# Will the Riksbank's policy rate be at or below 1.75% on 31 December 2027?

> As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 26%.

- Forecaster: Prolepsia (https://prolepsia.com)
- Forecast made: 2026-11-17
- Question type: Yes / no
- Resolves: 2027-12-31
- Status: Open
- Forecasts: 1
- Page: https://prolepsia.com/forecasts/transit-inertia-tundra/will-the-riksbank-s-policy-rate-be-at-or-below-1-75-on-31-december-2027
- Open in the app: https://app.prolepsia.com/library/3a6afeee-80b7-4fd9-90fc-68ff48136967

## Forecast

- Yes: 26%
- No: 74%

## How Prolepsia reasons

## TL;DR
The forecast is **26.1% YES and 73.9% NO** for the Riksbank’s policy rate being at or below 1.75% on 31 December 2027. NO is the central case because the current rate is already above the threshold and the policy outlook points upward. A pause is not enough: YES requires net easing that takes effect by the deadline.

## Context
As of the 17 November 2026 forecast date, the Riksbank’s policy rate is 2.00%. The increase from 1.75% was announced on 4 November and took effect on 11 November. The bank cited improving Swedish activity and higher expected inflation, partly from costs associated with the war in the Middle East. Its next decision is scheduled for 16 December ([November decision](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-report/2026/monetary-policy-decision-november-2026)).

The question concerns the official rate effective on one date, not the average during the year or the rate announced at the final meeting. Exactly 1.75% counts as YES. The relevant record is the most recent effective rate on or before 31 December 2027; an announced change that takes effect afterward does not count ([official rate records](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/interest-rates-and-exchange-rates/policy-rate-deposit-and-lending-rate/)).

## Evidence
History argues against treating a new hiking cycle as an immediate prelude to cuts. Six completed first-hike episodes following at least a year without an increase show the following rates at the start and 409 days later. Only the oldest ended below its starting level ([historical policy-rate records](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/interest-rates-and-exchange-rates/policy-rate-deposit-and-lending-rate/)).

| First-hike episode | Post-hike rate | Rate 409 days later |
|---|---:|---:|
| December 1997 | 4.35% | 3.40% |
| November 1999 | 3.25% | 4.00% |
| January 2006 | 1.75% | 3.25% |
| July 2010 | 0.50% | 2.00% |
| January 2019 | −0.25% | 0.00% |
| May 2022 | 0.25% | 3.50% |

This is a small reference class, not a direct probability for the present question. The episodes began at different rate levels and under different economic conditions. Broader history gives a less one-sided picture: among 237 overlapping month-end observations from January 2006 through September 2025, 77 were followed by a decline of at least 0.25 percentage points over 409 days. Among 57 observations within 60 days after a hike, the corresponding share was about 23%. Overlapping observations share the same policy cycles, so they provide much less independent evidence than their counts suggest ([historical policy-rate records](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/interest-rates-and-exchange-rates/policy-rate-deposit-and-lending-rate/)).

Published rate paths also have a substantial record of error. A historical evaluation covering forecasts beginning in February 2007 and outcomes through the first quarter of 2019 found root-mean-square errors of 0.29 percentage points one quarter ahead, 1.16 points one year ahead and 2.02 points two years ahead. The corresponding sample counts were 70, 65 and 59. Average errors, measured as actual minus forecast, were −0.07, −0.57 and −1.65 points ([Nordström’s evaluation](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecno.12167)). That history establishes room for large departures from the projected path. It does not establish that the old downward bias will repeat in a different inflation regime.

The current evidence nevertheless favors an above-threshold outcome. The Riksbank has just raised the rate to 2.00% and retained an upward policy outlook. Holding at today’s level throughout the remaining horizon would resolve NO. A YES outcome therefore needs an actual reversal, not merely fewer increases than expected ([November decision](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-report/2026/monetary-policy-decision-november-2026)).

The September projections reinforce that direction. Their full published sequence here is 2.07% in the first quarter of 2027, 2.24% in the second, 2.38% in the third, and 2.41% in the third quarter of 2028. These are quarterly averages, not exact-date rates. They show an outlook materially above the threshold without settling the question ([Riksbank projections](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-press-releases/press-releases/2026/policy-rate-unchanged-at-16.75-per-cent)). The National Institute of Economic Research’s September forecast points the same way: it projected year-end policy rates of 2.50% in 2027 and 2.75% in 2028. Those remain conditional institutional forecasts, not observed outcomes ([Swedish Economy report](https://www.konj.se/media/zvhekcwi/swedish-economy-report-september-2026.pdf?pdfVersion=639264589085730000)).

Inflation is the strongest counterweight. CPIF inflation was 0.7% in August, 1.5% in September and 1.1% in October. Constant-tax CPIF inflation over those same months was 2.1%, 2.9% and 2.4%, showing how much tax changes affect the picture ([CPIF series](https://statistikdatabasen.scb.se/api/v2/tables/TAB6590/data?lang=en&outputFormat=json-stat2); [constant-tax series](https://statistikdatabasen.scb.se/api/v2/tables/TAB6592/data?lang=en&outputFormat=json-stat2)). Excluding energy, the regular inflation measure fell from 0.5% in September to 0.1% in October. October’s monthly changes were 0.0% for CPIF and −0.1% excluding energy ([October inflation release](https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-economic-trends/price-statistics/consumer-price-index-cpi/pong/statistical-news/consumer-price-index-cpi-october-2026)).

These are genuine signs of weakness, but they are not clean measures of persistent inflation. For September, the Riksbank put inflation excluding temporary fiscal measures at 3.0% including energy and 1.6% excluding it. Constant-tax inflation and the bank’s adjustment for temporary fiscal measures are different measures and should not be spliced together. The reasonable inference is that the low headline readings overstate the case for cuts, while still adding downside risk ([November policy update](https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/ppr/penningpolitiska-rapporter-och-uppdateringar/engelska/2026/monetary-policy-update-november-2026.pdf)).

The response from policymakers matters too. On 12 November, after the inflation release, First Deputy Governor Aino Bunge acknowledged the undershoot but still described further increases as likely if the outlook held. Her emphasis on gradual adjustment and household sensitivity points to caution, not an established easing cycle ([Bunge’s remarks](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/speeches-and-presentations/2026/aino-bunge-interest-rates-should-be-adjusted-gradually-in-an-uncertain-situation/)).

The demand picture is mixed. Household confidence fell from 102.3 in September to 94.3 in October, while business sentiment strengthened. Companies’ selling-price plans were elevated relative to historical norms. That combination supports both sides of the forecast: fragile consumption creates a route to reversal, while firms’ pricing intentions support the bank’s concern about persistent inflation ([October business tendency survey](https://www.konj.se/publikationer/konjunkturbarometern/2026-10-29-stort-fall-i-hushallens-stamningslage/)).

Labor data show slack beneath improving employment. Third-quarter employment rose from 5,324,000 in 2025 to 5,398,000 in 2026, but underemployment also rose, from 367,000 to 400,000. Weekly hours moved only from 138.9 million to 139.2 million, a change that was not statistically significant. Smoothed unemployment remained at 8.7% in each of the first three quarters of 2026. The data support a recovery, but not a tight labor market ([Statistics Sweden labor-force release](https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/arbetsmarknad/utbud-av-arbetskraft/arbetskraftsundersokningarna-aku/pong/statistiknyhet/arbetskraftsundersokningarna-aku-tredje-kvartalet-2026/)).

Households also transmit rate changes quickly. In September, 78% of outstanding mortgages were floating-rate. This is exposure to higher interest costs, not proof of distress, but it increases the risk that further tightening weakens spending more than expected ([financial-market statistics](https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/finansmarknad/finansmarknadsstatistik/finansmarknadsstatistik/pong/statistiknyhet/finansmarknadsstatistik-september-2026/)).

Energy is not a simple inflationary or disinflationary signal. Brent fell from USD114.88 a barrel on 29 October to USD95.82 on 12 November, easing one source of pressure. Nordic electricity remained expensive, however, and the conflict had not reached a major diplomatic resolution. Lower oil prices alone do not establish that the supply-cost shock has passed ([energy-market report](https://www.energimyndigheten.se/energisystem-och-analys/sveriges-energilage-just-nu/marknadsrapporter-och-lagesbilder/nulaget-pa-energimarknaderna/)).

## What's non-obvious
The main distinction is between a shorter hiking cycle and an outcome below the threshold. Weak data can stop further increases without producing YES. Since the rate is already 2.00%, even a lasting hold leaves the outcome on the NO side. If further hikes occur first, a later reversal has more ground to cover before the deadline.

The second distinction is between measured inflation and the inflation pressure that drives policy. October’s near-zero ex-energy reading looks decisive in isolation. Fiscal adjustments show why that reading cannot be taken literally as persistent inflation. The opposite shortcut is also wrong: an upward official rate path does not eliminate reversal risk. Historical forecast errors, household exposure and unused labor capacity explain why YES remains a substantial minority outcome.

## Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is whether energy and supply costs persist long enough to offset weak domestic demand. A prolonged underlying inflation undershoot, disappointing consumption or a global downturn could force cuts. Continued cost pass-through or stronger activity could keep policy above the threshold even with weak household sentiment.

An equivalent official fiscal-adjusted October inflation reading was not established. More observations on adjusted inflation, hours worked, consumption and actual business pricing would help distinguish a temporary price-level effect from sustained disinflation. A comparable recent aggregate mortgage-arrears series was also not established; floating-rate exposure alone does not demonstrate financial stress.

The historical comparisons are informative but limited. First-hike episodes are few, rolling observations overlap, and older forecast errors reflect different interest-rate regimes. None supplies a precise conditional frequency for today’s circumstances. Finally, the effective date remains decisive: a late policy reversal only contributes to YES if enough easing is implemented by 31 December 2027.

## Forecast history

| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-17 | 26% chance of yes |

## Sources Prolepsia read

- [Monetary policy decision \| Sveriges Riksbank](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-report/2026/monetary-policy-decision-november-2026)
- [A forecast evaluation of the Riksbank's policy‐rate projections - Nordström - 2020 - Economic Notes - Wiley Online Library](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecno.12167)
- [The Swedish Economy, September 2026 — 6](https://www.konj.se/media/zvhekcwi/swedish-economy-report-september-2026.pdf?pdfVersion=639264589085730000)
- [CPIF series](https://statistikdatabasen.scb.se/api/v2/tables/TAB6590/data?lang=en&outputFormat=json-stat2)
- [The inflation rate according to the CPI was 0.9 percent in October 2026](https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-economic-trends/price-statistics/consumer-price-index-cpi/pong/statistical-news/consumer-price-index-cpi-october-2026)
- [De globala energimarknaderna](https://www.energimyndigheten.se/energisystem-och-analys/sveriges-energilage-just-nu/marknadsrapporter-och-lagesbilder/nulaget-pa-energimarknaderna)
- [Arbetsmarknadsläget i Västra Götaland - Västra Götalandsregionen](https://www.vgregion.se/regional-utveckling/statistik-och-analys/arbetsmarknadslaget)
- [Lönerna ökar långsammare \| Medlingsinstitutet](https://mi.se/arkiv/nyheter/2026/2026-10-29-lonerna-okar-langsammare)
- [Pressmeddelanden - Arbetsförmedlingen](https://arbetsformedlingen.se/om-oss/press/pressmeddelanden?id=41C7BCCA07090C60&pageIndex=1&year=0)

## The question

This question asks whether Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden's central bank) will have an official policy rate (styrränta) of 1.75% or lower on 31 December 2027. The forecast is made as of 16 November 2026 and concerns the policy rate in effect on that specific calendar date, rather than the average rate during 2027 or the rate announced at the final monetary policy meeting of the year.

As of 16 November 2026, the Riksbank's policy rate stands at 2.00%, following a 0.25-percentage-point increase announced on 4 November 2026 that took effect on 11 November 2026. The previous rate was 1.75%. The Riksbank justified its November increase by citing improving Swedish economic activity and expectations of higher inflation driven partly by cost pressures associated with the war in the Middle East. Its next monetary policy decision is scheduled for announcement on 16 December 2026. ([riksbank.se](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-report/2026/monetary-policy-decision-november-2026/))

The Riksbank's September 2026 forecast projected a gradual increase in the policy rate, with quarterly averages reaching 2.38% in the third quarter of 2027. However, these projections are conditional assessments rather than binding commitments, and subsequent economic developments may lead to changes in monetary policy. ([riksbank.se](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-published/notices-and-press-releases/press-releases/2026/policy-rate-unchanged-at-16.75-per-cent))

The question will be evaluated after 31 December 2027 using the Riksbank's official historical policy rate records. A YES outcome requires the policy rate applicable on that date to be at or below 1.75%, while a NO outcome requires it to exceed 1.75%.

### How it resolves

The question resolves YES if the official policy rate (styrränta) established by Sveriges Riksbank and effective on 31 December 2027 is less than or equal to 1.75% per annum.

The question resolves NO if the official policy rate effective on 31 December 2027 is greater than 1.75% per annum.

The primary resolution source will be the Riksbank's official historical policy rate data, available through its website under 'Policy rate (previously repo rate), deposit and lending rate' and its historical interest rate database. These sources report policy rate levels and their effective dates. The applicable rate will be identified as the rate associated with the most recent effective date on or before 31 December 2027, provided no subsequent decision has taken effect by that date. ([riksbank.se](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/interest-rates-and-exchange-rates/policy-rate-deposit-and-lending-rate/))

If the official historical data are temporarily unavailable, the Riksbank's published monetary policy decisions and accompanying press releases will serve as fallback sources. The applicable rate will be determined from the announced effective dates, rather than announcement dates.

Because 31 December 2027 is a specific calendar date, the policy rate effective on that date will determine the result even if no monetary policy decision or implementation occurs that day. All dates will be interpreted according to Swedish local time (Europe/Stockholm).

Resolution should occur once the official rate applicable on 31 December 2027 can be verified, ordinarily in early January 2028. If the Riksbank ceases publishing historical policy rate information, the question may still resolve using archived official decisions or other authoritative contemporaneous records. If no reliable evidence establishes the applicable rate, the question will be annulled rather than assigned an unsupported YES or NO outcome.

### Fine print

The threshold of 1.75% is inclusive. A policy rate of exactly 1.75% resolves YES; a rate of 1.76% or higher resolves NO. Any rate below 1.75%, including zero or a negative policy rate, also resolves YES.

The question concerns the Riksbank's official policy rate, not the Swedish overnight market rate (SWESTR), deposit rate, lending rate, government bond yields, commercial bank lending rates, or the Riksbank's published forecast of future policy rates.

If the Riksbank announces a policy rate change before or on 31 December 2027 but specifies an effective date after 31 December 2027, that change will not count. Conversely, an earlier announcement that takes effect on 31 December 2027 will count.

If the Riksbank changes the name of its policy rate or replaces it with a directly equivalent official monetary policy benchmark before the resolution date, the successor benchmark will be used, provided the Riksbank explicitly identifies it as the replacement for the current policy rate. If the policy rate is discontinued without an identifiable successor and no applicable rate can be established for the target date, the question will be annulled.

Only the rate effective on the specified date matters. Whether the policy rate was above or below 1.75% at any earlier point during 2027 does not independently affect the outcome.

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Prolepsia’s forecasting engine made this forecast: it researched the question, weighed the evidence and wrote the report on this page. A probability is not a promise; this one changes as the evidence does.
