# What will the spread between French and German 10-year government bond yields be at the close on 31 December 2027, in basis points?

> As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia’s median forecast is 143, with an 80% chance it falls between 87.5 and 240.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-17
- Question type: Number
- Resolves: 2028-01-07
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/stratus-fulcrum-outlier/what-will-the-spread-between-french-and-german-10-year-government-bond-yields-be
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/43e215cd-b10a-46ad-8345-37eb4db37ed4

## Forecast

- 10th percentile: 87.5
- Median: 143
- 90th percentile: 240

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast for the close on 31 December 2027 is a median of 142.5 basis points, with a 10th percentile of 87.5 basis points and a 90th percentile of 240 basis points. Plan around a persistently large French risk premium, not a return to the old low-spread regime. The central case is modest narrowing; the main adverse risk is lasting political gridlock that undermines fiscal adjustment.

## Context
The spread measures the French nominal benchmark government-bond yield minus the German equivalent. The [reported reading of 156.3 basis points on 17 November 2026](https://www.ideal-investisseur.fr/en/markets/oat-bund-spread.html) places the market in a stressed state. France’s fiscal outlook explains much of that premium, but a stressed starting price also leaves room for relief if political uncertainty recedes.

The target is the closing spread at the end of the forecast period, not its annual average or intrayear peak. Comparable observations from the same provider and date govern resolution. The benchmark can change as securities are issued, and the preceding common trading date applies if the target-date observations are unavailable. These conventions matter because historical monthly averages and interpolated constant-maturity yields are useful context, but are not identical to the resolving benchmark closes.

## Evidence
The historical backbone argues against both complacency and straight-line extrapolation. French spreads have occupied distinct regimes rather than fluctuating around one stable long-run level. The historical summaries below use monthly convergence yields, not daily benchmark closes ([ECB long-term interest-rate statistics](https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/IRS?advFilterDataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&dataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&layerType=AL&page=0&showDatasetModal=false)).

| Historical period | Mean spread, basis points | Maximum, basis points |
|---|---:|---:|
| 1999–2007 | 8.6 | 17 |
| 2008–2009 | 33.9 | 63 |
| 2010–2012 | 70.9 | 154 |
| 2013–2019 | 44.6 | 77 |
| 2020–May 2024 | 47.1 | 65.7 |
| June 2024–October 2026 | 77.8 | 147.4 |

The closest French high-spread analogue is the sovereign-debt crisis. The monthly spread reached [154 basis points in November 2011 and fell to 71 basis points in December 2012](https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/IRS?advFilterDataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&dataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&layerType=AL&page=0&showDatasetModal=false). That establishes that substantial compression is possible. It does not establish a reliable frequency: the completed historical observations starting above 100 basis points mostly trace the same crisis and recovery. **One normalization episode is not a robust base rate.**

The recent deterioration also has a clear sequence. The supplied monthly observations show an initial repricing, incomplete relief, and then a much sharper widening. The table lists the available observations for that sequence; gaps are not interpolated ([ECB monthly yield history](https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/IRS?advFilterDataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&dataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&layerType=AL&page=0&showDatasetModal=false)).

| Observation | Spread, basis points |
|---|---:|
| May 2024 | 51.2 |
| June 2024 | 66.6 |
| December 2024 | 83.2 |
| January 2025 | 83.6 |
| December 2025 | 74.7 |
| February 2026 | 65.6 |
| June 2026 | 71.6 |
| July 2026 | 78.0 |
| August 2026 | 81.5 |
| September 2026 | 96.7 |
| October 2026 | 147.4 |

October’s move reflected both legs: the French monthly-average yield rose while Germany’s fell. That is evidence of relative sovereign-risk repricing, not simply a common increase in euro interest rates. It also explains why calm-period volatility understates the uncertainty now facing investors ([ECB yield data](https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/IRS?advFilterDataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&dataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&layerType=AL&page=0&showDatasetModal=false)).

