Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces agree a nationwide ceasefire before 31 December 2027?
As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 20%.
20%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
Probability of Yes: 20.3%. Probability of No: 79.7%. A brief nationwide humanitarian truce is the clearest route to YES, but the two commands remain divided over whether and when RSF forces must withdraw from contested cities.
Key evidence
- There is a direct precedent. The SAF and RSF signed a seven-day ceasefire in May 2023, and the UN recorded further nationwide pauses of 24 and 72 hours in June. Those deals show that the commands can agree to a short halt without settling the war. A new one would count if both sides formally accept the same nationwide terms by December 30, 2027, Sudan time, even if fighting never stops. (U.S.–Saudi agreement; UN report)
- The latest concrete proposal exposed the sticking point. The U.S.-backed draft circulated in June 2026 proposed a 90-day truce. The SAF-led authorities sought broader RSF withdrawals from cities; the RSF supported a pause in principle but rejected the proposed withdrawals. Support for different versions of a truce is not mutual acceptance. (Reuters)
- Diplomatic contact has not produced a shared commitment. The UN confirmed that both sides formed separate detainee committees, a real but limited step. Egyptian and UN readouts confirmed November outreach, not coordinated pressure by outside backers or assent to a common text. (UN Security Council briefing; Egyptian readout; UN briefing)
Uncertainties
A mediator could broker a short pause by moving withdrawals from a precondition to a later step. Coordinated pressure from outside backers or a shift in battlefield incentives could make that compromise easier. In the other direction, regional friction and signs of strain in the RSF coalition raise the risk of disruption, but they do not establish command breakdown. The clearest reason to revise upward would be confirmation that authorized representatives from both commands are negotiating the same nationwide text and narrowing their differences over when withdrawals would occur. A local pause, an aid deal, or another general endorsement of peace would not provide the same evidence.
Read the full report
TL;DR
Probability of Yes: 20.3%. Probability of No: 79.7%. The likeliest qualifying deal is a brief nationwide humanitarian truce, but the SAF and RSF remain divided over whether and when RSF forces must withdraw from contested cities.
Context
Sudan’s civil war began on April 15, 2023. By the November 17, 2026 forecast date, the SAF held Khartoum and much of the east and north, while the RSF held much of Darfur. The war had displaced about 13 million people, according to AP. That creates urgency for a pause, but it does not give the two commands the same reasons to accept one. (EUAA; AP)
The question is whether both commands formally accept the same definite nationwide ceasefire terms from November 17, 2026 through December 30, 2027, Sudan time. A 24-hour truce counts even if it never takes effect. A regional pause, a unilateral announcement, or a promise to negotiate does not. A signed agreement, matching official statements, or credible public confirmation from a mediator can establish acceptance. Evidence available through January 31, 2028 can verify that both sides accepted in time; it cannot extend the deadline.
Evidence
Historical comparisons put a qualifying deal in the minority of comparable cases, but the rate depends on what counts as a deal and which conflicts are included. Among intrastate rebel–government pairs observed three to five years into an active conflict spell, 17 of 115 had a jointly declared, whole-conflict-zone ceasefire in the next 409 days when each spell was counted once. Among the 31 spells with a prior deal of that kind, 12 had another. A stricter comparison found seven deals among 57 observations of high-intensity conflicts with an older but no recent ceasefire. That comparison required the agreement to take effect, which this question does not. In the other direction, a whole-conflict-zone agreement can cover less than all of Sudan. These figures describe different cuts of the same underlying ceasefire record, not independent evidence. They show why the SAF–RSF precedent matters, but they do not tell us how much it matters after years without a comparable deal. (ETH/PRIO ceasefire data; coding guide)
The best analogue is the same pair of commands. U.S. and Saudi mediators confirmed a seven-day ceasefire signed on May 20, 2023. The UN recorded a 24-hour nationwide agreement on June 9 and a further 72-hour nationwide ceasefire announced on June 17. These deals came early in the war, so they show what is possible, not what is imminent. More recent cooperation has been narrower. In August 2024, mediators secured guarantees for two aid routes without securing a nationwide halt. The December 2025 arrangement to protect the Heglig oil installations was another narrow bargain. Neither kind of deal required the commands to stop offensive operations across Sudan. (U.S.–Saudi agreement; UN report on the June truces; UN Security Council record)
The biggest obstacle is the order of events. The U.S.-backed draft circulated in June 2026 proposed a 90-day humanitarian truce, followed by talks on a permanent ceasefire. The SAF-led authorities pressed for broader withdrawals from cities, while the RSF rejected even partial withdrawals in its reported response. By the fall, the SAF side was still seeking monitored withdrawals from urban areas. Both sides had engaged with a concrete proposal. Neither had publicly accepted the same terms as the other. A pause first and a withdrawal first are different bargains, even when both are described as support for a truce. (Reuters; UN Security Council briefing)
The strongest sign of practical cooperation was small. On October 16, the UN said both sides had set up separate committees to work on detainee releases and possible exchanges. In the same briefing, it reported no credible movement toward a negotiated pause. Mediators were also coordinating more closely: the Quad and Quintet met jointly in September, and the UN and Switzerland convened a coordination meeting in October. Egyptian and UN readouts confirmed further contacts in November. Those meetings kept channels open, but the public readouts did not show coordinated pressure by outside backers or a common text under negotiation by two authorized military delegations. (UN Security Council briefing; African Union; UN Geneva; Egyptian readout; UN November briefing)
The military picture also gives both sides reasons to hold out. Reported SAF advances in West Kordofan make an immediate freeze less attractive to the army. The RSF’s hold over much of Darfur gives it a reason to resist a deal that starts with territorial concessions. Separately, the Sudan–Ethiopia consulate closures, an RSF field commander’s November 15 defection announcement, and allied Tamazuj’s November 16 threat to leave the coalition modestly raise the risk of disruption. None establishes that either command is losing the ability to bargain. Tamazuj does not have to sign for the two principal parties to reach a qualifying agreement. (Sudan Tribune; EUAA)
What's non-obvious
Three things that look similar in headlines are different here: supporting a truce in principle, accepting a particular truce, and observing it. A headline about acceptance can overstate progress when each side attaches different withdrawal terms. The opposite mistake is to assume continued fighting rules out a YES. A brief agreement that fails on its first day still counts. This is why a humanitarian truce is a more plausible route to YES than a political settlement, and why monitor deployments or a lasting drop in fighting are not the first signals to watch.
