Prolepsia forecastNumber

How many bills will President Trump veto (regular and pocket vetoes) between 1 January and 31 December 2027, as listed by the US Senate's vetoes page?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia’s median forecast is 10, with an 80% chance it falls between 3 and 22.

10median

Prolepsia’s forecast distributionHow likely each value is for: How many bills will President Trump veto (regular and pocket vetoes) between 1 January and 31 December 2027, as listed by the US Senate's vetoes page?. Median: 10. 80% range: 3 to 22.
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The median (50th percentile) is 10 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027. The 10th percentile is 3 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027, and the 90th percentile is 22 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027. Democratic control of both chambers supports a higher veto count, but the decisive issue is how many separate measures reach Trump—not how many disputes Congress starts.

Key evidence

  • Congressional control changes the outlook. Election reporting establishes incoming Democratic majorities in both chambers, creating a different environment from unified Republican government. The incoming Senate majority remains below the ordinary legislative cloture threshold (AP).
  • Regulatory disapprovals provide a repeatable route to vetoes. Eligible Congressional Review Act resolutions receive expedited Senate consideration, including limited debate. That allows qualifying measures to bypass the ordinary cloture bottleneck, though passage in both chambers is still required (statutory procedures).
  • Trump's own history shows how separate resolutions multiply the count. His six vetoes in 2019 included two emergency-termination measures, one War Powers measure, and three arms-sale disapprovals. Several vetoes can therefore arise from a small number of underlying disputes (Senate record).
  • The recent baseline does not carry into the target year. The Senate lists two second-administration vetoes, both dated December 29, 2025, and no pocket vetoes. Neither counts toward 2027 (Senate record).

Uncertainties

There is no verified numerical slate of qualifying 2027 measures. Jeffries's announced priorities establish policy intent, not a count of separately presented bills (leadership letter).

The main downside risks are Senate obstruction, Democratic defections, negotiated compromises, and packaging several policies into one bill. The main upside risk is an organized campaign of separate regulatory or foreign-policy disapprovals. Veto threats and concurrent resolutions do not count, and later recording delays do not extend the 2027 measurement window.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The median (50th percentile) is 10 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027. The 10th percentile is 3 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027, and the 90th percentile is 22 vetoes January 1–December 31, 2027. The central judgment is that Democratic control of Congress increases veto opportunities, while passage through both chambers limits how many become actual vetoes.

Context

As of November 17, 2026, the Senate lists two vetoes during Trump's second administration: H.R. 131 and H.R. 504, both dated December 29, 2025, with no pocket vetoes. Neither contributes to the target-year count. The unsuccessful override proceedings in January 2026 were not additional vetoes (Senate second-administration record).

The political setting for 2027 is different. Election reporting establishes incoming Democratic control of both chambers, but not a Senate majority large enough to clear ordinary legislative cloture on its own. This creates more opportunities for confrontation without giving Democrats unrestricted power to send partisan legislation to Trump (AP election reporting).

Evidence

The historical backbone is the experience of presidents facing newly strengthened opposition after midterms. The selected calendar-year comparisons available here are shown below. They are a small, varied reference class, not a stable annual rate or a prediction that political hostility translates directly into vetoes.

Calendar year President Vetoes
1987 Reagan 3
1995 Clinton 11
2007 George W. Bush 7
2011 Obama 0
2015 Obama 5
2019 Trump 6
2023 Biden 9

These counts were reconstructed from individual Senate veto records. The historical material includes the Reagan record, Clinton record, and Trump record. The lesson is the spread: opposition gains have been followed by no vetoes in one comparison year and sustained confrontation in others. Divided government creates opportunities. It does not determine how often Congress completes legislation the president rejects.

Trump's own first-term history sharpens the comparison. He issued six vetoes in 2019, three in 2020, and one on January 1, 2021, for ten regular vetoes and no pocket vetoes across the administration. The 2021 veto appears under a 2020 congressional-session heading on the Senate page. Actual veto dates, rather than section headings, therefore matter for this question (Senate first-administration record).

The composition of those vetoes matters as much as the total. All six in 2019 concerned emergency termination, war powers, or arms sales: two emergency-termination resolutions, one War Powers resolution, and three arms-sale disapprovals. This shows that vetoes need not depend on passing a broad domestic agenda. Narrow, procedurally favored resolutions can supply much of the count (Senate first-administration record).

Biden's more recent experience points in the same direction. He vetoed nine measures in 2023 and four in 2024. Eight and three, respectively, were Congressional Review Act disapprovals. The remaining 2023 veto concerned District of Columbia legislation. These figures support treating regulatory disapproval as a substantial source of vetoes rather than a minor procedural detail.

