Prolepsia forecastYes / noResolved
Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the October 2026 meeting?
As of 26 October 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 93%.
93%chance of yes
Resolved: Yes — no change. The upper bound of the target federal funds range remained 4.00%, so the change versus the pre-October-2026-meeting level was 0 bps.
The Federal Reserve's October 28, 2026 FOMC statement says the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3-3/4 to 4 percent. The prior September 16, 2026 FOMC statement had raised the range to that same 3-3/4 to 4 percent level. Therefore, the upper bound stayed at 4.00% after the October 27-28 meeting, satisfying the market's 'No change' condition.
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 92.7% Yes and 7.3% No for no change after the October 2026 meeting. With the current target range at 3.75%–4.00%, Yes means keeping the upper bound at 4.00%, absent an intervening action. A pause is strongly favored, but it would not signal that tightening is finished.
Key evidence
- Officials have left room to skip a meeting. Williams said September’s increase allowed time to gather information, while Waller explicitly said further increases need not occur at consecutive meetings. These are reasons to expect patience, not promises of an October hold. (Williams; Waller)
- The starting rate is clear. September’s decision raised the target range by 25 basis points to 3.75%–4.00%. The contract concerns the upper bound, not market yields or changes in policy language. (Federal Reserve statement)
- The release calendar favors waiting. The decision is scheduled for October 28 at 18:00 UTC. Third-quarter GDP and September personal income and outlays, including PCE inflation, are scheduled for October 29, after the announcement. (Fed calendar; BEA schedule)
- Inflation remains the strongest argument against a hold. September headline CPI rose 0.6% month over month, while final-demand producer prices rose 1.3%. These seasonally adjusted increases leave a credible case for acting immediately. (CPI release; PPI release)
Uncertainties
The main unknown is the committee’s existing preference about timing. September’s minutes said most participants expected another increase by year-end, without settling whether it would come in October. A surprise hike therefore does not require a new shock. (September minutes)
The short remaining window limits new catalysts but does not eliminate decision risk. Guidance about later tightening, dissenting votes, or balance-sheet changes would not by themselves turn an unchanged target-range upper bound into a No outcome.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 92.7% Yes and 7.3% No for no change in the target federal funds range’s upper bound after the October 2026 meeting. The central expectation is a pause at the current 4.00% upper bound, supported by officials’ comments on pacing and the timing of major economic releases. The main risk is an immediate increase based on inflation evidence already available, not a new shock.
Context
The question is about one decision, not the full path of interest rates. The contract measures the change in the target range’s upper bound against its level immediately before the October meeting. September’s unanimous decision raised the range by 25 basis points to 3.75%–4.00%, effective September 17. Absent an intervening action, Yes means retaining the 4.00% upper bound. Changes in market interest rates, balance-sheet policy, or the statement’s tone do not themselves determine the result. (September statement)
As of the October 26 forecast date, the decision is close. The meeting runs October 27–28, with the announcement scheduled for October 28 at 18:00 UTC. The contract uses the FOMC statement and includes a Yes fallback if no statement appears by the end of the next scheduled meeting. That fallback is not a material reason for expecting Yes; the case rests on an ordinary decision to hold. (October calendar; FOMC calendar)
Evidence
The historical starting point favors holds, but it is a weak guide on its own. Five of the six scheduled meetings from January through September 2026 left rates unchanged. That is a small sequence of related decisions, not a set of independent trials. September’s restart of tightening also changed the policy setting. The history supports treating a hold as normal, but it does not settle whether the committee wants consecutive increases. (FOMC meeting history)
The target-rate record establishes the baseline clearly. The upper bound was 3.75% before September’s action, rose to 4.00% on September 17, and remained there through October 25 in the available daily record. This confirms what counts as no change; it says nothing by itself about the next decision. (Federal funds target upper bound; September statement)
The strongest positive evidence is the distinction officials have drawn between further tightening and immediate tightening. In his September 29 remarks, John Williams said September’s action removed urgency and allowed time to gather information. Christopher Waller’s October 8 speech explicitly allowed increases at nonconsecutive meetings. These comments make an October pause consistent with a continuing tightening stance. Neither statement commits the committee to holding. (Williams remarks; Waller speech)
The September minutes show why that distinction matters. Most participants anticipated another increase by year-end, and several regarded policy as not restrictive or only mildly restrictive. This supports further tightening but leaves its timing open. An October hold and a later increase fit that record; so does an immediate increase if policymakers judge the existing inflation evidence sufficient. (September minutes)
Outside assessments reinforce the pause interpretation without making it certain. PIMCO’s October 22 preview supported a hold with a tightening bias. KPMG’s preview expected an October hold followed by a December increase and reported support for a pause among senior leadership. These are analysts’ assessments, not official commitments. Their value is that they interpret the leadership signals after the latest inflation reports. (PIMCO preview; KPMG preview)
The labor data provide room for patience. The October 2 release reported payroll changes of −10,000 in July, +133,000 in August, and +29,000 in September. Unemployment rose from 4.1% in August to 4.2% in September. September hourly earnings increased 0.1% month over month and 3.0% year over year. These are release-vintage estimates, subject to revision. I read them as evidence against urgency, not as evidence of an emergency requiring a cut. (Employment report)
The information calendar strengthens that case. Advance third-quarter GDP and September personal income and outlays, including PCE inflation, are scheduled for October 29 at 08:30 Eastern, after the decision. Waiting would let the committee assess those releases before its next scheduled action. The window is not empty: durable goods, confidence, housing, and regional surveys remain relevant. But the major GDP and PCE releases cannot supply a new public-data catalyst before the announcement. (BEA schedule)
