Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will the EU approve a new joint borrowing plan for defence before 31 December 2027?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 83%.

83%chance of yes

Yes 83%No 17%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

Probability of Yes: 83.5%. Probability of No: 16.5%. The leading route is a new EU-backed loan for Ukraine with an explicit defence component, not an increase to SAFE; the EU must formally adopt the borrowing authority by 30 December 2027.

Key evidence

  • A separate Ukraine loan is the strongest candidate. At the 9 November Eurogroup, Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis distinguished €45 billion already planned for 2027 from another €45 billion the EU was looking to mobilise against a remaining gap of about €70 billion. On 17 November, The Kyiv Independent reported seeing a draft that directed €25 billion of the new loan to Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity. That is more than half the loan, making defence a substantial purpose rather than an incidental benefit. The report described a draft, not a published proposal or an agreed deal.
  • The EU has a recent legal precedent. The existing €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan used enhanced cooperation among 24 member states and provided for an indicative €60 billion defence component. But its separate budget backstop required unanimity and was capped at €90 billion. The Commission’s 30 October proposal concerns the remaining €45 billion under that old authority and does not count.
  • There are fallback routes. The Catalyst Europe draft pairs new EU borrowing with objectives that include defence industry and military mobility, but the final act would need to make defence a substantial intended use of the borrowed funds. A SAFE ceiling increase would also count. The €21.3 billion SAFE call stays within the existing €150 billion ceiling and does not count.

Uncertainties

The main obstacle is agreement on who guarantees and services the debt. The old backstop cannot simply cover the top-up, and there was no agreement at the forecast cutoff on a replacement. A compromise could also remove the defence allocation or fund it without new EU borrowing. The clearest evidence to watch is a published legal text that specifies additional borrowing authority, a workable guarantee and a substantial defence use. Even then, a proposal or summit agreement is not enough: the binding act must be adopted by the deadline.

Read the full report

TL;DR

Probability of Yes: 83.5%. Probability of No: 16.5%. Watch the separate Ukraine loan rather than SAFE: the decisive step is formal adoption by 30 December 2027 of new EU borrowing authority with defence as an explicit, substantial purpose.

Context

The EU is already borrowing for defence. The Council adopted the SAFE regulation on 27 May 2025, authorising up to €150 billion in Commission borrowing for loans to member states. Allocations, loan agreements and bond issuance under that ceiling do not count. A binding act raising the ceiling does, as does a separate EU borrowing programme that makes defence a substantial purpose. The beneficiary need not be an EU member, so a loan for Ukraine can qualify.

As of 17 November 2026, the most concrete prospect was new financing for Ukraine’s 2027 shortfall. EU officials had distinguished it from the support already authorised, and Costa and von der Leyen put additional financing on the agenda for the 26–27 November summit. Reporting described a draft with a substantial defence allocation. The Commission had not yet published a legislative proposal for that top-up, and governments had not agreed on its guarantee.

Evidence

The closest precedent is the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan, adopted on 24 February 2026, with an indicative split of €60 billion for defence and €30 billion for budget support. It used enhanced cooperation among 24 member states. That let the participating countries proceed without requiring every member to bear the loan’s costs. It did not remove the need for unanimity on the separate EU budget guarantee. The Council adopted that backstop on 23 April 2026, 99 days after the Commission presented the legislative package. The precedent shows both why another loan is feasible and where it can stall.

Other crisis measures help put the deadline in context. The 2024 exceptional Ukraine loan took 35 days from proposal to adoption, SURE took 47, and SAFE took 69. The recovery borrowing package took 200 days to reach adoption of the own-resources decision. These are selected successes, not a passage rate. They show that the EU can legislate well within the time available once governments agree on the financing. The December 2025 reparations-loan proposal, which had not been adopted at the cutoff, shows why a proposal is not a reliable guide to the financing method ultimately chosen.

The strongest current signal is the combination of an identified funding gap and a draft that ties fresh debt to defence. At the 9 November Eurogroup, Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis distinguished €45 billion already planned for Ukraine in 2027 from another €45 billion the EU was looking to mobilise against a remaining gap of about €70 billion. On 17 November, The Kyiv Independent reported seeing a draft that assigned €25 billion of the additional loan to defence industrial capacity and €20 billion to other support. More than half the proceeds would go explicitly to defence under those terms. This is direct evidence about the draft’s purpose, not evidence that the allocation has been agreed or that the loan will pass.

The financing bottleneck is the guarantee. The April backstop was capped at €90 billion, so the top-up cannot simply draw on it. An EU act backed by commitments from participating states could also qualify, and member-state guarantees have backed EU borrowing for Ukraine before, in 2022. There was no agreement at the cutoff to use that structure here. Germany was pressing for wider burden sharing (Merz’s 12 November remarks), while the Czech prime minister rejected making Ukraine financing a precondition for the next EU budget. Those positions complicate a repeat of the old deal. They do not establish that a final text will be vetoed.

The next long-term budget offers a second route. The Catalyst Europe proposal authorises up to €150 billion in new loans in current prices and names defence industrial capacity and military mobility among its objectives. The Irish Presidency’s October negotiating text kept the loan provision in brackets. The draft has no dedicated defence share, so the final text would need to do more than make defence eligible. Timing is a separate hurdle: the preceding long-term budget was adopted in December 2020, but its main common-provisions regulation followed in June 2021. A budget deal in 2027 does not guarantee that an accompanying borrowing act will pass in time.

A SAFE increase is a weaker fallback. The Commission’s 29 October call for €21.3 billion used room under the existing €150 billion ceiling. The 9 November Eurogroup discussion and the 17 November Defence Council outcome did not announce a cap increase. The original SAFE timetable shows that a standalone act can move quickly, but Parliament’s challenge to the use of Article 122 makes a repeat less straightforward. National spending, ordinary EIB lending and joint procurement using existing funds can all advance defence without producing a qualifying act.

What's non-obvious

The two €45 billion figures refer to different money. The Commission’s 30 October proposal allocates the remaining €45 billion of the existing Ukraine Support Loan. Its legal text proposes €31.7 billion for defence and €13.3 billion for budget support, but adds no borrowing authority. The separate draft reported on 17 November is the one that could resolve the question YES. The distinction cuts both ways: an explicit defence allocation under old authority does not count, and new borrowing for general budget support does not count merely because it frees other money for defence.

The same distinction applies to political and legal approval. Enhanced cooperation within EU law can produce a qualifying act, but it is not a shortcut around unanimity if the chosen backstop still requires a unanimous budget amendment. Conversely, the EU need not issue a single bond by the deadline. The test is the official adoption date of the binding act, not the summit announcement, publication date or first disbursement.

Uncertainties

The main unknown is whether governments can agree on a guarantee and who services the debt. The draft report makes the defence purpose clearer, but it does not settle either issue. A compromise could shrink the loan, strip out the defence allocation or use bilateral contributions or non-debt financing instead. A durable ceasefire could also change the size and composition of the financing gap. None of those outcomes requires the EU to abandon support for Ukraine; they would simply make that support less likely to meet this question’s legal test.

The next useful evidence is a published legal text with three things: an increase in authorised borrowing, a specified issuer and backstop, and language committing a substantial part of the proceeds to defence. For a budget-linked fallback, the key is whether the final lending act makes defence an intended use of borrowed funds rather than one eligible use among many. For SAFE, the test is simpler: the act must expressly raise the €150 billion ceiling. In every case, the binding act must be formally adopted by 30 December 2027.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 83% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
83% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Regulation - EU - 2025/1106 - EN - EUR-Lexeur-lex.europa.eu
  2. Costa and von der Leyenwww.consilium.europa.eu
  3. Audiovisual Service - Eurogroup meetingaudiovisual.ec.europa.eu
  4. Exclusive: EU proposes additional 45 billion euros for Ukraine, seeks to incentivize allies to step upkyivindependent.com
  5. Merz’s 12 November remarkswww.bundesregierung.de
  6. Czech prime ministervlada.gov.cz
  7. Commission invites Member States to use €21.3 billion under SAFE to boost Defence Readiness and support to Ukraine - European Commissiondefence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu
  8. Commission takes a key step forward on 2027 financial support for Ukraineenlargement.ec.europa.eu
  9. IMMC.COM%282026%29606%20final.ENG.xhtml.1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.docxpublications.europa.eu
  10. 3. The loan agreed by the European Council to respond urgently to the situation in Ukraine, requires both unanimous agreement to amend the MFF and an agreement on a loan backed by the EU budget headroom that does not have an impact on the financial obligations of those three Member States. The impossibility of achieving the objective of the loan, within a reasonable period through a package of acts involving the Union as a whole, is therefore clear from the European Council discussions and the conclusions reached, as confirmed by Coreper on 19 December 2025.data.consilium.europa.eu

The question

This question asks whether the European Union will formally approve a new EU-level joint borrowing programme to finance defence expenditure between 17 November 2026 and 30 December 2027, inclusive. As of November 2026, the EU has already established a significant common borrowing mechanism for defence. On 27 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/1106, establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, which authorises the European Commission to borrow up to €150 billion on capital markets to provide loans to member states for defence investments and joint procurement. SAFE forms part of the broader ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative, which aims to mobilise approximately €800 billion in additional European defence spending. During 2026, the EU began implementing SAFE, approving national investment plans and associated financial assistance. The European Parliament's October 2026 research briefing confirms that SAFE is an established instrument and identifies other emerging defence-financing initiatives. Discussions about additional common borrowing have continued, including at the Eurogroup meeting on 9 November 2026, where the possibility of new common borrowing beyond existing temporary instruments was raised in connection with joint defence procurement. Against this background, the question concerns approval of an additional borrowing programme rather than implementation of SAFE itself. A qualifying programme must create new authority for EU institutions to raise funds through common debt issuance specifically or substantially intended to finance defence-related expenditure. The programme may provide loans, grants, or a combination of both. No minimum borrowing amount is required. The forecast closes on 30 December 2027, interpreting 'before 31 December 2027' strictly as excluding 31 December itself. Background sources include the Council of the European Union's SAFE documentation (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/safe/), Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj), and the European Parliament's October 2026 briefing on emerging defence-financing initiatives (https://research.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS_BRI%282026%29796994?locale=EN).

How it resolves

The question resolves YES if, between 17 November 2026 and 30 December 2027, inclusive, the European Union formally adopts a binding legal act establishing a new EU-level joint borrowing programme that authorises the European Commission or another EU institution to issue debt backed by the EU budget, EU own resources, or collective commitments of participating member states, with defence-related expenditure constituting an explicit and substantial purpose of the programme. A qualifying programme may finance military equipment, defence procurement, defence industrial capacity, military infrastructure, research and development of military capabilities, or other clearly identified defence investments. The programme must establish additional borrowing authority beyond the €150 billion SAFE framework approved in May 2025. A legally adopted extension or amendment of SAFE qualifies only if it explicitly increases the maximum authorised EU borrowing above the previously approved €150 billion ceiling. A new financing instrument with a distinct legal basis also qualifies if it authorises additional common borrowing for defence. The question resolves NO if no qualifying legal act has been adopted by the deadline, including circumstances in which EU institutions have announced, proposed, negotiated, or politically endorsed a plan without completing the legally required approval process. Approval is determined by formal adoption of the relevant binding EU legal act by the institution or institutions legally empowered to adopt it, including the Council of the European Union and, where required, the European Parliament. Political conclusions of the European Council alone do not constitute approval. The primary resolution sources will be the Official Journal of the European Union and EUR-Lex, supplemented by official announcements from the Council of the European Union, European Commission, and European Parliament. The adoption date specified in the official legal act will determine whether the deadline has been met, even if publication or entry into force occurs later. If the legal act is formally adopted by 30 December 2027 but published afterward, it qualifies provided official EU documentation subsequently confirms the adoption date. If no qualifying act can be verified through official EU records by 31 March 2028, the question resolves NO unless there is credible official evidence that a qualifying act was adopted before the deadline and its publication is pending. The question will be annulled only if an extraordinary event makes it fundamentally impossible to apply the stated criteria, rather than merely because negotiations fail or relevant institutions do not reach agreement.

Fine print

The existing SAFE programme, including the approval of individual member-state investment plans, loan agreements, disbursements, and debt issuance within its already authorised €150 billion ceiling, does not count as a new borrowing plan. An expansion of SAFE that authorises borrowing above the existing ceiling does count. The programme need not issue bonds, disburse funds, or begin operating before the deadline; formal legal approval is sufficient. National borrowing by individual member states, even when coordinated through EU institutions or used for joint procurement, does not qualify unless it is part of an explicitly authorised common borrowing mechanism. Borrowing by the European Investment Bank under its existing financing authority does not qualify unless a new EU-level programme explicitly establishes additional common borrowing authority for defence. Similarly, increased national defence spending permitted through EU fiscal-rule exemptions, reallocations within the existing EU budget, and financing exclusively from existing revenue do not qualify. A programme financing defence alongside other policy priorities qualifies if defence is an explicitly identified, substantial intended use of the borrowed funds, rather than an incidental possibility. A borrowing arrangement established outside the EU legal framework by a subset of member states does not qualify, even if it supports European defence cooperation. If multiple qualifying programmes are approved, approval of the first is sufficient for a YES resolution. All dates are interpreted according to the official EU adoption date in Brussels, Belgium.