More meetings are less informative than a change in who is negotiating and what they are authorized to settle. Separate detainee committees show that both commands can take procedural steps. They do not show that either command has empowered representatives to trade concessions on withdrawals. A mediator confirming that authorized delegates from both sides are revising the same draft would say more than another joint appeal from outside governments.
Uncertainties
The public record cannot tell us how close private bargaining is to a compromise. The main upside is a brokered pause that puts withdrawals on a later, monitored timetable rather than making them a condition for the pause to begin. A battlefield stalemate or coordinated pressure from outside backers could make that bargain more attractive. The clearest upward signal would be a mediator identifying the same dated nationwide text under discussion by both commands and reporting progress on that sequence. A verified reciprocal detainee exchange would be a smaller positive signal: it would show the commands can deliver on a bargain, not that they have agreed on the ceasefire.
The regional picture is also incomplete. The reported new Ethiopian supply route was not verified, and a defection announcement or an ally’s threat to quit does not establish a wider split. Verified evidence that either command can no longer speak for its principal forces would matter more. So would evidence that outside backers are applying new leverage rather than holding more meetings. Until then, neither the diplomatic contacts nor the signs of coalition strain settle the key question: whether two recognized commands will commit to the same nationwide halt before the deadline.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 20% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- 1. General description of the security situation | European Union Agency for Asylumwww.euaa.europa.eu
- APapnews.com
- Download - Ceasefire Projectceasefireproject.org
- Agreement on a Short-Term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Arrangements in Sudan - United States Department of State2021-2025.state.gov
- United Nationsdocuments.un.org
- UN Security Council recorddigitallibrary.un.org
- Sudan army says US peace plan must call for full RSF withdrawal from cities, documents show | MarketScreener Canadaca.marketscreener.com
- Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 10245th meeting — UN Transcriptstranscripts.un.org
- AUC Chairperson co-chaired, with U.S. Advisor, a high-level meeting of the Quad and Quintet on Sudan | African Unionau.int
- UN Geneva - Multimedia Newsroom : Press Conference: 6th Consultative Meeting on Enhancing Coordination of Peace Initiatives and Efforts in Sudanwww.unognewsroom.org
The question
This question asks whether the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the two principal belligerents in Sudan's civil war, will reach a mutually acknowledged agreement establishing a nationwide ceasefire between November 17, 2026, and December 30, 2027, inclusive. The question concerns the formal acceptance of a ceasefire agreement by both parties, rather than whether fighting actually stops or whether the ceasefire is subsequently maintained. Sudan's civil war began on April 15, 2023, following the breakdown of relations between the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The conflict has caused extensive civilian casualties, mass displacement, severe humanitarian suffering, and widespread destruction. By November 2026, fighting had continued for more than three years, with the SAF and RSF controlling different parts of the country. According to Associated Press reporting on November 16, 2026, approximately 13 million people had been displaced by the conflict. https://apnews.com/article/64fecf743ea8c55ae9dc4a72d0acd2a7 Numerous diplomatic initiatives have sought to secure a ceasefire, including efforts involving the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, and the United Nations. In 2025 and 2026, proposals included temporary humanitarian truces intended to facilitate negotiations toward a permanent cessation of hostilities. However, negotiations repeatedly encountered disagreements concerning territorial control, withdrawal of RSF forces, military integration, and Sudan's political future. As of November 17, 2026, no mutually accepted nationwide ceasefire agreement between the SAF and RSF had been established through the recent diplomatic initiatives. A July 2026 US-backed proposal envisaged a 90-day humanitarian truce followed by negotiations on a permanent ceasefire, but the parties had not reached agreement on its terms. In November 2026, the United Nations continued pursuing diplomatic engagement, while the African Union and UN Security Council reiterated their calls for a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated political solution. Sources include the European Union Agency for Asylum (https://dip-aws.euaa.europa.eu/coi/sudan-security-situation/1-general-description-security-situation), the African Union's November 2, 2026, statement (https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20261102/20th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-aupsc-and-members-unsc), and the October 2026 Security Council Report (https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-10/sudan-42.php?print=true). The forecast will resolve positively if both the SAF and RSF formally accept the same agreement providing for a nationwide cessation of hostilities before December 31, 2027. The agreement may be temporary or permanent and may be negotiated directly or through international mediators. Actual compliance with the agreement is not required for a positive resolution.
