the strongest evidence against a quick start: it addresses the route to law directly. ([Home Office consultation response](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ransomware-proposals-to-increase-incident-reporting-and-reduce-payments-to-criminals/outcome/government-response-to-ransomware-legislative-proposals-reducing-payments-to-cyber-criminals-and-increasing-incident-reporting-accessible); [September Lords debate](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2026-09-07/debates/1032000D-B0E8-4AC3-B618-61FCAE6BF4B4/FinancialServicesAndMarketsBill%28HL%29); [ministerial letter](https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2026-0594/2026-09-18_-_07.09_TLM_Commitment_to_Baroness_Bennet.pdf))

The forthcoming National Security Bill is the strongest named candidate for primary legislation. The [King’s Speech briefing](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a18713db95db968c8f3bbfd/The_King_s_Speech_2026_-_background_briefing_notes.pdf) and the [Home Secretary’s October statement](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2026-10-12/debates/BAD9E091-76DE-478A-AD67-00B68C6E7FEE/NationalSecurity) point to cybercrime reform, but neither commits to a payment ban. The [July techUK briefing notice](https://www.techuk.org/events/uk-government-ransomware-proposals-techuk-member-update) connects the ransomware package to that bill without identifying which measures would go in it. The later September letter makes it hard to read that notice as confirmation. A package that advances incident reporting but leaves out payment restrictions would not qualify.

The existing Cyber Security and Resilience Bill offers a different route. Neither the [26 October bill text](https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/68323/documents/8979) nor the [3 November Lords amendments](https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/68323/documents/8980) contains an express payment ban. The bill was already at the stage of considering Lords amendments, where adding a freestanding prohibition would be difficult. Clauses 29–30 offer a conceivable route to an instrument prohibiting specified actions tied to essential-system security. [English NHS trusts and foundation trusts](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/506/schedules/2026-09-30) are already within the relevant regime. But a payment rule would need a sound statutory basis, consultation, approval in both Houses and its own commencement. No draft payment instrument or ministerial commitment to one had been identified by the cutoff.

## What's non-obvious
The advanced cyber bill is not evidence that the ban is nearly law. Its most plausible contribution is an indirect one: giving ministers a route to a narrower rule without a second Act. The best signal on whether ministers intend to use it that way points elsewhere. In his [2 November parliamentary answer](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-10-26/37829), Ian Murray described requirements aligned with the Cyber Assessment Framework and focused on technical and operational outcomes. That weakens the case for an early payment instrument; it does not settle what the powers could lawfully support.

The reverse distinction matters too: a policy can look like a ban and still not count. The [Academy Trust Handbook](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academy-trust-handbook) already barred cyber ransoms in its 2025 version and extended the wording to ransom and extortion payments from 1 October 2026. That is a funding-agreement condition, not a statutory prohibition. A narrower rule can therefore cut either way for this forecast. Enacted as an operative statutory ban for English NHS trusts, it could deliver Yes. Adopted as a funding or administrative policy, it would leave the answer No.

## Uncertainties
The public record does not show how far private drafting has progressed, whether ministers have settled the scope and exceptions, or whether parliamentary time will be allocated. It also does not establish that the delegated cyber powers would support a payment prohibition. A published government-backed clause or draft statutory instrument would answer more than another policy announcement, especially if it names the covered bodies and sets a short, fixed commencement period.

Even if Parliament passes a qualifying ban in 2027, the remaining question is when the substantive duty starts. If commencement is phased, the provisions actually in force must cover a substantial class of public bodies; starting reporting duties alone is not enough. The final check is the statutory text and, where required, the [official commencement record](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/). A provision that starts only after the deadline, or is no longer legally operative at it, does not qualify.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-18 | 18% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [Financial Services and Markets Bill \[HL\] - Hansard - UK Parliament](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2026-09-07/debates/1032000D-B0E8-4AC3-B618-61FCAE6BF4B4/FinancialServicesAndMarketsBill%28HL%29)
- [2026-09-18_-_07.09_TLM_Commitment_to_Baroness_Bennet PDF](https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2026-0594/2026-09-18_-_07.09_TLM_Commitment_to_Baroness_Bennet.pdf)
- [sanctions limited to designated recipients](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware)
- [2024 King's Speech: progress of legislation - House of Commons Library](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10314)
- [Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/31/notes/division/11/index.htm)
- [National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 Stages - Parliamentary Bills - UK Parliament](https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/4140/stages)
- [Home Office said no final decision had been made](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-12-04/HL12700)
- [Security Minister Dan Jarvis told a committee](https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/17086/pdf)
- [CORRECTED CLEAN 27 May FINAL Embargoed Lobby Pack 2026](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a18713db95db968c8f3bbfd/The_King_s_Speech_2026_-_background_briefing_notes.pdf)
- [UK government ransomware proposals: techUK member update \| techUK](https://www.techuk.org/events/uk-government-ransomware-proposals-techuk-member-update)

## The question

This question asks whether the United Kingdom will have brought into force, by 31 December 2027, legislation that legally prohibits public sector bodies from making ransomware payments to cybercriminals. The prohibition must be legally binding and operational by the deadline, rather than merely proposed, announced, or enacted with a future commencement date.

On 14 January 2025, the UK Home Office launched a public consultation on legislative proposals to combat ransomware. One central proposal was a targeted prohibition on ransomware payments by all public sector bodies, including central government, local authorities, and public institutions, alongside owners and operators of regulated critical national infrastructure. The objective was to undermine the ransomware business model by making essential public services less attractive targets for cybercriminals.

