Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will the US average effective tariff rate be above 15% on 31 December 2027, as measured by the Yale Budget Lab?
As of 14 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 16%.
16%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 16.5% Yes and 83.5% No, conditional on the question not being annulled. NO is favored because Yale’s latest comparable benchmark sits well below 15.0%, and crossing the threshold requires substantial net additions that remain effective on December 31, 2027.
Key evidence
- The starting gap is large. Yale’s November 9 release reports a pre-substitution effective rate of 10.4175995536% in its end-2026 current-law scenario. That is not an observed November rate or a December 2027 forecast. The gap to 15.0% is 4.5824004464 percentage points. (Yale summary data)
- The statutory rate is the wrong target. Yale adjusts statutory duties for differences between modeled liabilities and collections. Using the higher statutory figure would overstate proximity to the threshold. (Yale methodology)
- The strongest ordinary escalation route remains unresolved. USTR’s excess-capacity investigations cover 16 economies, but its record lists investigations and hearings rather than a final tariff schedule. Coverage, rates and overlap with existing duties remain decisive. (USTR initiation; investigation record)
- Existing duties can also fall. Litigation challenges the broad forced-labor tariff program. The government has argued for remand without vacatur, meaning an adverse ruling would not necessarily stop duties immediately. (Government brief)
Uncertainties
The main upside risk is broad escalation, including withdrawal of currently operative sanctions-related tariff waivers. Those waivers have no automatic expiry, so the underlying duties are not an inevitable future increase. (Executive order)
Negotiated exemptions, court remedies and replacement tariffs could offset new measures. Yale’s own revisions also matter: its November product-coverage correction changed estimates without a policy repeal. (Release notes) Exactly 15.0% resolves NO; the applicable official estimate, including accepted revisions through March 30, 2028, determines the outcome.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 16.5% Yes and 83.5% No, conditional on a valid resolution. NO is the clear favorite because Yale’s latest comparable pre-substitution benchmark is 10.4175995536%, leaving a substantial gap to 15.0%. A YES outcome requires broad net tariff additions that take effect and remain operative on December 31, 2027.
Context
This question measures one tariff regime on one date. It does not ask for the average rate during 2027, the highest announced tariff, or customs revenue divided by imports. The target is Yale’s overall pre-substitution effective rate across merchandise imports, with fixed import weights. Exactly 15.0% resolves NO. Accepted historical revisions through March 30, 2028, determine the final observation.
The latest Yale publication is dated November 9, 2026. Its relevant summary gives an end-2026 current-law calculation, not a current-day observation or a published December 2027 projection. That distinction limits what the starting figure can tell us, but it remains the best comparable anchor for assessing the size of the required policy change. (Yale publication; official summary)
Evidence
The historical record shows that large tariff shifts are possible. Yale reported a rate of 2.4% entering February 2025 and 15.6% on June 1, 2025. That establishes a precedent for crossing the threshold under this administration. It does not establish a reliable frequency for doing so: these observations belong to one changing policy episode, and Yale later changed its measurement approach. (Yale’s historical analysis)
The subsequent reversal matters too. After the Supreme Court invalidated IEEPA tariffs on February 20, 2026, Yale’s April 8 analysis estimated a pre-substitution rate of 11.8%, with a projected decline to 9.7% later that year under its baseline assumptions. Those figures describe an earlier policy and measurement setting. They are not directly interchangeable with the later estimates.
