Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will Reform UK have the highest vote share in YouGov's last Westminster voting intention poll published in 2027?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 18%.

18%chance of yes

Yes 18%No 82%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The saved forecast is 17.6% Yes and 82.4% No. Reform UK is the underdog because it currently trails both Labour and the Conservatives; a tie for first in the final qualifying poll would still count as Yes.

Key evidence

  • The starting position is worse than the August example suggests. The August poll had Labour and Reform tied at 23%, with the Conservatives at 20%. By the publication on 17 November 2026, Labour was at 27%, the Conservatives at 23% and Reform at 21%. Reform therefore needs to overcome two competitors, not simply restore its earlier tie. (August poll; latest poll)
  • The deficit is sustained. Reform failed to lead in the latest seven polling waves. Its past dominance in the broader polling record is therefore a poor guide to the current starting point. (YouGov tracker)
  • Both rivals have support beyond voting intention. November net favourability was +8 for Andy Burnham, −13 for Kemi Badenoch and −45 for Nigel Farage. These are not vote shares, but they support taking Labour’s and the Conservatives’ recoveries seriously. (Leadership ratings)
  • Reform’s coalition remains contestable. In the June voter study, 40% of Reform supporters would consider the Conservatives and 43% would consider Restore Britain. These are overlapping consideration groups, not predicted defections. (Voter study)

Uncertainties

There are approximately thirteen months for the ranking to change. The strongest counterweight to the forecast is economic dissatisfaction: 74% described the economy as bad and 59% expected it to worsen, despite a favourable initial response to the Budget. That leaves a route back for anti-government voting. (Budget survey)

The unknown is who benefits. Labour losing support does not automatically put Reform first if the Conservatives also gain. Leadership changes, party fragmentation and polling-method changes add uncertainty. Only the last qualifying poll first published during 2027 matters—not the annual average, an election result or an earlier Reform lead.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The saved forecast is 17.6% Yes and 82.4% No. Reform UK enters the forecast period behind both Labour and the Conservatives, and the evidence supports treating that disadvantage as a sustained political change. The decisive test is first place, including a rounded tie, in the final qualifying YouGov Westminster poll published in 2027—not an election result or a lead earlier in the year.

Context

The August tie is no longer the right starting point. YouGov’s poll conducted on 30–31 August 2026 had Labour and Reform on 23%, with the Conservatives on 20%. Its publication on 17 November instead put Labour on 27%, the Conservatives on 23% and Reform on 21%. The latest survey covered 2,252 Great Britain adults interviewed on 15–16 November. Reform now trails Labour by six percentage points and the Conservatives by two. (August poll; November results and tables)

The question concerns one national polling publication. Publication date determines which poll counts, and the reported whole-number shares determine whether Reform finishes first. Each party counts separately. YouGov’s standard national headline uses constituency-aware questioning and statistical modelling, but remains distinct from the large seat-projection exercises excluded by the question. (YouGov methodology)

Evidence

The historical backbone cuts both ways. Reform was top or tied top in 78 of the 97 observations in the current tracker record, covering 13 January 2025 to 16 November 2026. That establishes that leading this polling series is not an exceptional outcome for the party. But Reform led in none of the latest seven waves. The earlier frequency describes a period containing a strong Reform position; it is not a suitable forecast from its present third-place position. (YouGov tracker)

The recent polling history shows the reversal clearly. The table gives the supplied sequence of headline shares, with dates referring to fieldwork rather than initial publication. These are snapshots, not an annual average. (August publication; YouGov tracker)

Fieldwork date or end date, 2026 Labour Conservative Reform Liberal Democrat Green
30–31 August 23% 20% 23% 12% 13%
14 September 23% 20% 23% 13% 11%
21 September 23% 21% 21% 12% 14%
28 September 24% 19% 25% 12% 11%
5 October 27% 20% 22% 11% 11%
12 October 24% 23% 21% 12% 11%
19 October 27% 23% 22% 11% 10%
26 October 27% 22% 20% 11% 10%
2 November 26% 24% 21% 11% 10%
9 November 27% 21% 20% 12% 10%
16 November 27% 23% 21% 11% 9%

This is more than one adverse sample. Reform’s latest four-poll average was 20.50%, against Labour’s 26.75% and the Conservatives’ 22.50%. The data support a clear current deficit. They do not establish that the recent rate of decline will continue through another year. (YouGov tracker)

The historical record also contains substantial year-length movements. That keeps a comeback credible. But the contemporary series contains less than two years of observations and essentially one major rise-and-fall cycle. Many year-length comparisons overlap. Older observations cover a different party system and methodological setting. The useful lesson is that these gaps can move a great deal—not that Reform’s earlier ascent supplies a reliable upward trend. (Current tracker; historical record)