The current daily evidence corroborates the elevated starting level without establishing an exact resolving-methodology close. The Banque de France reports [TEC10 of 4.9130% on 17 November 2026](https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/statistiques/taux-et-cours/indices-obligataires-2026-11-17). TEC10 is interpolated, whereas the [Bundesbank’s current federal-security series](https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/money-and-capital-markets/interest-rates-and-yields/daily-yields-of-current-federal-securities-772220) references a benchmark security. Their agreement with the approximate published spread is reassuring, but methodological differences prevent treating them as a synchronized benchmark closing pair.

France’s fiscal position is the strongest reason not to expect full normalization. The European Commission’s projections show only limited near-term deficit improvement, rising debt, and a growing interest burden. These are projections, not realized outcomes, and already incorporate substantial draft-budget adjustment ([Commission forecast for France](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/france/economic-forecast-france_en)).

| Commission projection | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Deficit, % of GDP | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.7 |
| Government debt, % of GDP | 119.2 | 122.1 | 123.2 |
| Real GDP growth, % | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.4 |
| Interest expenditure, % of GDP | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.3 |

The implication is unfavorable even if planned measures take effect. Failed implementation would weaken an already fragile baseline. The [Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques](https://www.hcfp.fr/liste-avis/avis-ndeg2026-5-lois-de-finances-2027) also questions the government’s growth assumptions and stresses execution risk.

Politics determines whether those measures survive. The Assembly rejected the amended budget revenue section by [0 votes for, 458 against and 2 abstentions](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/scrutins/9759). That confirms difficulty assembling support, not permanent inability to pass a budget. A presidential election does not automatically create a parliamentary majority; the [constitutional framework](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000571356) leaves several routes to budget passage or continued conflict. For the terminal spread, the credibility of the subsequent budget matters more than election-night relief alone.

Germany supplies a counterweight. The Commission projects its deficit rising from [4.1% of GDP in 2026 to 4.4% in 2027, and debt from 64.3% to 66.3%](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/germany/economic-forecast-germany_en). Higher borrowing can reduce Bund scarcity and put upward pressure on German yields. I read this as a route to spread compression without a matching improvement in French creditworthiness, not as evidence that the fiscal gap has disappeared.

Market evidence also leaves room for partial normalization. ICE reported an October cash spread of [164 basis points against a matched-tenor credit-default-swap differential of 110 basis points](https://www.ice.com/fixed-income-data-services/fixed-income/ice-fixed-income-monthly-report). The difference suggests that cash-market pricing contains more than credit risk alone. It is not an amount to subtract mechanically: liquidity, financing and instrument differences matter, while the credit differential itself had also risen.

Financing access remains functional. France’s [5 November auction raised €11.999 billion within the announced €10–12 billion range](https://www.aft.gouv.fr/fr/publications/communiques-presse/05-novembre-2026-emission-oat). That demonstrates demand at the prevailing price, not immunity from future stress. Reports of individual foreign sellers likewise do not establish a wholesale investor exit. The available repo, collateral and ownership evidence does not establish a current forced-selling mechanism.

Finally, the [ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2022/html/ecb.pr220721~973e6e7273.en.html) addresses unwarranted, disorderly disruption to monetary transmission, subject to fiscal and sustainability assessments. It provides neither automatic exclusion for France nor unconditional insurance. **There is no numerical ECB spread ceiling.** This supports retaining a substantial adverse tail rather than treating institutional protection as a hard bound.

## What's non-obvious
Bad fiscal news does not automatically mean further widening from an already stressed price. The relevant question is whether fiscal and political outcomes disappoint what investors already demand compensation for. Conversely, an election-related rally does not prove debt sustainability has improved. Temporary relief and a persistently elevated terminal premium fit together.

The spread also measures two moving yields. More German issuance can narrow it even while French borrowing costs remain high. And a severe sell-off during the electoral period need not survive until the terminal close. These distinctions explain the combination of modest central compression and a wide, asymmetric uncertainty range: the forecast neither extrapolates the latest widening nor assumes a full crisis reversal.

## Uncertainties
The largest gap is political delivery. The eventual parliamentary arrangement, enacted consolidation and credibility of the next budget remain unknown. A durable governing agreement and independently assessed fiscal measures would clarify the case for compression; repeated reversals would strengthen the case for persistence or widening.

Market-positioning evidence is incomplete. Current matched-tenor financing-adjusted pricing differences, aggregate short positions, repo specialness and autumn investor flows were not established. Better evidence here would help separate reversible technical pressure from a lasting change in required compensation. The absence of those data is not evidence that pressure is absent.

The fiscal baseline also has timing limits. The Commission forecast’s information cutoff preceded the parliamentary rejection, despite its later publication. Energy and inflation shocks, German supply absorption and shifts in safe-haven demand add uncertainty to both yields. Whether renewed stress qualifies for ECB action remains a policy judgment, not a known trigger.

Measurement uncertainty is smaller but real. A synchronized current closing pair under the preferred resolution methodology was not verified. At resolution, provider-designated closes, benchmark changes, common-date availability and year-end liquidity will determine the observation. These issues do not overturn the economic assessment, but they reinforce why the terminal result should not be treated as mechanically predictable.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-17 | Median 143, 80% range 87.5 to 240 |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [OAT / Bund spread today: 156.3 bps as of Nov 17, 2026](https://www.ideal-investisseur.fr/en/markets/oat-bund-spread.html)
- [IRS \| ECB Data Portal](https://data.ecb.europa.eu/data/datasets/IRS?advFilterDataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&dataset%5B0%5D=Long-term+interest+rate+statistics+%28IRS%29&layerType=AL&page=0&showDatasetModal=false)
- [Indices obligataires - 2026-11-17 \| Banque de France](https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/statistiques/taux-et-cours/indices-obligataires-2026-11-17)
- [Daily yields of current Federal securities \| Deutsche Bundesbank](https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/money-and-capital-markets/interest-rates-and-yields/daily-yields-of-current-federal-securities-772220)
- [Economic forecast for France - Economy and Finance - European Commission](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/france/economic-forecast-france_en)
- [Avis n°2026 – 5 Lois de finances 2027 \| Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques](https://www.hcfp.fr/liste-avis/avis-ndeg2026-5-lois-de-finances-2027)
- [Analyse du scrutin n°9759 - 17e législature - Assemblée nationale](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/scrutins/9759)
- [Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 - Légifrance](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000571356)
- [ICE Fixed Income Monthly Report](https://www.ice.com/fixed-income-data-services/fixed-income/ice-fixed-income-monthly-report)
- [05/11/2026 : Émission de l'AFT : 11,999 milliards d’euros d’OAT long terme \| Agence France Trésor](https://www.aft.gouv.fr/fr/publications/communiques-presse/05-novembre-2026-emission-oat)

## The question

This question asks for the yield spread, expressed in basis points, between French and German 10-year government bonds at the close of trading on Friday, 31 December 2027. The spread is defined as the French 10-year government bond yield minus the German 10-year government bond yield, multiplied by 100 when both yields are expressed as percentages. A positive spread means French government bonds yield more than German government bonds; a negative spread means German government bonds yield more. One basis point equals 0.01 percentage points. The question concerns nominal, euro-denominated sovereign debt, using benchmark 10-year yields rather than yields on inflation-linked bonds or monthly averages. As of 17 November 2026, the French-German 10-year sovereign yield spread is approximately 150–160 basis points, with one market data provider reporting 156.3 basis points on that date. The spread has widened substantially since 2024, reflecting concerns about French fiscal sustainability, government debt, political uncertainty, and differences in perceived sovereign credit risk. In October 2026, the spread reached levels not seen since the euro-area sovereign debt crisis of 2011. Research published by ING in November 2026 highlights continued uncertainty surrounding France's fiscal outlook and the 2027 electoral cycle. The outcome will depend on developments in French and German fiscal policy, sovereign creditworthiness, European Central Bank monetary policy, market liquidity, and investor risk perceptions through the end of 2027. The forecast concerns the spread at the end of 2027, not the average spread during the year or the maximum spread reached before that date. Background sources include the Banque de France, Deutsche Bundesbank, ING's November 2026 rates outlook, and contemporary sovereign bond market data. ([ideal-investisseur.fr](https://www.ideal-investisseur.fr/en/markets/oat-bund-spread.html))