Following the consultation, which closed on 8 April 2025, the government published its response on 22 July 2025. It reported broad support for the targeted ban but identified unresolved questions concerning the organisations covered, potential exemptions, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties. The government committed to developing the proposals further rather than immediately introducing legislation. Source: UK Home Office, Government response to ransomware legislative proposals, July 2025. ([gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ransomware-proposals-to-increase-incident-reporting-and-reduce-payments-to-criminals/outcome/government-response-to-ransomware-legislative-proposals-reducing-payments-to-cyber-criminals-and-increasing-incident-reporting-accessible))

On 17 December 2025, the Home Office confirmed in a parliamentary answer that no final decision had been made on the proposed ban and that the government was continuing to consider the appropriate policy approach. A House of Commons Library research briefing dated 22 May 2026 also described the ransomware payment ban as a separate legislative proposal still under development. During a House of Lords debate on 7 September 2026, the government reiterated that work on the proposals was continuing. ([questions-statements.parliament.uk](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-12-04/HL12700/))

As of 18 November 2026, the available evidence indicates that the proposed general statutory prohibition on ransomware payments by public sector bodies has not yet entered into force. Existing government policies discouraging or restricting ransomware payments, and financial sanctions prohibiting payments to designated entities, are distinct from the proposed statutory ban. ([gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware/financial-sanctions-guidance-for-ransomware))

The forecast period runs from 18 November 2026 through 31 December 2027, inclusive. The question concerns whether a qualifying prohibition becomes legally effective during this period, regardless of when the legislation was introduced or received Royal Assent.

### How it resolves

The question resolves YES if, by 23:59 UK local time on 31 December 2027, at least one legally binding provision of UK primary or secondary legislation has commenced and prohibits ransomware payments by public sector bodies as a defined category of organisations.

To qualify, the legislation must explicitly prohibit making payments, directly or indirectly, in response to ransomware attacks or associated cyber extortion demands. The prohibition must cover public sector bodies beyond central government departments alone, such as local authorities, NHS bodies, or other public authorities. It need not cover every public sector organisation without exception, provided it establishes a general statutory prohibition applicable to a substantial category of public sector bodies.

The legislation may form part of a dedicated ransomware law, broader cybersecurity legislation, criminal justice legislation, or another Act or statutory instrument. The legislative vehicle and the precise form of enforcement are immaterial, provided the prohibition is legally binding and in force by the deadline.

The question resolves NO if, by the deadline, no qualifying statutory prohibition has entered into force. This includes circumstances where legislation has been proposed, consulted upon, introduced into Parliament, passed by Parliament, or received Royal Assent but the relevant prohibition has not yet commenced. It also resolves NO if the government adopts only voluntary guidance, administrative policies, reporting requirements, payment notification procedures, or restrictions that do not establish a general legal prohibition on ransomware payments by public sector bodies.

Resolution will primarily rely on the official UK legislation database, legislation.gov.uk, including the text of relevant Acts, statutory instruments, commencement regulations, and their recorded commencement dates. Official UK Parliament records, including parliamentary bills, explanatory notes, and Hansard, will be used to establish legislative intent and clarify ambiguities. Home Office and other UK government publications may provide supplementary evidence about implementation and commencement.

If a qualifying provision has legally commenced by the deadline but the official legislation database has not yet been updated, an authoritative commencement instrument or other official legal record demonstrating that the provision was in force by 31 December 2027 will suffice for a YES resolution. The assessment will be based on the legal position as of the deadline, even if confirmation becomes available later.

If no qualifying provision can be established after a reasonable period for publication and verification of official records, the question resolves NO rather than being annulled.

### Fine print

For the purposes of this question, ransomware payments include monetary payments, cryptocurrency transfers, and other transfers of economic value made to attackers or their intermediaries to obtain decryption keys, restore access to systems, prevent disclosure of stolen data, or otherwise satisfy demands arising from ransomware attacks.

A prohibition may contain limited exceptions, such as those authorised for national security, public safety, or other exceptional circumstances, without disqualifying it from a YES resolution. However, the legislation must establish a general rule against making such payments rather than simply requiring notification, consultation, or prior authorisation while otherwise permitting payments routinely.

Legislation that only prohibits ransomware payments to sanctioned individuals, designated terrorist organisations, or other specifically prohibited recipients does not qualify because it does not establish a general prohibition on ransomware payments by public sector bodies.

Existing restrictions applying solely to central government departments do not qualify unless new legislation extends the prohibition to a broader class of public sector organisations.

A prohibition limited exclusively to private-sector critical infrastructure operators does not qualify. Conversely, legislation covering both public sector bodies and private-sector critical infrastructure operators qualifies if its public-sector provisions satisfy the criteria.

A partial or phased commencement qualifies only if the provisions actually in force by the deadline establish a substantive prohibition covering a substantial category of public sector bodies. Commencement of unrelated provisions, such as incident reporting requirements, does not qualify.

If qualifying legislation enters into force before the deadline but is subsequently repealed, suspended, or rendered legally inoperative before 31 December 2027, the question resolves NO. The prohibition must remain legally operative at the deadline.

The geographical scope is the United Kingdom. Legislation enacted by the UK Parliament that applies only to England, or to England and Wales, may qualify if it otherwise establishes the required prohibition. Legislation applying exclusively to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland through devolved legislation does not qualify unless equivalent prohibitions are also in force across a substantial part of the wider UK public sector.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