The more comparable history is Yale’s sequence of end-2026 calculations after its methodological update. The table gives the full sequence of default-scenario vintages described in the research, rather than selecting only the latest decline. These are successive estimates of an end-year regime, not realized rates on each publication date. (Yale release history; archived update history)
| Publication vintage, 2026 | End-2026 pre-substitution effective rate |
|---|---|
| July 16 | 7.957% |
| July 21 | 8.213% |
| July 24 | 10.865% |
| August 11 | 10.880% |
| August 24 | 10.880% |
| November 2 | 10.972% |
| November 9 | 10.418% |
The sequence shows both policy change and measurement change. It is not a set of independent historical trials, and extrapolating its short-run movements would give false confidence. The July 16 materials also included a separate proposed-Section-301 scenario with a pre-substitution rate of 10.855%; that was a policy alternative, not another observation in the default sequence. (Archived scenario history)
The latest precise benchmark is 10.4175995536%. The gap to the threshold is 4.5824004464 percentage points, and a YES requires more than that gap. This is a demanding hurdle for measures confined to a few products or trading partners. It is not an estimate of where the rate will finish in 2027. (Official summary data)
Measurement makes the hurdle larger than a statutory headline suggests. Yale’s July methodology distinguishes statutory rates from effective rates adjusted for noncompliance and differences between modeled duties and observed collections. Pre-substitution keeps import weights fixed; it does not remove those adjustments. Post-substitution makes a further adjustment for changes in purchasing patterns. Only the pre-substitution effective measure answers this question. (Yale methodology)
The November revision gives a concrete example of measurement risk. A correction to the coverage of metals-derivative tariffs removed an incorrectly included duty from computers, computer parts and roughly 70 other product groups. Yale’s statutory estimate fell by about 0.6 percentage points, retrospectively from April 6 onward, without a corresponding tariff repeal. The latest estimate is therefore neither a floor nor an immutable starting point. (Yale release notes)
The principal ordinary route upward is the excess-capacity investigation. USTR initiated investigations covering 16 economies on March 11, 2026. The ordinary timetable leaves room for action before the endpoint. But the official record identifies investigations and hearings, not a final schedule defining tariff rates, covered goods and stacking rules. This supports a real escalation risk, not an enacted increase. (USTR initiation; current investigation record)
Negotiation is also an active path. USTR’s October 7 cooperative excess-capacity initiative included several investigated partners. I read that as evidence against treating every investigation as an inevitable additional tariff layer. Reporting about a possible 7.5% China tariff points the other way, but a China-only increase is not a 7.5-percentage-point increase across all US imports. (USTR joint initiative; reported China proposal)
Existing broad tariffs must not be counted twice. The July forced-labor action covered 60 economies at headline rates generally of 10% or 12.5%, with exclusions and special treatment of ordinary duties. It replaced the expiring Section 122 surcharge rather than simply stacking another universal charge on top. It is already represented in the latest benchmark. (Final action)
That same tariff layer faces litigation. The government’s supplemental brief addresses statutory authority and argues for remand without vacatur. A legal defeat therefore need not mean immediate removal: relief, scope and stays matter. Conversely, removal of a substantial existing layer would offset new duties and make the threshold harder to reach. (Government brief)
The sectoral pipeline is mixed. The October machinery and robotics proclamation chose negotiations rather than an immediate duty. Pharmaceutical arrangements include qualifying zero-duty treatment into 2029, while the specified onshoring-rate increase to 100% occurs in 2030, outside the horizon. A separate China semiconductor increase is scheduled for June 23, 2027, but its additional rate remains unspecified. These distinctions weaken the claim that every high headline rate or review deadline translates into a large 2027 aggregate increase. (Machinery proclamation; pharmaceutical rules; semiconductor action)
A separate sanctions authority creates a more abrupt upside risk. Executive Order 14436 provides for very high Graham Act duties but also waives them. The operative waiver has no automatic expiry. Withdrawal could create a large increase; the existence of the authority alone does not place those duties in the effective regime. (Executive order)
What's non-obvious
The decisive quantity is the net addition, not the announced rate. A tariff can replace another duty, exempt much of a country’s trade, or cover a small product base. Broad geographic coverage is not the same as broad dutiable-import coverage. That is why a stream of tariff announcements can coexist with an aggregate rate that stays below the threshold.
The other easy mistake is to treat Yale’s latest figure as either an observed daily rate or a ready-made 2027 forecast. It is neither. The end-2026 benchmark anchors the scale of the problem, while the endpoint depends on subsequent additions, removals and revisions. The case for NO rests on that substantial starting gap and those offsets—not on an assumption that tariff policy stops changing.