The Congressional Review Act is the strongest reason to place the forecast above a simple reading of the historical comparisons. Eligible resolutions receive expedited Senate consideration. The statute provides for committee discharge after 20 calendar days with support from 30 senators and limits debate to 10 hours. A cohesive majority can therefore pass qualifying resolutions without clearing the ordinary cloture hurdle (CRA procedures).

The lookback mechanism also works without a change of president. Qualifying late-session rules can receive renewed review opportunities in the next session. That makes late-2026 Trump rules a potential source of separately presented disapproval resolutions in 2027. Eligibility is rule-specific, however; the existence of the procedure does not establish how many usable targets leaders will have (CRS overview).

There is evidence of intent as well as procedural capacity. A Democratic resolution challenging the rescission of the endangered-species definition of “harm” was introduced on August 3, 2026, and discharged by petition on September 15. That demonstrates willingness to use the process, not a measure guaranteed to carry into the forecast year (resolution record). Steven Balla's November 10 analysis anticipates Democratic CRA measures passing Congress and receiving vetoes, but supplies no numerical inventory. I read that as support for repeated confrontations, not proof of a particular count (GW Regulatory Studies Center analysis).

The broader agenda supplies other opportunities, with weaker links to the final count. Jeffries's November 4 letter identifies five first-100-days objectives: Medicaid, SNAP, ACA tax credits, tariffs, and the Iran war. These are objectives, not five bills. Several could be bundled into one package; others could stall before presentment (Jeffries letter). Reconciliation can bypass ordinary cloture for qualifying fiscal legislation, but packaging and substantive restrictions prevent a direct conversion from policy priorities to separate vetoes (CRS reconciliation guide).

Foreign-policy disputes also provide opportunities, but the historical throughput is sobering. In June 2019, the Senate passed 22 arms-sale disapproval resolutions. Only three passed the House and became vetoes. Counting Senate activity alone would have badly overstated presidential decisions (CRS arms-sales review). Concurrent resolutions create another counting trap: the November 2026 agreement concerning H.Con.Res.93 does not create a veto opportunity because concurrent resolutions are not presented to the president (Senate Daily Press).

Tariff disputes require similar care. The February 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling rejected IEEPA tariff authority. Challenges to replacement tariffs must address the authority actually being used; emergency-termination procedures cannot simply be assumed to apply to every tariff dispute (Supreme Court opinion). Some other disapproval routes retain substantial voting barriers. The new Russia-sanctions law, for example, includes explicit three-fifths Senate thresholds in its termination-disapproval process (statutory text).

What's non-obvious

The relevant unit is a separately presented measure, not a political dispute. One dispute can generate several vetoes when Congress passes distinct resolutions. Several large policy disputes can also produce just one veto when leaders bundle them into a single bill. This makes legislative packaging and procedural eligibility more useful than the volume of confrontational rhetoric.

The filibuster is neither a complete barrier nor irrelevant. It constrains ordinary legislation, while qualifying regulatory and other expedited resolutions can take different paths. The forecast reflects both facts. It sits above the recent low-veto baseline because opposition control and expedited procedures create real opportunities. Its wide range remains necessary because no verified numerical 2027 slate establishes how aggressively those opportunities will be used.

Uncertainties

The largest gap is the absence of a complete inventory of eligible late-2026 rules, a final applicable lookback cutoff, and a leadership-approved list of 2027 targets. Those details would help distinguish an occasional disapproval strategy from a sustained campaign. The absence of an inventory does not show that eligible targets are scarce; it leaves their number and political priority unknown.

Bicameral completion is the next uncertainty. Party defections, contested procedural eligibility, limited floor time, negotiations, and bundled packages can all reduce the number of distinct measures reaching Trump. The course of hostilities and future arms-sale notifications will also affect the foreign-policy pipeline. An announced priority or scheduled vote is not enough to settle any of these questions.

