Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will the FAO Food Price Index average for calendar year 2027 be higher than its average for 2026?
As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 76%.
76%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 75.7% Yes and 24.3% No. The late-2026 price level gives 2027 a head start in an annual-average comparison, while weather and export risks support prices; stronger supply and cheaper inputs are the main counterweights.
Key evidence
- Positive carryover is the strongest signal. October 2026 FFPI was 133.9 points, down 1.2% from September but up 5.9% from a year earlier. The January–October average was 130.5406. Holding November and December at October’s level gives an illustrative 2026 average of 131.1033, leaving October 2.146% above that baseline. A flat price path can therefore produce a higher annual average (FAO).
- History supports conditioning on that starting position. Annual increases occurred in 18 of 35 years during 1991–2025. In the same historical analysis, positive October-to-estimated-annual gaps preceded increases in 16 of 18 cases. Those small samples support the direction, not near-certainty (FAO historical series).
- External outlooks point upward, but cover different baskets. The World Bank projects food commodity prices rising 7.2% in 2027; the IMF projects 2.4%. Neither is a direct FFPI forecast (World Bank; IMF).
- Supply is ample in aggregate, but not always accessible. FAO forecasts 2026 cereal production of 2,999 million tonnes and a 32.4% stocks-to-use ratio. Export disruptions in Russia and Ukraine complicate the apparent inventory cushion (FAO cereal outlook).
Uncertainties
The main NO pathway is better harvests and trade access alongside weaker demand, falling energy and fertilizer costs, and softness in animal products. NOAA’s strong El Niño outlook adds crop risk, but does not guarantee regional damage or higher prices (NOAA).
November–December 2026 and all of 2027 remain unknown. Recent meat-price estimates can also revise. Resolution compares the two complete nominal annual averages using official data available on March 31, 2028; equality resolves NO.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 75.7% Yes and 24.3% No that the nominal FAO Food Price Index annual average for 2027 exceeds its 2026 average. Late-2026 prices give 2027 a positive starting position, and institutional food commodity outlooks point upward. The central risk is a sustained price reversal from better harvests, restored export access, cheaper inputs, and weakness in meat and dairy.
Context
This question concerns internationally traded food commodity prices, not grocery bills or national food inflation. The FFPI combines cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, meat, and sugar. The outcome compares the arithmetic averages of all monthly nominal observations in each calendar year; a higher December reading alone does not settle it (FAO index and methodology).
As of November 17, 2026, October is the latest published month. Neither the complete 2026 average nor any 2027 monthly observation is known. The comparison will incorporate revisions available on March 31, 2028, and equality resolves NO. The practical task is to assess whether the current price level and supply outlook favor a higher annual average—not whether every commodity or every month rises.
Evidence
The historical backbone is less bullish than a simple inflation story suggests. The nominal annual FFPI rose in 38 of 64 years during 1962–2025, 18 of 35 during 1991–2025, 14 of 25 during 2001–2025, and only 6 of 15 during 2011–2025. These overlapping windows show that nominal food commodity prices do not rise reliably every year (FAO historical annual series).
The recent annual history makes the same point. Annual averages for 2020–2025 were 98.05, 125.73, 144.51, 124.52, 121.98, and 127.19 points, respectively. Large increases were followed by large declines before prices recovered. A strong YES forecast therefore needs evidence beyond nominal denomination or a recent annual increase (FAO historical annual series).
That evidence starts with the relationship between the latest monthly price level and the current year’s average. Historically, positive October-to-estimated-annual gaps preceded increases in 16 of 18 cases, compared with 2 of 17 cases when the gap was nonpositive. This is a small reference class, and the observations span different market regimes. Still, it shows why late-year prices contain more information for this question than an unconditional annual base rate (FAO monthly data; annual data).
The full available monthly path for 2026 shows how the current advantage developed. The following observations are rounded to three decimals from the November workbook (FAO monthly data).
| Month, 2026 | Nominal FFPI points |
|---|---|
| January | 124.128 |
| February | 125.474 |
| March | 128.670 |
| April | 131.007 |
| May | 131.007 |
| June | 130.059 |
| July | 131.711 |
| August | 133.868 |
| September | 135.564 |
| October | 133.917 |
The January–October average is 130.5406 points. If November and December both equal October, the illustrative full-year 2026 average is 131.1033. October’s level is 2.146% above that baseline. This is the decisive arithmetic: 2027 does not need continuing price increases to produce a higher annual average. A flat path at October’s level would suffice under that scenario. The scenario is not a prediction that prices stay flat, and the unfinished 2026 average is not a fixed threshold (FAO monthly data).
October also supplies direct counterevidence. The headline index fell 1.2% from September, despite remaining 5.9% above October 2025. Cereals, meat, and dairy declined during the month, while vegetable oils and sugar rose. Dairy was 16.9% below its year-earlier level. This is a mixed market, not an uninterrupted surge across the food basket (FAO October release; FAO component commentary).