Uncertainties
The biggest unknown is the final excess-capacity remedy: its rates, exemptions, import coverage and treatment of existing duties. A published final schedule would sharply improve the assessment. So would complete information on negotiated concessions and whether future tariffs supplement or replace current measures.
Legal durability remains unresolved. The available research did not establish a final merits ruling eliminating the forced-labor program, a complete current docket picture, or a reliable decision timetable. Missing information is not evidence that the tariffs are safe. The relevant evidence will be operative orders, their geographic scope and any stays—not simply which side wins an initial argument.
Finally, Yale had not published a 2027 aggregate rate baseline in the examined material. Its future weights, exemption treatment and historical corrections can move the resolving statistic in either direction. The strict threshold and revision cutoff therefore matter, especially near 15.0%. These uncertainties preserve a meaningful YES risk, but they do not displace the saved forecast favoring NO.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 16% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- The State of U.S. Tariffs | The Budget Labbudgetlab.yale.edu
- official summaryraw.githubusercontent.com
- State of Tariffs: 2026-11-09 release on the annex-parser-fixed tracke… · Budget-Lab-Yale/budget-lab-interactives@94d36c7 · GitHubgithub.com
- USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigations Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors | United States Trade Representativeustr.gov
- Trump administration to delay excess capacity tariffs - TTwww.ttnews.com
- Federal Register :: Notice of Actions in Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure of Each Economy To Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced With Forced Laborwww.federalregister.gov
- Government brieflibertyjusticecenter.org
- ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF ROBOTICS, INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY, AND THEIR PARTS AND COMPONENTS INTO THE UNITED STATES – The White Housewww.whitehouse.gov
- semiconductor actionwww.govinfo.gov
- Executive orderpublic-inspection.federalregister.gov
The question
This question asks whether the United States' average effective tariff rate (ETR), as calculated and reported by The Budget Lab at Yale University, will exceed 15.0% on December 31, 2027. The relevant measure is the overall, pre-substitution average effective tariff rate across all US merchandise imports, including tariffs imposed under all applicable trade authorities. Pre-substitution means that import weights are held fixed rather than adjusted to reflect changes in purchasing patterns induced by tariffs. The question concerns the tariff regime actually in effect on December 31, 2027, rather than the average tariff rate during calendar year 2027 or projections of policies that have not yet taken effect. As of November 14, 2026, US tariff policy has undergone substantial changes since the beginning of President Donald Trump's second administration in January 2025. The Budget Lab estimated that the average effective tariff rate rose from approximately 2.4% in early 2025 to 15.6% on June 1, 2025, amid the introduction and modification of multiple tariff measures. Subsequent legal developments and policy changes substantially altered the tariff landscape. In particular, the Supreme Court's February 20, 2026 ruling invalidating tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) led to significant changes in the tariff regime. The Budget Lab's April 8, 2026 analysis estimated a pre-substitution average effective tariff rate of 11.8%, with a projected decline to 9.7% later in 2026 under its baseline assumptions. Sources: The Budget Lab, 'Effective Tariff Rates and Economic Uncertainty in a Rapid Policy Environment' (June 4, 2025), and 'State of U.S. Tariffs: April 8, 2026.' The Budget Lab subsequently introduced methodological improvements and an interactive tariff tracking tool in July 2026. These improvements incorporated more detailed statutory tariff calculations and adjustments informed by observed differences between statutory rates and actual tariff collections. Its 'State of U.S. Tariffs' publication was updated on November 9, 2026. Because both US trade policy and the Budget Lab's measurement methodology may continue to evolve, the December 31, 2027 rate remains uncertain. The forecast therefore concerns the rate that The Budget Lab ultimately attributes to that specific date, using its applicable methodology, rather than a calculation independently reconstructed from tariff announcements. Sources: The Budget Lab, 'Improvements to the Budget Lab Tariff Model and a New Tracking Tool for Making It More Accessible' (July 20, 2026), and 'The State of U.S. Tariffs' (November 9, 2026).
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if The Budget Lab at Yale University reports an overall, pre-substitution US average effective tariff rate strictly greater than 15.0% for December 31, 2027. It resolves NO if the corresponding rate is 15.0% or lower. The primary resolution source will be The Budget Lab's official Tariff Rate Tracker and associated 'State of U.S. Tariffs' interactive reports, datasets, or downloadable data. The relevant observation is the aggregate US average effective tariff rate applicable to December 31, 2027, incorporating all tariff measures legally in effect on that date and included in The Budget Lab's methodology. The measure must cover all US merchandise imports rather than a particular trading partner, product category, or tariff authority. The pre-substitution measure takes precedence over any post-substitution rate or rate calculated directly from realized customs revenue. Resolution will occur once The Budget Lab has published sufficient information to establish the rate applicable to December 31, 2027, allowing up to 90 days after that date for publication or retrospective updates. If a December 31 observation is available in a daily historical series, that observation will be used. If the tracker instead reports the rate only on dates when policies change, the most recent historical observation on or before December 31, 2027, will be used, provided The Budget Lab's data establish that the reported rate remained applicable through December 31. If multiple versions of the relevant rate are published, the most recently updated official historical estimate available by March 30, 2028, will take precedence. This avoids resolving the question based on an outdated estimate when The Budget Lab has subsequently corrected or revised its calculations. If The Budget Lab changes the name, format, or presentation of its tariff rate tracker, the equivalent overall pre-substitution average effective tariff rate published by the institution will be used. If it changes its underlying methodology, the institution's updated methodology will be accepted, provided the resulting statistic remains substantively equivalent to the original target. If The Budget Lab ceases publication, does not provide a rate applicable to December 31, 2027, by March 30, 2028, or changes its methodology so substantially that no comparable pre-substitution measure can be identified, the question will be annulled. No estimate from another institution will be substituted for The Budget Lab's measure.
Fine print
The threshold is strictly greater than 15.0%. A reported value of exactly 15.0% resolves NO, while a reported value of 15.1% resolves YES. If additional decimal places are available in The Budget Lab's official underlying data, the unrounded value will be used. If only rounded figures are available, the most precise officially published figure will determine the outcome. A displayed value of 15.0% will therefore resolve NO unless more precise official data establish that the underlying value exceeds 15.0%. The relevant date is December 31, 2027, using the US Eastern Time calendar date for determining which tariff policies are in effect. Tariffs announced before that date but scheduled to take effect afterward are excluded. Tariffs that have expired, been suspended, or been legally invalidated before that date are excluded to the extent that The Budget Lab excludes them from its applicable rate calculation. Temporary tariffs still in effect on December 31, 2027, are included even if they are scheduled to expire shortly afterward. The question measures the overall effective tariff rate, not the increase relative to the pre-2025 baseline. For example, an overall rate of 16% resolves YES regardless of how much of that rate is attributable to policies introduced before or after January 2025. The rate is a point-in-time measure, not an annual average, a forecast of future tariff policy, a trade-weighted average calculated independently by another institution, or a tariff-revenue-to-import-value ratio based solely on realized customs collections. Changes in The Budget Lab's modeling assumptions, import weights, or treatment of tariff exemptions will be accepted as part of its published methodology, subject to the requirement that the reported measure remain comparable to the original target. Later revisions published after March 30, 2028, will not reopen the resolution.
More public forecasts
Will US casualty insurance rates rise by more than 5% in 2027, as measured by the CIAB market survey?
27%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will at least one major AI lab announce its own web index to replace third-party search APIs before 31 December 2027?
82%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will Congress pass a law limiting the president's power to impose tariffs before 31 December 2028?
32%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will the EU and China agree minimum prices that replace EU tariffs on Chinese electric cars before 31 December 2027?
26%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will the US raise its tariff on most EU goods above 15% before 31 December 2027?
20%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast
Will global commercial insurance prices fall in the second quarter of 2027, as measured by the Marsh Global Insurance Market Index?
96%chance of yes
Prolepsia forecast