Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will Pedro Sánchez be the next Prime Minister of Spain?
As of 14 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 6%.
6%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 5.6% for Yes and 94.4% for No. Sánchez needs both a substantial electoral upset and a parliamentary agreement that keeps him, rather than another Socialist, as prime minister.
Key evidence
- The election is close. The official decree schedules voting for November 29, 2026, and the new chambers to convene on December 23. As of the November 14 forecast, only 15 days remain before voting (official decree).
- The central polling picture favors the right. RTVE’s November 13 synthesis projects 194 PP–Vox seats, above the 176-seat absolute-majority threshold. The November 14 40dB report projects PP 126 and Vox 63, plus two separately listed UPN–PP seats: 191 including UPN. The synthesis overlaps with individual polls, so these are not wholly independent confirmations (RTVE; 40dB report).
- There is meaningful dissent. The November 12 CIS release puts PSOE ahead and offers a much more favorable seat picture for Sánchez. But its 45,074 interviews were conducted October 7–30, earlier than the latest tracking. A large sample does not eliminate weighting or turnout-model error (CIS coverage).
- A right-wing shortfall is not enough. Junts said on November 6 that it would not facilitate Feijóo but wanted another PSOE candidate. That separates the prospects of a Socialist government from Sánchez’s personal prospects (EFE).
Uncertainties
The strongest challenge is correlated polling error. In 2023, RTVE’s late synthesis projected 178 PP–Vox seats; the final total was 170. That crossed the majority threshold, though today’s central projected cushion is larger (2023 synthesis; official results).
Late turnout, provincial seat allocation and Junts’s willingness to bargain remain decisive unknowns. Deadlock could lead to another election, preserving a recovery route. But caretaker service does not qualify, another Socialist taking office first means No, and no qualifying appointment by March 31, 2028, 11:59 PM ET resolves to “Other,” also making Sánchez’s outcome No.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 5.6% for Yes and 94.4% for No. The central expectation is a PP-led government, with Sánchez blocked first by electoral arithmetic and then by opposition to his personal candidacy. Count only a new congressional confidence vote followed by formal swearing-in; continued incumbency or caretaker service does not satisfy the question.
Context
Spain votes on November 29, 2026, just 15 days after the forecast date. The election decree schedules the new chambers to convene on December 23, so the immediate contest—not the distant resolution deadline—drives the outlook (official decree). Most current polling projects enough seats for PP and Vox to govern without relying on Sánchez’s potential partners (RTVE synthesis).
The market concerns the next person to receive congressional confidence and be formally sworn in to form a new government by March 31, 2028, 11:59 PM ET. Sánchez can qualify through reappointment, but simply staying in office does not count. Another Socialist qualifying first means No. If nobody qualifies before the deadline, the market resolves to “Other,” which also means No for Sánchez.
Evidence
The historical backbone argues against treating a polling lead as a guarantee. It also argues against assuming that polls always exaggerate the right. Relevant comparisons across the elections held in April 2019, November 2019 and July 2023 show errors in both directions. The table uses PP plus Vox, excluding separately identified allied lists where needed. Error means the final result minus the projected total.
| Election and poll | Projected PP–Vox seats | Final seats | Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| April 2019, GAD3, normalized to exclude Navarra Suma | 105–113; midpoint 109 | 90 | −19 |
| November 2019, Celeste-Tel | 132 | 141 | +9 |
| November 2019, GAD3 | 141 | 141 | 0 |
| July 2023, 40dB | 170 | 170 | 0 |
| July 2023, RTVE synthesis | 178 | 170 | −8 |
| July 2023, GAD3 | 181 | 170 | −11 |
| July 2023, Sigma Dos | Midpoint 181 | 170 | −11 |
| July 2023, IMOP | 183 | 170 | −13 |
The April comparison comes from GAD3’s published survey. The November comparisons were reported in contemporary coverage. The July comparisons come from the original 40dB report, RTVE’s synthesis and secondary reporting of other polls. Historical seat totals are recorded in the Interior Ministry’s elected-candidate data.
These are a few elections, not a reliable statistical base rate. Several polls from the same election share the same electorate and campaign shocks. April 2019 is also less transferable because Ciudadanos was then an important competing right-wing party. The strongest recent lesson is narrower: in July 2023, an eight-seat miss in RTVE’s synthesis moved PP–Vox from above the majority threshold to below it. Yet 40dB’s earlier central bloc estimate matched the final total exactly. History supports a substantial-error risk, not an automatic correction in Sánchez’s favor.
Today’s mainstream projections give the right a larger cushion. RTVE’s November 13 synthesis assigns PP 130 seats and Vox 64, for 194 combined, with PSOE on 110. Its constituent polls overlap, so the synthesis is a summary of the polling picture rather than an independent extra survey (RTVE).
The freshest primary evidence is less adverse to Sánchez, but still adverse. The November 14 40dB report, based on 1,500 online interviews conducted November 10–13, estimates PP at 31.1%, PSOE at 29.8% and Vox at 18.5%. Its seat chart gives PP 126, Vox 63 and a separate UPN–PP list two seats: 191 including that list. Reported certainty of voting is 74.7% among PSOE supporters, 75.1% among PP supporters and 78.8% among Vox supporters. These figures do not show a clear PSOE turnout advantage (40dB report). An earlier GAD3 survey, conducted November 3–5 and published November 9, projected PP 136 and Vox 63, or 199 combined (GAD3).
There is real disagreement. SW Demoscopia’s November 13 report, based on 7,500 telephone interviews conducted October 26–November 12, projects PP 114 and Vox 59. That is 173 together, rising to 175 with its separately listed PP–UPN seats and 176 including Coalición Canaria. This is a much tighter outcome, but still not evidence of a Sánchez investiture majority (SW Demoscopia).
CIS supplies the strongest contrary evidence. Its October study estimated PSOE at 34.0%, PP at 22.2% and Vox at 17.1% (October estimates). The pre-election release published November 12 estimated PSOE at 33.3%, PP at 25.5% and Vox at 18.4%, using 45,074 interviews conducted October 7–30. Its seat picture is substantially more favorable to Sánchez than most private polling. But its fieldwork is older, and reported recalled-vote imbalances raise questions about nonresponse and weighting. The sample size reduces sampling noise; it does not settle a disagreement about how respondents translate into actual voters (RTVE’s CIS coverage).
Government formation is a separate hurdle. On November 6, Junts rejected facilitating Feijóo while demanding a different PSOE candidate. It also objected to Ada Colau entering government. Junts reversed an anti-Sánchez position before supporting him in 2023, so its current veto is consequential but not irreversible (EFE). Sánchez remains PSOE’s unanimously nominated candidate; no accepted replacement or signed alternative confidence agreement has been established (nomination report).
Other parties cannot simply be assigned to an anti-right bloc. PNV rejects governments dependent on Vox, without promising unconditional support to Sánchez (PNV programme). UPN’s agreement supports Feijóo (PP–UPN agreement). Coalición Canaria has tied support to commitments for the islands rather than excluding either major party (Valido interview). Feijóo has publicly left governing with Vox open, so friction between those parties is not enough to assume their negotiations will fail (RTVE).
Institutional history keeps minority and repeat-election routes open. Rajoy failed a confidence vote in September 2016 before succeeding through abstentions in October. Sánchez failed in July 2019 before winning in January 2020. In 2023, Feijóo failed before Sánchez won. These precedents show that election-night leadership does not determine the next premier (Congress investiture history). The rules require 176 affirmative votes initially, or more yeses than noes 48 hours later; two months without an investiture after the first ballot trigger another election (Constitution, Article 99).
What's non-obvious
A narrower PP–PSOE gap is not the same as a viable Sánchez majority. Vox’s seats count toward the right’s governing arithmetic, and separately reported allied lists matter near the threshold. Likewise, Junts refusing to install Feijóo does not promise affirmative votes—or sufficient abstentions—for Sánchez. The decisive question is who can win confidence, not which major party improves its vote share.
The weaker signals do not close that gap. Left-wing coordination differs by province, and the reported focus on 16 provincial targets is a campaign plan, not 16 expected seat gains (campaign reporting). November 11 mobilization also produced sharply conflicting participation claims, not a verified electoral-turnout boost (mobilization coverage). These signals justify watching turnout and marginal seats. They do not overturn the central parliamentary picture.
Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is shared polling error. Surveys can agree because they share faulty turnout, weighting or seat-conversion assumptions. New province-level evidence and actual turnout patterns would help distinguish genuine agreement from common bias. CIS and SW demonstrate that a more competitive outcome remains supported by some evidence, even though neither establishes Sánchez’s personal route to office.
Coalition bargaining is less observable than polling. There is no verified agreement showing whether Junts would maintain its personal veto, abstain or ultimately support Sánchez. Nor is there a completed PP–Vox government agreement. Firm confidence commitments and exact post-election seat totals would resolve much of this uncertainty.
Finally, a repeat election preserves a recovery route only while nobody else has qualified. The deadline gives negotiations time; it does not make caretaker continuation a Yes. The forecast remains 5.6% for Yes and 94.4% for No because Sánchez must overcome both the electoral obstacle and the candidate-specific bargaining obstacle before another person takes office.
What changed since the last forecast
This forecast is not compared to the previous run because the answer shape, model stack, or engine settings changed. Treat it as a fresh baseline.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
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| 5% chance of yes | |
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| 8% chance of yes | |
| 7% chance of yes | |
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| 7% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- BOE-A-2026-20742 Real Decreto 806/2026, de 5 de octubre, de disolución del Congreso de los Diputados y del Senado y de convocatoria de elecciones.www.boe.es
- Encuestas elecciones generales: PP y Vox podrían gobernarwww.rtve.es
- Elecciones generales 28 de abril - GAD3 para La Vanguardiawww.gad3.com
- El PSOE y Vox recuperan apoyos electorales en la semana de la exhumación de Francowww.eldiario.es
- Presentación de PowerPointep00.epimg.net
- Pedro Sánchez, por detrás en las encuestas de cara a debate clave en televisiónwww.bloomberglinea.com
- Interior Ministry’s elected-candidate datadescargas.interior.gob.es
- Presentación de PowerPointelpais.com
- 13.11.2026 · Barómetro electoral · Elecciones Generales 29-Nmedia.licdn.com
- October estimateswww.cis.es
The question
Imported from Polymarket. This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market.
How it resolves
This market will resolve to the next individual who officially assumes the office of Prime Minister of Spain by March 31, 2028, 11:59 PM ET. To count for resolution, the individual must receive a vote of confidence from the Congress of Deputies and be formally sworn-in, resulting in the official formation of a new government. Any interim or caretaker Prime Minister who does not receive a parliamentary vote of confidence will not count toward the resolution of this market. If no such Prime Minister takes office by March 31, 2028, 11:59 PM ET, this market will resolve to “Other”. The primary resolution source for this market will be official information from the Government of Spain; however, a consensus of credible reporting may also be used.
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