### How it resolves

The question will resolve to the difference between the French and German nominal 10-year benchmark government bond yields at the close of the final applicable trading session on 31 December 2027, expressed in basis points. The calculation is: Spread (basis points) = 100 × [French 10-year yield (%) − German 10-year yield (%)]. The preferred measurement is the closing yield on the benchmark French 10-year Obligation Assimilable du Trésor (OAT) minus the closing yield on the benchmark German 10-year Bund, using a consistent market data provider and observation methodology for both countries. Bloomberg will be the preferred source for the two benchmark yields, using its generic 10-year sovereign government bond yield series for France and Germany, subject to availability. Refinitiv/LSEG will be the first fallback source if consistent Bloomberg closing observations are unavailable. If neither provides comparable values, publicly available daily yield data from the Banque de France and Deutsche Bundesbank will be considered, provided they measure sufficiently comparable 10-year nominal sovereign yields. The Banque de France publishes daily French 10-year constant-maturity government bond yields (TEC10), while the Bundesbank publishes daily yields for German federal government securities, including the current 10-year federal bond. These official series are potential fallbacks, although differences in methodology must be considered. If the relevant benchmark markets are open on 31 December 2027 and comparable closing yields are available for both countries, those values will be used. If either market is closed or comparable closing observations are unavailable on that date, the most recent preceding trading date for which both countries have comparable observations from the same source will be used. Both yields must refer to the same observation date. The spread will be calculated from the most precise available published yields and rounded to one decimal place in basis points. The outcome may be negative, zero, or positive. The question will be annulled only if comparable benchmark yields cannot be established from the specified sources or reasonable equivalent sources, or if extraordinary institutional changes make the French-German 10-year sovereign yield spread fundamentally undefined. Ordinary market volatility, changes in sovereign credit ratings, and temporary disruptions will not themselves justify annulment. ([webstat.banque-france.fr](https://webstat.banque-france.fr/en/catalog/fm/))

### Fine print

The target date is 31 December 2027, using the European market calendar and local European trading conventions. Euronext's published 2027 calendar identifies 31 December 2027 as a half-trading day for relevant cash and derivatives markets, although this does not conclusively establish trading hours or closing conventions for the over-the-counter sovereign bond market. The resolution will therefore use the closing observation designated by the selected market data provider rather than an independently specified clock time. If the provider does not publish a closing observation on that date, the common preceding trading-date rule will apply. Benchmark bonds may change during the forecast period as new sovereign securities are issued. The applicable benchmark will be the security or constant-maturity reference designated by the selected data provider at the resolution date, rather than a specific bond selected in November 2026. This avoids distortions caused by the aging of individual securities. The calculation will use nominal yields to maturity, not bond prices, credit default swap spreads, yield changes, or inflation-adjusted yields. The French yield will always be subtracted from neither series: the spread is explicitly French yield minus German yield. For example, a French yield of 4.80% and a German yield of 3.30% would produce a spread of +150 basis points. The suggested forecasting range of 0–500 basis points is intended to encompass a broad set of plausible outcomes rather than impose a hard limit. Negative spreads and spreads exceeding 500 basis points remain theoretically possible. The actual result will not be capped at either bound. Data corrections published by the selected provider within 30 calendar days of the target date will be incorporated before final resolution; later revisions will not ordinarily change the result. ([euronext.com](https://www.euronext.com/en/trading/trading-hours-holidays?trk=public_post_comment-text))

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
