Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will the Iranian regime fall before 2027?

As of 20 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 1%.

1%chance of yes

Yes 1%No 99%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

Probability of Yes: 1.3%. Probability of No: 98.7%. Iran's ruling system is under severe pressure, but with about six weeks left, the evidence points to continued government control rather than a break that meets the market's December 31 deadline.

Key evidence

The March succession preserved the system. After Ali Khamenei was killed, the Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei through the existing institutions. Who makes day-to-day decisions remains unclear, but the market requires a fundamental break in the governing system or loss of effective authority over most Iranians. A change at the top is not enough. (Congressional Research Service)

Abdanan showed local coordination, not a national shutdown. The November 17 protest followed a crash that killed 13 refinery workers. Shop closures and anti-government chants showed how a local grievance could draw workers, merchants, and protesters together. The reporting did not establish sustained stoppages across major cities, organized security-force defections, or a rival authority taking over civilian administration. (Associated Press)

Fiscal stress had not clearly broken active-duty payroll. The IMF projected a 7.6% contraction and 78.6% average consumer-price inflation for 2026. Against October accounts of security-pay arrears, military welfare channels reported November 18–19 disbursements for the regular army, police, and Revolutionary Guard. Those overlapping notices were not audited and did not establish coverage across units. They modestly weaken the case for an imminent payroll-driven rupture. (IMF; Axios)

Uncertainties

A wider war, worsening shortages, or broader strikes could expose divisions that public reporting cannot see. The strongest evidence against the forecast would be serving units collectively refusing orders, synchronized stoppages across major cities and industries, or provincial officials taking orders from a rival authority. The main unknowns are how widely active-duty pay reached, who can command the security forces in a crisis, and whether a new shock would leave enough time for the regime to lose sovereign power by December 31.

Read the full report

TL;DR

Probability of Yes: 1.3%. Probability of No: 98.7%. The key distinction is that Iran's ruling system is under severe strain, while the market requires a break in that system or loss of governing power over most Iranians by December 31, 2026.

Context

As of November 20, the Islamic Republic had about 42 days left before the deadline of December 31, 2026, at 11:59 p.m. ET. The regime had survived the killing of Ali Khamenei on February 28 and the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei in March. The new leader's public absence made it hard to tell who was making decisions, but the state still operated through its existing civilian and security institutions. (Congressional Research Service; IISS)

Yes requires a broad consensus of credible reporting that the regime has ceased to exercise sovereign power. That means a fundamental break in the governing system or loss of effective authority over a majority of the population. An internal takeover that leaves the core institutions intact does not count. Nor does losing territory if the regime still governs most Iranians.

Evidence

The historical starting point is that mature autocracies rarely end in six weeks. The Geddes–Wright–Frantz data record 42 failures in 1,409 regime-years for autocracies at least 25 years old, and 13 in 443 for those at least 45 years old. Both imply a six-week breakdown rate well under 1%. This is not a wartime benchmark, and the historical definition does not exactly match the market's. Iran's war, blockade, and fiscal distress make the average a poor stand-alone guide, but the short window still matters. A regime can deteriorate quickly when a rival can already govern: Assad fell in 11 days in December 2024, but the opposition already had an administrative and territorial base in Idlib. The reporting did not identify a comparable rival administration inside Iran. (Geddes–Wright–Frantz; UK country assessment on Syria)

The March succession is the strongest direct evidence of continuity. The Assembly of Experts filled the office after a severe shock rather than yielding to a new governing authority. In September, President Masoud Pezeshkian described a six-member group coordinating decisions across existing bodies. That did not establish who had the final word. Nor did public factional disputes or the long vacancy at the intelligence ministry establish a break in command. The IISS review found no visible split in the security forces after the initial blows. DW documented two individual defectors in October, evidence of disaffection but not of serving units switching allegiance. (Congressional Research Service; CBS interview; Iran International; IISS; DW)

Abdanan showed how a local grievance can turn political. A crash killed 13 refinery workers, shopkeepers closed their businesses, and some participants in the November 17 protest chanted against the regime. The closures and labor solidarity matter because they connected different groups. They did not amount to a nationwide oil stoppage or a sustained strike across major cities. Hengaw reported detentions; the counts were disputed, but the reports of dispersal and arrests support a narrower point: local forces still acted. That says little about whether units across the country would obey orders in a larger crisis. (Associated Press; Oil contract workers' council; Hengaw)