Pocket vetoes count, but they are not a major historical driver. The Senate records none for George W. Bush, Obama, Trump's first administration, or Biden (Senate veto summary). The Senate's final classification governs, including retrospective corrections. Only Trump's own qualifying vetoes during the calendar year count; departure from office would shorten his exposure. Recording delays can postpone resolution, but they cannot move a veto from outside 2027 into the measurement window.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 10 on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
Median 10, 80% range 3 to 22

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. U.S. Senate: Vetoes by President Donald J. Trumpwww.senate.gov
  2. Midterm races that are still too early to call | AP Newsapnews.com
  3. U.S.C. Title 5 - GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEESwww.govinfo.gov
  4. The Congressional Review Act (CRA): A Brief Overviewwww.everycrsreport.com
  5. GW Regulatory Studies Center analysisregulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu
  6. Dear Colleague Announcing Candidacy for Speaker of the House – Congressman Hakeem Jeffriesjeffries.house.gov
  7. Tuesday, November 10, 2026 - U.S. Senate Daily Presswww.dailypress.senate.gov
  8. 24-1287 Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (02/20/2026)www.supremecourt.gov
  9. Election results, 2026 - Ballotpediaballotpedia.org
  10. 5 U.S.C. § 802: Congressional disapproval procedureuscode.house.gov

The question

This question asks how many congressional bills and joint resolutions President Donald J. Trump will veto during the calendar year 2027, from January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2027, inclusive. Both regular vetoes and pocket vetoes count, using the official U.S. Senate's presidential veto records as the authoritative source. Each distinct bill or joint resolution vetoed during this period counts as one veto, regardless of whether Congress subsequently overrides the veto. As of November 17, 2026, the U.S. Senate's records list two vetoes during Trump's second presidential administration, both regular vetoes issued on December 29, 2025, against H.R. 131 (Finish the Arkansas Valley Conduit Act) and H.R. 504 (Miccosukee Reserved Area Amendments Act). The Senate records no pocket vetoes during his second administration to date. During Trump's first administration (2017–2021), he issued 10 regular vetoes and no pocket vetoes. The forecast concerns only vetoes occurring during 2027, excluding vetoes from earlier or later years. The relevant sources are the U.S. Senate's 'Vetoes, 1789 to Present' summary (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/vetoCounts.htm) and its 'Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump' page for his second administration (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/TrumpDJ2.htm).

How it resolves

The question resolves to the total number of distinct bills and joint resolutions that President Donald J. Trump vetoes between January 1, 2027, and December 31, 2027, inclusive, as recorded by the U.S. Senate's official presidential veto records. Both regular vetoes and pocket vetoes are included. The primary resolution source is the U.S. Senate's 'Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump' page for his second administration (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/TrumpDJ2.htm), supplemented by its 'Vetoes, 1789 to Present' summary (https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/vetoCounts.htm). For regular vetoes, the date recorded as the veto date by the Senate determines whether the veto falls within 2027. For pocket vetoes, the legally effective date of the pocket veto determines the calendar year, using the Senate's classification and any accompanying historical notes. If the Senate does not explicitly provide the date of a pocket veto, the date will be determined from official congressional or presidential records documenting the bill's presentation to the president, the expiration of the constitutional consideration period, and the relevant congressional adjournment. Each qualifying legislative measure counts once. Vetoes subsequently overridden by Congress remain included because they were presidential vetoes when issued. Veto threats, statements of opposition, and announced intentions to veto do not count. Bills that become law without the president's signature do not count. The resolution should be determined after the Senate has had sufficient time to record all vetoes occurring during 2027, including pocket vetoes recognized retrospectively. The target resolution date is March 31, 2028. If the Senate's records are incomplete at that time, resolution may be delayed until June 30, 2028, to allow for updates. If the Senate's veto records remain unavailable or materially incomplete by June 30, 2028, the question will be annulled rather than resolved using an alternative source as the primary authority. If Trump ceases to hold office at any point during 2027, only vetoes personally exercised by Trump while serving as president will count; vetoes issued by any successor are excluded. If Trump remains president but issues no qualifying vetoes during 2027, the question resolves to zero.

Fine print

The measurement period is the 2027 calendar year, not the second session of the 119th Congress or the first session of the 120th Congress. The date of the veto, rather than the date Congress initially passed or presented the measure, governs inclusion. Consequently, a bill passed in 2026 but vetoed in 2027 counts, while a bill passed in 2027 but vetoed in 2028 does not. Bills and joint resolutions are included, but concurrent resolutions and simple resolutions are excluded because they are not presented to the president for signature or veto. Regular vetoes and pocket vetoes are counted according to the Senate's official classification. If the Senate subsequently revises its classification or determines that an attempted pocket veto was ineffective, its final classification as of the resolution deadline governs. Separate vetoes of distinct bills count separately, even when issued on the same date or concerning similar legislation. The Senate's presidential summary table provides cumulative administration totals, so the 2027 count must be determined from individual veto records rather than by using the cumulative total alone. The forecast range of 0 to 40 vetoes is intended to cover plausible outcomes, but the actual number could theoretically exceed 40. The question measures vetoes attributable specifically to Donald Trump, not all presidential vetoes issued during 2027.