Published commodity outlooks support the upward direction. The World Bank projects its food index rising 7.2% in 2027, including grains at 9.3% and oils and meals at 7.8%. The IMF projects a smaller 2.4% food-price increase. Their agreement on direction matters; their difference in magnitude is a warning against treating either as a precise FFPI forecast. Commodity coverage and weights differ, including the treatment of animal products (World Bank forecast table; IMF outlook).
The World Bank’s upward food outlook also includes falling input costs: fertilizer prices decline 12.4% and Brent oil declines 13.2% in its 2027 projections. Those declines provide a credible route to supply relief. They also show that the food-price forecast is not simply an assumption that every commodity becomes more expensive (World Bank forecast table).
Aggregate cereal supply argues against a blanket shortage thesis. FAO forecasts 2026 production of 2,999 million tonnes, the second-highest on record, and a 32.4% stocks-to-use ratio for seasons ending in 2027. Its cereal production outlook increased from 2,982 million tonnes in June to 2,999 million tonnes in November. USDA’s November wheat outlook also raised projected global ending stocks by 4.8 million tonnes to 280.8 million tonnes. These are supply buffers, although the agencies’ balances are not interchangeable (FAO June outlook; FAO November cereal outlook; USDA wheat outlook).
The location of those stocks matters. FAO attributes some inventory accumulation in Russia and Ukraine to export disruptions. Stocks that cannot reach international buyers do less to restrain traded prices. Continued restrictions support prices; restored access creates a downside channel by releasing supplies already present in the global balance (FAO October release).
Weather adds risk, not certainty. NOAA’s November 12 assessment assigns greater than 79% probability to strong-to-very-strong El Niño conditions through January–March 2027, while explicitly warning that regional impacts are not guaranteed. The climate signal supports concern about agricultural disruption, but it is not a probability of harvest losses or a higher FFPI (NOAA assessment).
Palm oil illustrates the timing problem. GAPKI projects Indonesian crude-palm-oil-plus-palm-kernel-oil production falling from 61.80 million tonnes in 2026 to 59.87 million in 2027, domestic use rising from 27.12 million to 30.20 million, and exports falling from 33.89 million to 29.73 million. These are industry projections, not measured shortages. Against them, Malaysian palm stocks rose from 3,510,554 tonnes in September to 3,621,164 tonnes in October, providing an immediate buffer against later tightening (GAPKI outlook; Malaysian official statistics).
Biofuel demand reinforces that exposure, but implementation dates matter. Indonesia’s B50 program began in July 2026, so treating the entire policy as new 2027 demand would overstate the incremental change. A full year of operation still matters, but actual consumption depends on fuel sales, funded volumes, technical compliance, and policy execution (USDA Indonesia biofuels report).
What's non-obvious
The strongest reason for YES is not a dramatic shortage forecast. It is annual-average arithmetic. Early-2026 readings pull that year’s average below October’s level. The relevant question is therefore how far prices retreat from their late-2026 position, not simply whether prices keep rising. October’s monthly decline weakens the momentum story without erasing the starting-position advantage.
The second distinction is between global abundance and accessible supply. Large inventories can coexist with expensive international trade when stocks sit behind disrupted export routes. The same distinction works in reverse: better logistics can lower prices without any new harvest. Likewise, high current palm inventories and delayed weather damage are compatible. They describe different points in time, rather than cancelling each other out.
Uncertainties
The largest unresolved issue is the actual 2027 supply response. Weather forecasts do not establish plantation-weighted crop losses, and early harvest projections are not final output. Exporter-accessible inventories, realized yields, and trade flows would clarify whether apparent abundance reaches international markets.
Biofuel absorption is another gap. A finalized, funded 2027 schedule and reliable utilization data would distinguish a binding demand increase from announced capacity or policy intent. Meat and dairy also deserve attention because crop-price strength need not carry the whole FFPI when animal-product prices weaken.