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if, between November 17, 2026, and December 30, 2027, inclusive, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces formally agree to a common ceasefire arrangement intended to suspend offensive military operations nationwide. A qualifying agreement must satisfy all of the following conditions: (1) Both the SAF and RSF, through their recognized leadership or explicitly authorized representatives, formally accept the same ceasefire terms. (2) The agreement explicitly covers the territory of Sudan as a whole, rather than only specific cities, states, regions, or military fronts. (3) The agreement provides for a cessation of hostilities between the two organizations, rather than merely humanitarian access, prisoner exchanges, negotiations, or confidence-building measures. (4) Both parties' acceptance is publicly confirmed by official statements, a signed agreement, or a credible statement from a mediator identifying both parties as having accepted the arrangement. (5) The final required acceptance occurs before December 31, 2027, at 00:00 Sudan local time (UTC+2). A written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both organizations qualifies. Separately issued official statements also qualify if they clearly and unconditionally accept the same identifiable ceasefire proposal. A mediator's official confirmation that both parties have accepted identical ceasefire terms also qualifies, even if the full agreement is not publicly released. The agreement need not take effect immediately, provided it establishes a definite ceasefire commitment rather than merely expressing an intention to negotiate one in the future. Temporary humanitarian ceasefires, including agreements lasting 24 hours, several days, or 90 days, qualify if they explicitly establish a nationwide cessation of hostilities and are mutually accepted by both organizations. A permanent ceasefire or a comprehensive peace agreement containing an explicit nationwide ceasefire provision also qualifies. The question resolves NO if the deadline passes without credible evidence that both organizations have formally accepted a qualifying agreement. It also resolves NO if negotiations produce only unilateral ceasefire announcements, declarations of intent, regional truces, localized humanitarian pauses, agreements involving only one of the two organizations, or proposals that remain conditional on further negotiations or unfulfilled requirements. The primary resolution sources will be official announcements from the SAF and RSF, statements issued by the United Nations, African Union, or recognized international mediators, and authenticated ceasefire agreement documents. Independent reporting from Reuters, Associated Press, BBC News, and other established international news organizations will be used to corroborate the parties' acceptance and clarify ambiguous announcements. If official statements conflict, priority will be given to authenticated agreement documents and explicit statements from both parties. A mediator's assertion that an agreement exists will not independently establish a YES outcome if either organization explicitly denies having accepted it and no compelling documentary evidence resolves the contradiction. The question will be evaluated using evidence available through January 31, 2028, allowing time for reporting and verification of agreements reached before the deadline. Information published after December 30, 2027, may establish that an agreement was reached before the deadline, but an agreement first accepted after the deadline will not qualify. If the available evidence remains insufficient to establish mutual acceptance, the question resolves NO rather than being annulled. Annulment is reserved for exceptional circumstances in which the original question becomes fundamentally impossible to interpret or adjudicate, rather than merely difficult to verify.
Fine print
The forecast concerns agreement, not implementation. A ceasefire agreement that is subsequently violated, collapses immediately, or is never fully implemented will still qualify, provided both parties genuinely and formally accepted it before the deadline. However, a proposed agreement that is withdrawn before the second party accepts it will not qualify. A ceasefire does not need to be part of a broader political settlement, address the integration of the RSF into the SAF, or establish arrangements for Sudan's future government. Agreements may include monitoring mechanisms, troop withdrawals, humanitarian corridors, or third-party guarantors, but these elements are not mandatory. Nationwide means that the agreement is intended to apply throughout Sudan to hostilities between the SAF and RSF, including forces operating under their respective commands. It does not require every independent militia, allied armed group, or other belligerent to join. Explicitly excluding substantial regions of Sudan from the agreement would prevent qualification. Temporary operational exceptions, such as defensive responses to attacks, do not automatically disqualify an otherwise nationwide ceasefire. If either organization undergoes a leadership change, an agreement accepted by its recognized successor leadership will count. A ceasefire agreed by a splinter faction that does not represent the organization's principal command will not qualify. If the SAF or RSF is defeated, dissolved, or absorbed into another organization before the deadline, that development alone will not count as a ceasefire agreement. An agreement negotiated before November 17, 2026, but formally accepted by both parties during the forecast period will qualify. An agreement fully accepted before that date does not qualify as a new agreement, although a distinct renewal or replacement mutually accepted during the forecast period may qualify. All dates and deadlines are interpreted using Sudan's local time (UTC+2). The phrase 'before 31 December 2027' is interpreted strictly, meaning the last qualifying calendar date is December 30, 2027.
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