Inflation is the main contrary evidence. September headline CPI rose 0.6% month over month, seasonally adjusted, and 3.7% year over year, unadjusted. Core CPI rose 0.3% monthly and 2.6% annually. Gasoline accounted for more than half the headline monthly increase, which gives policymakers a reason to assess persistence rather than react to the headline alone. It does not erase the increase. (September CPI)
Producer prices add to the concern. September final-demand PPI rose 1.3% monthly, seasonally adjusted, and 6.3% annually, unadjusted. Excluding food, energy, and trade services, the increases were 0.5% monthly and 5.0% annually. Together with CPI, these figures provide a coherent case for tightening now. A surprise hike does not require fresh bad news. (September PPI)
Survey evidence is mixed rather than reassuring. The flash composite PMI eased from 58.4 in September to 57.6 in October, still above the expansion threshold of 50. Yet capacity constraints strengthened, backlogs rose at their fastest pace since May 2022, and selling-price increases were the fastest since August 2022. A softer activity headline therefore conceals stronger price pressure. The flash results are preliminary, and their realized sample size and response rate were not verified. (PMI reporting)
Consumer inflation expectations also rose across months, but the final October reading added no further surprise. Year-ahead expectations increased from 4.6% in September to 4.7% in October, while long-run expectations rose from 3.4% to 3.5%. Both final October figures matched their preliminary readings. These measure expectations, not realized inflation. (Michigan survey)
Financial conditions offer less support for waiting than a simple account of rising bond yields suggests. The ten-year Treasury yield stood at 5.01% on September 16, reached 5.31% on October 5, and fell to 4.96% on October 22. The full set of supplied reference points shows that the earlier rise had reversed: the latest level was 35 basis points below the peak and 5 basis points below the September decision-day level. Borrowing costs can still restrain demand, but this yield no longer shows sustained additional tightening since that decision. (Ten-year Treasury yield)
What's non-obvious
The key distinction is between the destination of policy and the pace of getting there. Strong inflation and expectations of another increase by year-end do not automatically imply an October increase. Officials have explicitly left room to pause between hikes. The forecast therefore describes a hold with a tightening bias, not a judgment that inflation is beaten or that rates have peaked.
The other subtle point cuts against complacency. A falling PMI headline and an earlier rise in Treasury yields can sound like two reasons to hold. The details weaken both arguments: PMI price pressures strengthened, and the Treasury-yield increase reversed. The case for Yes rests more on policy pacing and the release calendar than on a clean easing of inflation pressure.
Uncertainties
The largest unknown is the committee’s private timing preference. Public remarks establish permission to wait, not agreement to wait. Policymakers can review the same CPI, PPI, and survey evidence and decide that acting immediately is preferable. The short horizon reduces the scope for new developments but does not resolve that existing disagreement.
The survey evidence has limits. The PMI respondent count and response rate were not verified, and conflicting descriptions of its employment component prevent a firm conclusion on that detail. Clearer survey documentation would improve confidence in the breadth of the signal. It would not turn survey prices into measured national inflation.
There is also no verified public commitment to the October outcome. More direct evidence of committee-wide agreement would narrow the central uncertainty. Officials’ silence during the scheduled October 17–29 communications blackout is expected and should not be treated as fresh confirmation of a hold. (Blackout calendar)
The remaining No risk is principally an increase rather than a cut. Inflation already supplies a reason to act, while the evidence supporting patience supplies a reason to defer. That tension is consistent with the saved forecast: a strong expectation of no change, with a meaningful residual risk of immediate tightening.
What changed since the last forecast
Between the October 23 and October 26 forecasts, the expected hold became somewhat more likely: the probability rose from 89% to 93%. No new policy commitment or major economic release is identified; the later analysis puts more weight on officials’ stated flexibility about the pace of tightening and the fact that key GDP and PCE data arrive after the decision, so this is a modest shift in interpretation rather than a clear new development.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 93% chance of yes | |
| 89% chance of yes | |
| 82% chance of yes | |
| 81% chance of yes | |
| 85% chance of yes | |
| 85% chance of yes | |
| 83% chance of yes | |
| 81% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statementwww.federalreserve.gov
- Federal Funds Target Range - Upper Limit (DFEDTARU) | FRED | St. Louis Fedfred.stlouisfed.org
- Unwavering Dedication - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORKwww.newyorkfed.org
- Macro Signposts | October Fed Meeting Preview: A Pause Is Still a Recalibration | PIMCOwww.pimco.com
- Fed paces itselfkpmg.com
- Employment reportwww.bls.gov
- Release Schedule | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)www.bea.gov
- US business activity cools in October; strong demand fueling price pressures By Reuterswww.investing.com
- Surveys of Consumerswww.sca.isr.umich.edu
The question
Imported from Polymarket. This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market.
How it resolves
The FED interest rates are defined in this market by the upper bound of the target federal funds range. The decisions on the target federal funds range are made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. This market will resolve to the amount of basis points the upper bound of the target federal funds rate is changed by versus the level it was prior to the Federal Reserve's October 2026 meeting. If the target federal funds rate is changed to a level not expressed in the displayed options, the change will be rounded up to the nearest 25 and will resolve to the relevant bracket. (e.g. if there's a cut/increase of 12.5 bps it will be considered to be 25 bps) The resolution source for this market is the FOMC’s statement after its meeting scheduled for October 27-28, 2026 according to the official calendar: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm. The level and change of the target federal funds rate is also published at the official website of the Federal Reserve at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm. This market may resolve as soon as the FOMC’s statement for their October meeting with relevant data is issued. If no statement is released by the end date of the next scheduled meeting, this market will resolve to the "No change" bracket.
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