Finally, the historical comparison uses revised data, and the distribution of initial-to-final FFPI revisions has not been established. FAO warns that recent meat-price estimates can change. Both annual averages remain exposed to revisions, and the final two months of 2026 can alter the starting threshold (FAO index release). These uncertainties leave a substantial NO outcome, while the saved forecast continues to favor YES.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 76% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- FAO Food Price Index | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nationswww.fao.org
- Commodity Markets Outlook – October 2026 | Forecaststhedocs.worldbank.org
- World Economic Outlook, October 2026; Resilience Under Strain, Urgent Choices; October 13, 2026www.imf.org
- Wheat Outlook: November 2026www.ers.usda.gov
- Climate Prediction Center: ENSO Diagnostic Discussionwww.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov
- Proyeksi 2027: Ekspor Minyak Sawit Indonesia Diperkirakan Turun 12,27% Menjadi 29,73 Juta Ton - Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia (GAPKI)gapki.id
- Malaysian official statisticsbepi.mpob.gov.my
- USDA Indonesia biofuels reportapps.fas.usda.gov
- Commodity Marketswww.worldbank.org
- Kementerian ESDM RI - Media Center - Arsip Berita - Pemerintah Tetapkan Alokasi Biodiesel Tahun 2026 sebesar 15,65 juta kLwww.esdm.go.id
The question
This question asks whether the annual average of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index (FFPI) for calendar year 2027 (January 1 through December 31, 2027) will be strictly higher than the corresponding annual average for calendar year 2026 (January 1 through December 31, 2026). The comparison uses the nominal FAO Food Price Index, expressed in index points with 2014–2016 = 100, rather than the inflation-adjusted real index. The FFPI measures changes in international prices for a basket of globally traded food commodities. It combines five commodity-group indices covering cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, meat, and sugar, weighted according to their average export shares during 2014–2016. As of November 17, 2026, the latest published FFPI reading is 133.9 points for October 2026, a decrease of 1.2% from September 2026 but an increase of 5.9% compared with October 2025. The October reading remains 16.4% below the historical peak recorded in March 2022. The full-year 2026 average is not yet available because November and December 2026 have not concluded. The question will be evaluated after the complete 2027 calendar-year data become available, expected in January 2028. The purpose is to forecast whether the overall level of internationally traded food commodity prices, as measured by the FAO's nominal index, will be higher on average in 2027 than in 2026, regardless of the direction of prices in any individual month or commodity group. Source: FAO Food Price Index, November 6, 2026 release. ([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex))
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if the nominal FAO Food Price Index annual average for calendar year 2027 is strictly greater than its nominal annual average for calendar year 2026. It resolves NO if the 2027 annual average is less than or equal to the 2026 annual average. The primary resolution source will be the FAO's official Food Price Index dataset, available through its World Food Situation – FAO Food Price Index webpage at https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/. Specifically, the nominal annual Food Price Index values for 2026 and 2027 will be compared using the same official dataset and methodology. The annual average for each year is defined as the arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly nominal FFPI observations from January through December of that calendar year. Where the FAO publishes official annual nominal FFPI values, those values will be used as the primary figures, provided they represent the arithmetic averages of the corresponding monthly observations. Otherwise, the annual averages will be calculated directly from the official monthly nominal series using the greatest available published precision. The comparison will use the FAO data available on March 31, 2028, allowing time for the December 2027 observation to be published and for initial revisions. Any revisions published by FAO before that date will be incorporated into both annual averages. Revisions published after March 31, 2028, will not change the resolution. If FAO changes the index's base period or calculation methodology before resolution, both annual averages must be taken from a consistent, officially published series using the same methodology. If both years' values are available only under different, non-comparable methodologies, the question will be annulled unless FAO provides an official consistent historical series or conversion. If the necessary data are temporarily unavailable on March 31, 2028, resolution will be postponed until April 30, 2028. If comparable official figures for both years remain unavailable at that time, the question will be annulled. No alternative food price index, national consumer price index, or independently estimated commodity price series will be substituted for the FAO Food Price Index. Source: FAO official Food Price Index datasets and methodology. ([fao.org](https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex))
Fine print
The comparison concerns the nominal FAO Food Price Index, not its real (inflation-adjusted) counterpart. It measures international food commodity prices rather than consumer food prices, retail grocery prices, or food inflation within any particular country. Calendar years are used rather than agricultural marketing years or fiscal years. The outcome depends exclusively on the respective 12-month annual averages, not on whether the index ends 2027 above its December 2026 level or whether more individual months in 2027 have higher readings than their counterparts in 2026. All five commodity groups are included according to the FAO's official index methodology. Equality resolves NO because the question asks whether the 2027 average is strictly higher. Comparisons should use the greatest precision available from the official dataset before rounding; a difference concealed by published one-decimal rounding should not be treated as equality when more precise official data are available. If the FAO permanently discontinues the index without publishing comparable full-year values for both calendar years, the question will be annulled rather than resolved using an unofficial replacement. The expected resolution date is March 31, 2028, with a possible extension through April 30, 2028, solely for data availability.
More public forecasts
Will Brent crude average above $75 a barrel in calendar year 2027?
66%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will a cut to Japan's consumption tax rate on food take effect between 1 January and 31 December 2027?
97%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will 2027 be the warmest calendar year on record for global mean surface air temperature in the Copernicus ERA5 dataset?
95%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will the US FTC or DOJ sue to block more than five mergers in calendar year 2027?
23%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will US securities class action filings exceed 230 in calendar year 2027?
49%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will average daily US equity trading volume in 2027 exceed 2026, per Cboe?
54%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast