Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will the Swiss National Bank's policy rate be below 0% on 31 December 2027?
As of 15 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 14%.
14%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 14.1% Yes and 85.9% No for the SNB’s official policy rate being strictly below 0.00% on 31 December 2027. Zero or a positive rate is the central outcome because the official economic outlook does not call for negative rates, and the SNB has explicitly set a higher hurdle for crossing zero.
Key evidence
- The starting point is zero, not negative. The headline policy rate has been 0.00% since 20 June 2025. The separate −0.25% rate on above-threshold sight deposits does not count toward this question (SNB current rates).
- The September assessment projected annual-average inflation of 0.7% in 2026 and 0.8% in both 2027 and 2028, assuming a constant zero policy rate. Expected growth was 1.5–2% in 2026 and approximately 1.5% in 2027. These are conditional projections, not policy commitments, but they support a non-negative baseline (SNB assessment).
- Recent restraint is informative. In December 2025, the SNB held at zero despite November inflation of 0.0%, a quarterly GDP contraction and rising unemployment (December assessment).
- Inflation’s composition preserves a downside risk. October 2026 headline inflation was 1.5% year-on-year, but core inflation was only 0.5%; imported-product inflation exceeded domestic inflation (FSO release).
- Chairman Martin Schlegel has retained negative rates as an option while describing a higher hurdle for their use. Foreign-exchange intervention also remains available (November interview).
Uncertainties
The main threat to the forecast is a sustained disinflationary shock: weaker domestic or foreign demand, persistent franc appreciation, or both. Low core inflation makes Switzerland vulnerable even when headline inflation looks firmer.
The SNB’s response is discretionary. There is no established mechanical inflation or exchange-rate trigger, and intervention can substitute for some rate easing. Conversely, persistent inflation pressure would reinforce the non-negative outcome. The endpoint also matters: a negative rate introduced and reversed before 31 December 2027 resolves No.
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TL;DR
The forecast is 14.1% Yes and 85.9% No for the SNB’s official policy rate being strictly below 0.00% on 31 December 2027. Treat a zero or positive rate as the central planning case. The decisive risk is persistent demand weakness or franc appreciation that pushes the SNB past its higher hurdle for returning to negative rates.
Context
The SNB’s headline policy rate is 0.00%, effective since 20 June 2025. A separate rate of −0.25% applies to sight deposits above the relevant threshold, but that is not the policy rate measured here (SNB current rates). The question concerns the official rate actually in force on 31 December 2027 in Switzerland. Exactly zero resolves No, as does a temporary negative rate reversed before that date.
The SNB ordinarily assesses policy quarterly, in March, June, September and December, and can also act between scheduled assessments (policy decisions). There is therefore ample opportunity to change policy. The constraint is economic justification, not the meeting calendar: the current outlook supports zero, while policymakers continue to reserve negative rates for circumstances that warrant their costs.
Evidence
Switzerland’s history establishes that negative rates are feasible and can persist. Its earlier negative-rate regime began in January 2015 and ended in September 2022. The initial effective date was 22 January 2015; the modern headline policy-rate instrument was introduced in June 2019, during that existing regime (2015 annual report; 2019 decision; 2022 exit decision).
That is one prolonged episode, not a large sample of independent entries into negative territory. Counting its months or year-ends as separate trials would exaggerate what history tells us about a new move below zero. The useful lesson is narrower: the SNB has the capacity to use negative rates, and a sustained adverse environment can keep them in place.
More recent decisions offer a closer comparison. In June 2025, the SNB stopped at zero even though its conditional annual inflation forecasts were only 0.2% for 2025, 0.5% for 2026 and 0.7% for 2027 (June 2025 assessment). In December 2025, it again held zero despite November inflation of 0.0%, a third-quarter GDP contraction and rising unemployment. Its conditional forecast then put annual inflation at 0.3% in 2026 and 0.6% in 2027 (December 2025 assessment). Low inflation and weak activity have therefore not been sufficient, by themselves, to force a negative rate.
The latest official baseline is firmer. The September 2026 assessment projected annual-average inflation of 0.7% in 2026 and 0.8% in both 2027 and 2028, conditional on a constant zero policy rate. It expected real GDP growth of 1.5–2% in 2026 and approximately 1.5% in 2027 (September assessment). These are projections, not realised outcomes or promises. My reading is that they provide no affirmative reason to cross zero without a material deterioration.
A separate government outlook points in the same broad direction. SECO projected 2027 growth of 1.6%, adjusted for sporting events, and annual inflation of 0.6%. Its inflation forecast was lower than the SNB’s, but still positive (SECO forecast). The difference matters less than the shared picture of continued expansion and subdued inflation.
The strongest contrary evidence is inflation’s composition. Headline inflation rose from 1.0% year-on-year in September to 1.5% in October 2026, while core inflation remained at 0.5%. In October, domestic-product inflation was 0.8%, compared with 3.7% for imported products; core prices were unchanged month-on-month (FSO release). This is not broad evidence of persistent domestic inflation. It is also not proof of impending deflation. The figures show a thin underlying inflation cushion beneath a stronger headline reading.
Demand and employment evidence is mixed rather than recessionary. The KOF employment indicator remained above its long-run average of 1.7 points in the fourth quarter of 2026. Its full supplied quarterly history shows both the earlier weakness and subsequent recovery (KOF employment release):
| Quarter | Employment indicator, points |
|---|---|
| Q4 2024 | 3.1 |
| Q1 2025 | 2.9 |
| Q2 2025 | 1.4 |
| Q3 2025 | 0.5 |
| Q4 2025 | 1.7 |
| Q1 2026 | 2.2 |
| Q2 2026 | 1.5 |
| Q3 2026 | 2.3 |
| Q4 2026 | 2.0 |
These are seasonally adjusted survey balances, not employment growth rates. Other services lost momentum, but the aggregate did not signal contraction. Consumer sentiment was weaker: the composite fell from −36.9 in October 2025 to −44.9 in October 2026, indicating household vulnerability rather than a measured decline in spending (SECO consumer sentiment).
There is counterevidence to an imminent downturn. The industrial SME purchasing managers’ index eased from 54.5 in September to 52.0 in October, but all five components remained above the expansion threshold of 50 (federal SME portal). Seasonally adjusted unemployment was 3.1% in October, and the number unemployed fell during the month (SECO labour-market release). Taken together, these observations support slower, uneven growth—not an established demand collapse.
Wages and administered prices add mild disinflationary pressure. Companies surveyed by the SNB expected nominal wage growth to slow from 1.5% in 2026 to 1.3% in 2027; negotiations were incomplete, so these were expectations rather than settlements (SNB quarterly bulletin). Median household electricity tariffs were set to fall by approximately 4% in 2027, although that median is not a CPI-weighted price change (ElCom announcement). The rental reference rate remained 1.25%, with no fresh reduction entitlement from the latest announcement (rental reference-rate announcement). These factors temper inflation, but do not independently establish a need for negative rates.
The franc is the main channel through which the outlook can change quickly. The September discussion described trade-weighted depreciation, little safe-haven demand and easier monetary conditions (discussion summary). Schlegel’s November interview acknowledged renewed appreciation while noting that foreign–Swiss interest differentials dampened that pressure (November interview). The evidence supports a currency risk, not an established safe-haven crisis.
Policy choice remains decisive. Schlegel explicitly described a higher hurdle for entering negative territory than for cutting positive rates, while retaining willingness to act when necessary (November interview). Foreign-exchange intervention is also available; there is no established binding rule that it must be exhausted first (November policy speech). Thus, even a stronger franc does not translate mechanically into a negative headline rate.
What's non-obvious
The obvious reading of stronger headline inflation is that negative rates are off the table. That misses the weak underlying price pressure. The opposite reading—that low core inflation makes another cut inevitable—misses the SNB’s demonstrated tolerance for low inflation at zero. The key distinction is between subdued inflation and a persistent threat to medium-term price stability. Recent decisions and current guidance place the burden of proof on the latter.
The endpoint creates another distinction. A shock must not only induce negative rates; its effects must leave the rate negative on the observation date. Intervention can absorb part of the pressure, and a temporary cut can be reversed. Conversely, the earlier negative-rate episode shows that a genuinely persistent shock can produce a long-lived response. Duration matters as much as the initial disturbance.
Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is whether weak underlying inflation combines with sustained franc appreciation or falling demand. The available evidence does not establish how large or persistent that combination must become before the SNB crosses zero. No mechanical inflation threshold, exchange-rate trigger or binding instrument sequence has been identified.
Several measurements would sharpen the outlook: a sustained run of underlying inflation readings, realised spending and employment data that confirm or reject the survey weakness, broader exchange-rate evidence, and current intervention data. The October SNB trimmed-mean inflation reading was not verified. Consumer-sentiment component figures also contained small inconsistencies, so the composite and broad direction carry more weight than precise component changes.
Finally, adverse shocks need not be disinflationary. Energy pressure can weaken growth while raising prices, reducing the case for negative rates. Continued expansion or persistent inflation would reinforce No. The saved forecast keeps the adverse-demand and currency pathway material without making it the central outcome.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 14% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- Current interest rates and exchange rateswww.snb.ch
- Konjunkturprognosen Schweiz - Prévisions conjoncture Suisse - previsioni congiuntura svizzera - economic forecasts Switzerlandwww.seco.admin.ch
- 01_Medienmitteilungdam-api.bfs.admin.ch
- KOF employment releaseethz.ch
- Swiss economy shows signs of slowing in Octoberwww.kmu.admin.ch
- Leicht sinkende Strompreise 2027www.geo.admin.ch
- Le taux d’intérêt de référence applicable aux contrats de bail reste à 1,25 %www.bbl.admin.ch
- imf.orgwww.imf.org
The question
This question asks whether the Swiss National Bank (SNB) policy rate will be strictly below 0.00% on 31 December 2027. The relevant measure is the SNB's officially announced policy rate, expressed as an annual percentage, rather than market interest rates such as SARON or the interest rates applied to particular categories of commercial bank deposits. As of 15 November 2026, the SNB policy rate stands at 0.00%, a level in effect since 20 June 2025. At its most recent monetary policy assessment on 24 September 2026, the SNB maintained the rate at 0.00%, citing an inflation outlook consistent with price stability. Its September 2026 conditional inflation forecast projected average annual Swiss inflation of 0.7% in 2026 and 0.8% in both 2027 and 2028, assuming a constant policy rate of 0.00%. These projections are conditional scenarios rather than commitments about future policy decisions. ([snb.ch](https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/communication/press-releases-restricted/pre_20260924)) The SNB ordinarily reviews monetary policy quarterly, in March, June, September and December, although it may change its policy stance between scheduled assessments. The question therefore concerns the policy rate actually in force on 31 December 2027, regardless of when the decision establishing that rate was announced. ([snb.ch](https://www.snb.ch/en/the-snb/mandates-goals/monetary-policy/decisions)) The forecasting period begins on 15 November 2026 and ends on 31 December 2027. The question is whether the SNB will have returned to a negative policy rate by the specified date, not whether it will have implemented negative rates at any point during the intervening period.
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if the official Swiss National Bank policy rate in force on 31 December 2027 is strictly less than 0.00%. The question resolves NO if the official SNB policy rate in force on 31 December 2027 is equal to or greater than 0.00%. A policy rate of exactly 0.00% resolves NO. The primary resolution source will be the Swiss National Bank's official website (snb.ch), specifically its published policy rate, monetary policy decisions, and historical interest rate data available through the SNB Data Portal (data.snb.ch). The policy rate and its effective date, rather than the announcement date, determine the outcome. ([snb.ch](https://www.snb.ch/en/srv/current_interest_exchange_rates)) Resolution will use the policy rate legally or operationally in effect on 31 December 2027, based on Switzerland's local calendar date (Europe/Zurich). If the SNB announces a negative policy rate before or on 31 December 2027 but specifies an effective date after 31 December 2027, the question resolves NO unless another negative policy rate is already in force on the resolution date. Conversely, a negative policy rate announced before 31 December 2027 that remains effective on that date resolves YES, even if the SNB has subsequently announced a future increase to zero or above. If the SNB's current policy-rate instrument is renamed or replaced before the resolution date, the rate explicitly designated by the SNB as its successor monetary policy rate will be used. If no clear successor exists, the question will be annulled rather than resolved using a different interest rate that does not measure the same policy instrument. If the SNB's official historical data are temporarily unavailable, resolution will be deferred until the relevant information can be verified through official SNB publications or archived official announcements. If the policy rate cannot be reliably established from these sources, the question will be annulled.
Fine print
The threshold is strictly negative: any rate below 0.00%, including -0.01%, qualifies for YES. A rate of 0.00% does not qualify. The question measures the SNB's headline policy rate, not the Swiss Average Rate Overnight (SARON), government bond yields, mortgage rates, or the remuneration rate on sight deposits exceeding specified thresholds. These rates can be negative even when the SNB policy rate is zero or positive. For example, as of November 2026, the SNB policy rate is 0.00%, while the interest rate on sight deposits above the applicable threshold is -0.25%. ([snb.ch](https://www.snb.ch/en/srv/current_interest_exchange_rates)) Temporary negative policy rates introduced and subsequently reversed before 31 December 2027 will not qualify unless the rate is again negative on that date. The question does not require the SNB to have maintained negative rates for any minimum duration. 31 December 2027 is the sole observation date. The outcome will be determined using the rate effective on that calendar date in Switzerland, regardless of whether financial markets or SNB offices are open.
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