Labour’s recovery has a visible voter-retention mechanism. YouGov’s conference analysis reported retention of its 2024 voters rising from 39% in May to 53% in September. Losses to the Greens and Liberal Democrats fell from 28% to 18%, while losses to Reform and the Conservatives changed much less, from 11% to 10%. Labour can therefore move ahead of Reform without persuading many Reform supporters to switch directly. (Labour and Burnham analysis)

Leadership ratings reinforce that reading. November favourable and unfavourable ratings were 49% and 41% for Burnham, 34% and 47% for Badenoch, and 23% and 68% for Farage. These are measures of personal standing, not voting intention. I read them as support for the durability of the competitive change, rather than proof of any future vote share. (November favourability)

The Conservatives create a separate obstacle. In YouGov’s June voter study, 40% of current Reform supporters would consider voting Conservative, rising to 73% among Conservative-to-Reform switchers. Only 29% considered Reform exclusively. Consideration is not a promised transfer, but it shows that an important part of Reform’s coalition remains accessible to its rival. (Reform voter study)

Reform also faces competition from Restore Britain. The same study found that 43% of Reform supporters would consider Restore, while only 36% of Restore supporters would consider Reform. The Restore subgroup was small, so the asymmetry deserves caution. The broader point is firmer: right-wing protest support cannot simply be added together and credited to Reform. (Reform study; Restore study)

The strongest evidence pointing the other way is the economy. The October Budget was judged fair by 45% and unfair by 20%, yet 74% still described the economy as bad and 59% expected deterioration over the following year. A popular announcement is not the same as improved living standards. Those responses leave a clear route to renewed anti-government support. (Budget reaction)

Economic projections add to that risk without determining its political effect. The Bank of England projected weak real household labour-income growth and renewed inflation pressure in 2027. These are conditional projections, not realised outcomes. If household experience remains poor, Labour’s recovery faces a delivery test; whether Reform or the Conservatives benefits remains unresolved. (November Monetary Policy Report)

Reform retains resources and local activity. Reported donations of £72 million provide an organisational counterweight to its weaker polling, while the party highlighted three council by-election wins in November. Neither money nor selected local contests establishes a national rebound. They do argue against treating the current polling deficit as organisational collapse. (Donation reporting; party by-election release)

What's non-obvious

Labour does not need to win Reform voters to keep Reform out of first place. Recovering former Labour supporters from the Greens, Liberal Democrats or indecision can lift Labour above a largely unchanged Reform share. At the same time, a Conservative recovery can limit Reform from the other direction. The contest is about the ranking of individual parties, not the size of a combined anti-government or right-wing bloc.

The reverse also matters. Reform does not face two wholly independent hurdles: a Reform-specific recovery improves its margin against both main rivals at once. That is why third place today does not make Yes negligible. The whole-number tie rule also helps Reform at the boundary. But a brief lead during 2027 is insufficient; the recovery must be present in the selected final publication.

Uncertainties

The largest uncertainty is the durability of Labour’s recovery. Current retention and leadership evidence supports it. Economic dissatisfaction challenges it. Further evidence on household finances, government delivery and repeated voter-retention measures would show whether the recovery is becoming entrenched or fading.

The second uncertainty is who becomes the principal challenger on the right. The voter study measures openness to alternatives, not actual future movement. Repeated switching data on a consistent basis would help distinguish a Conservative recovery from a broader rise in opposition support. Restore’s smaller evidence base also limits confidence about how much support Reform can regain from that direction.

The historical reference class is thin. Overlapping comparisons do not create independent political episodes, and older polling regimes are imperfect analogues. Leadership changes, organisational shocks and future methodology changes add uncertainty that the recent record cannot settle. None of this overturns the forecast: it explains why a meaningful Reform comeback remains possible despite the clear current disadvantage.

Finally, the endpoint is one published poll. Sampling variation and rounding can decide a close result even when the wider political picture changes little. Resolution must use the final qualifying publication during 2027 and its official headline figures, rather than the poll with the latest fieldwork or the most representative-looking result.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 18% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
18% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Voting intention, 30-31 August 2026: Lab 23%, Ref 23%, Con 20%, Grn 13%, LD 12%yougov.com
  2. _FULLtabs.htmygo-assets-websites-editorial-emea.yougov.net
  3. historical recordapi-test.yougov.com
  4. Bank of England Monetary Policy Report November 2026www.bankofengland.co.uk
  5. Crypto-billionaires want ‘nothing’ in exchange for £72m donations, says Reform | ITV Newswww.itv.com
  6. So much for the “Burnham bounce”: Reform wins three more by-election victories – in two former Labour heartlands | Reform UKwww.reformparty.uk
  7. The Rt Hon Andy Burnham MP - GOV.UKwww.gov.uk
  8. Is Nigel Farage shifting from Reform's greatest asset to polling liability? | Politics News | Sky Newsnews.sky.com
  9. Allegations currently under investigation by the Commissioner - UK Parliamentwww.parliament.uk
  10. Performance Tracker 2026: Cross-service analysis | Institute for Governmentwww.instituteforgovernment.org.uk

The question

This question asks whether Reform UK will have the highest reported vote share, either outright or tied with another party, in the final YouGov Westminster voting intention poll published during the 2027 calendar year (1 January–31 December 2027). The question concerns national voting intention for elections to the UK House of Commons, using YouGov's standard Great Britain-wide Westminster voting intention polling series. It does not concern actual election results, seat projections, constituency-level polling, or polling averages. As of 17 November 2026, Reform UK is one of the principal parties competing for the lead in Westminster voting intention polling. For context, YouGov's poll conducted on 30–31 August 2026 reported Labour and Reform UK tied on 23%, followed by the Conservatives on 20%, the Greens on 13%, and the Liberal Democrats on 12%. This illustrates the competitive and fragmented polling landscape heading towards 2027. Source: YouGov, Politics and Current Affairs (https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics). The forecast will be evaluated using the final qualifying YouGov Westminster voting intention poll first published between 1 January 2027 and 31 December 2027, inclusive. The relevant date is the date YouGov first publicly releases the poll results, rather than the dates on which respondents were interviewed. The question resolves YES if Reform UK's reported vote share is greater than or equal to that of every other individual political party in that poll, and NO otherwise.

How it resolves

The primary resolution source will be YouGov's official website (https://yougov.co.uk), including its Westminster voting intention articles, voting intention tracker, and published polling tables. A qualifying poll must be conducted by YouGov, measure voting intention for a Westminster general election, report national party vote shares for Great Britain, and have its results first published during the period from 1 January 2027 through 31 December 2027, inclusive. Only YouGov's standard national Westminster voting intention polls qualify. Constituency polls, regional polls, MRP seat projections, hypothetical voting scenarios, polling aggregations, and polls conducted by other organisations are excluded. The final qualifying poll will be the one with the latest initial public publication date within 2027, using the Europe/London time zone. If multiple qualifying polls are first published on the same date and a publication-time ordering cannot be reliably established, the poll with the latest fieldwork end date will be selected. If these criteria still leave multiple polls tied, the question will be annulled unless their results produce the same YES or NO outcome. The vote shares used for resolution will be the headline weighted national Westminster voting intention percentages reported by YouGov for the selected poll, using YouGov's standard treatment of undecided respondents and other non-voting responses. Reported whole-number percentages will be used rather than unrounded underlying estimates. Where an official YouGov article and detailed tables appear inconsistent, the headline voting intention results in the final published tables will take precedence, provided they correspond to the same poll and standard voting intention measure. The question resolves YES if Reform UK's reported vote share is equal to or higher than the reported vote share of every other individual party in the selected poll. A tie for first place counts as YES. The question resolves NO if at least one other individual political party has a strictly higher reported vote share than Reform UK in the selected poll. If no qualifying YouGov Westminster voting intention poll is published during 2027, the question will be annulled rather than resolving NO. If a qualifying poll is published but the necessary party-level results cannot be established from YouGov's official publications or archived copies of those publications, the question will be annulled. Resolution should ordinarily take place in January 2028, allowing sufficient time to identify the final poll published in 2027 and examine its official results. The initially published results, including corrections clearly identified by YouGov as corrections to that publication, will be used. Subsequent methodological reanalyses or retrospective changes to the polling series will not alter the outcome.

Fine print

The question concerns the final qualifying poll published in 2027, not necessarily the poll with the latest fieldwork dates in 2027. Consequently, a poll conducted in December 2026 but first published in January 2027 could qualify, whereas a poll conducted in December 2027 but first published in January 2028 would not. Reform UK does not need to lead throughout 2027, nor does it need to have the highest average polling share across the year. Only the selected final poll determines the outcome. Ties are evaluated using the whole-number percentages officially reported by YouGov. For example, if Reform UK and Labour are both reported at 25%, with every other party below 25%, the outcome is YES, even if the underlying unrounded estimates differ. If Reform UK is reported at 24% and another party at 25%, the outcome is NO. Each political party is evaluated individually. The combined vote share of multiple parties, such as Labour and the Greens or the Conservatives and Reform UK, is not considered unless YouGov explicitly reports them as a single electoral party or joint list in its standard voting intention results. If Reform UK changes its name but remains recognisably the same political organisation, its results will continue to count. If it merges into a substantially different political organisation, the resolution should follow whether YouGov explicitly identifies the successor as Reform UK or its direct continuation. A complete dissolution without an identifiable successor would result in a NO outcome if a qualifying poll exists and reports other parties' vote shares. If organisational changes make the party's identity genuinely indeterminate, the question may be annulled. If YouGov changes its standard voting intention methodology during 2027, the final qualifying poll under the methodology in use at that time will be accepted. Methodological changes alone will not trigger annulment. The outcome concerns published polling estimates, not the true underlying level of electoral support or an eventual general election result.