The economy gives the regime less room to absorb another shock. The IMF's October outlook listed a 0.9% real GDP contraction and 50.6% average consumer-price inflation for 2025 and projected a 7.6% contraction and 78.6% average inflation for 2026. These annual figures are not November readings. The IEA estimated crude production at 1.94 million barrels a day in September and 1.86 million in October. Production is not exports, and exports are not cash in government accounts. Kpler's warning that crude and condensate receipts could dry up by mid-December depended on continued blockade enforcement. Reporting on a November 19 tanker transfer did not establish a completed export or payment. (IMF; IEA; Kpler)

The more direct fiscal test is whether serving forces get paid. October accounts from CENTCOM and a Revolutionary Guard member's family pointed to arrears. Iranian military welfare channels reported November 18–19 disbursements for the regular army, police, and Revolutionary Guard. The notices overlap and are not audited payroll records, so they cannot establish how many units received full pay. They do cut against the narrower claim that pay had already stopped across the forces that enforce state orders. Separately, reporting on overdue armed-forces retiree benefits concerned a special supplement, not regular pensions or active-duty salaries. (Axios on CENTCOM's account; October reporting on salary delays; Military welfare notices; HRANA on retiree benefits)

Renewed exchanges on November 17–18 left open the risk of a wider war. On November 19, Trump said he expected to defer his next decision until the new year, even as a wider campaign remained under consideration. That statement weighs against immediate escalation; it is not a commitment. Even a new campaign would have to do more than inflict damage. It would have to cause a break in governing authority and do so early enough for the change to be clear by the deadline. (Associated Press; Reuters)

What's non-obvious

The most useful distinction is between financial pain and a failure to carry out orders. Inflation, falling oil production, and arrears all point to stress. None shows that active-duty formations have stopped being paid or that they would refuse orders. The November disbursement notices are weak evidence about the health of the state, but they speak more directly to the immediate risk of a payroll-driven rupture than another bad inflation reading does.

The same distinction applies at the top. A Supreme Leader can be absent from public view, and factions can fight over decisions, while officials still run ministries and security forces still act. The market does not ask whether the post-succession system is weaker. It asks whether that system still governs. A rival actually taking over civilian administration would say more about that than another sign of conflict inside Tehran.

Uncertainties

Public reporting gives a poor view of private loyalties. There is no representative unit-level payroll record or verified picture of who can give binding orders across the security services. The available protest reporting also does not establish national coverage, and there is no population-weighted assessment of effective control. These gaps leave room for a rupture to emerge faster than the available evidence suggests.

The clearest reasons to revisit the forecast would be corroborated collective refusals by serving formations, sustained stoppages across several major cities and industries, or civilian officials taking orders from a rival authority. A renewed external campaign or a winter fuel crisis could bring those developments forward. Neither would settle the question on its own: the decisive evidence would be a fundamental institutional break or loss of governing power over most Iranians before the deadline.

What changed since the last forecast

This forecast is not compared to the previous run because the answer shape, model stack, or engine settings changed. Treat it as a fresh baseline.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has moved10 forecasts, from 10% on 6 Oct 2026 to 1% on 20 Nov 2026.6 Oct 2026: 10%10 Oct 2026: 8%15 Oct 2026: 8%20 Oct 2026: 8%25 Oct 2026: 7%30 Oct 2026: 7%4 Nov 2026: 3%9 Nov 2026: 3%14 Nov 2026: 3%20 Nov 2026: 1%
DateForecast
1% chance of yes
3% chance of yes
3% chance of yes
3% chance of yes
7% chance of yes
7% chance of yes
8% chance of yes
8% chance of yes
8% chance of yes
10% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. U.S. Conflict with Iran - EveryCRSReport.comwww.everycrsreport.com
  2. <visual_element id="e1">www.iiss.org
  3. # New Data Set: Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitionscpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com
  4. Country policy and information note: returnees after fall of Al-Assad regime, Syria, July 2025 (accessible) - GOV.UKwww.gov.uk
  5. Transcript: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan" - CBS Newswww.cbsnews.com
  6. طرح تازه مجلس؛ حذف شرط اجتهاد برای وزیر و افزایش اختیارات رهبر در وزارت اطلاعات | Iran Internationalwww.iranintl.com
  7. Iran's elite forces: Devotion and 'nothing but control'amp.dw.com
  8. Protesters rally in a town in southwestern Iran after a road crash killed 13 refinery workersapnews.com
  9. شورای سازماندهی اعتراضات کارگران پیمانی نفت – Telegramt.me
  10. Hengawhengaw.org

The question

Imported from Polymarket. This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market.

How it resolves

This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power. Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify. Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran. The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.