Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will the Federal Reserve cut its target rate at least twice during 2027?

As of 15 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 30%.

30%chance of yes

Yes 30%No 70%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The forecast is 30.4% Yes and 69.6% No. Fewer than two qualifying cuts during 2027 is the more likely outcome because inflation and the Fed’s current policy stance argue against an early easing cycle.

Key evidence

  • The starting position favors holding or tightening. The Fed raised its target range to 3.75%–4.00% in September, then held it in October. Both October dissenters preferred another increase, not a cut (September statement, October statement).
  • Policymakers’ September projections showed median year-end target midpoints of 4.1% for both 2026 and 2027. Those endpoints favor no net easing, but cannot establish how many separate cuts occur along the way (Fed projections).
  • Inflation remains persistent. Core CPI rose 0.3% in each of August, September, and October. October employment data showed 165,000 additional payroll jobs and 4.1% unemployment, rather than an established downturn (CPI release, employment release).
  • The revised calendar contains seven scheduled policy-decision meetings, with October reserved for strategy and no December decision listed. That makes the timing of any easing cycle more consequential, although emergency decisions still qualify (revised schedule).
  • Historical rate records show that repeated cuts are a recurring outcome, not a remote exception. But the relevant historical samples span different inflation regimes and do not override current conditions (Fed policy-rate records).

Uncertainties

The largest risk to No is a change in the economy: faster disinflation could permit gradual easing, while recession or financial stress could force a quicker response. Falling quarterly unit labor costs offer one route toward lower inflation without a downturn (productivity release).

Timing matters as much as direction. A late reversal could produce only one qualifying decision, even if that cut is large. Conversely, intervening increases would not erase earlier cuts: this question counts separate reductions, not the net change in rates. The tentative meeting schedule and policy decisions before 2027 also leave the starting conditions unsettled.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The forecast is 30.4% Yes and 69.6% No for at least two qualifying Federal Reserve rate-cut decisions during 2027. Fewer than two cuts is the central case because the Fed enters the forecast period focused on persistent inflation, with employment still growing and policymakers projecting no net easing. The decisive issue is whether disinflation or economic weakness arrives early enough to produce two separate announcements, not how far rates fall in total.

Context

As of November 15, 2026, the target federal funds range is 3.75%–4.00%. The Fed raised it by 25 basis points in September and held it in October; both October dissenters wanted another increase (September statement, October statement). This is not the starting position of an established easing cycle.

The question counts distinct decisions announced during 2027. One large reduction counts once, while increases between cuts do not cancel them. Scheduled and emergency decisions qualify. The distinction matters because neither a lower year-end rate nor a forecast of eventual easing establishes that two qualifying announcements will occur.

Evidence

Historical experience provides a useful starting point. The reconstructed record contains 12 years with at least two cuts among the 36 completed years from 1990 through 2025. Restricting the window to 1994–2025 gives nine qualifying years out of 32. The full annual count is below; it is derived from the Fed’s current and archived policy-rate records (current records, archive).

Year Cuts Year Cuts Year Cuts
1990 5 2002 1 2014 0
1991 10 2003 1 2015 0
1992 3 2004 0 2016 0
1993 0 2005 0 2017 0
1994 0 2006 0 2018 0
1995 2 2007 3 2019 3
1996 1 2008 7 2020 2
1997 0 2009 0 2021 0
1998 3 2010 0 2022 0
1999 0 2011 0 2023 0
2000 0 2012 0 2024 3
2001 11 2013 0 2025 3

The reference class changes when years with little room to cut are excluded. Removing years that began with a target-range upper bound of 0.25% leaves nine qualifying years out of 23. A stricter opening-rate threshold of at least 1% leaves nine out of 21. These comparisons show why an unconditional average understates the relevance of today’s positive policy rate. They do not settle the forecast: the samples are small, successive years share economic cycles, and inflation conditions differ (policy-rate records).

Current policy evidence points toward fewer cuts. The September increase was followed by an October hold with a 10–2 vote, and both dissenters preferred tightening (October statement). September meeting minutes also reported that most participants considered another increase appropriate by year-end, while several viewed policy as not restrictive or only mildly restrictive (meeting minutes). A positive nominal rate does not, by itself, mean the committee sees a need to reduce it.

The projections reinforce that reading. The September submissions from 18 participants showed median year-end target midpoints of 4.1% in both 2026 and 2027. The 2027 distribution had eight participants at 4.375%, six at 4.125%, three at 3.625%, and one at 3.125%. The same release projected 2027 real GDP growth of 2.4%, unemployment of 4.1%, headline PCE inflation of 2.3%, and core PCE inflation of 2.5% (Fed projections). These are policy assessments and economic projections, not promises. Still, they show that expected disinflation already coexists with a flat median policy-rate outlook.

Recent inflation data supply a reason for that caution. Core CPI rose 0.3% month over month in August, September, and October; October headline CPI rose 0.4%. The usual October annual comparisons were unavailable because corresponding October 2025 observations were missing (CPI release). September PCE inflation was 3.6% year over year for the headline measure and 3.1% for core, with monthly increases of 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively (BEA release). This is evidence of continuing inflation pressure, not a completed disinflation process.

Employment data also fail to establish an immediate need for easing. Revised payroll gains were 186,000 in August, 60,000 in September, and 165,000 in October. October unemployment was 4.1%, and the August and September payroll revisions added a combined 84,000 jobs (employment release). The latest claims report showed initial claims of 200,000, following a revised 191,000, with the four-week average unchanged at 195,250. That does not corroborate a broad layoff surge (claims release).

There are softer signals beneath the headline employment figures. Involuntary part-time work increased, especially its slack-work component, but temporary-help payroll changes did not show a sustained decline. The full three-month sequence is mixed (employment detail).

Indicator August 2026 September 2026 October 2026
Involuntary part-time employment, millions 4.390 4.501 4.840
Slack-work subset, millions 2.815 2.896 3.252
Temporary-help payroll change +15,500 −5,600 +18,600

Hiring and quits provide counterevidence to a broad labor-market rollover. The available monthly history shows both recovering in September, though the release described aggregate hires as little changed (JOLTS release).

Indicator, millions June 2026 July 2026 August 2026 September 2026
Hires 5.332 5.146 5.271 5.402
Quits 3.213 3.089 3.044 3.365

Productivity offers a separate route to cuts without recession. Preliminary third-quarter productivity rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%; their year-over-year changes were 2.1% and 2.4%, respectively. Stronger productivity can restrain costs while output keeps growing. But positive annual unit labor cost growth and preliminary estimates do not establish a lasting inflation break (productivity release).

Credit conditions look like a modest drag rather than a crunch. The loan officer survey reported some net tightening and weaker domestic business-loan demand, but most commercial and industrial lending terms eased or stayed unchanged. Funding substitution also explained part of the demand weakness (loan officer survey). Local reports described hiring restraint and easier recruitment alongside skilled-worker shortages and rising costs. These anecdotes explain possible mechanisms, but do not establish a national contraction (Beige Book).

Upstream prices complicate the benign disinflation route. A Fed study found that purchasing-manager reports about memory chips and processors preceded corresponding producer-price increases, though its short sample limits the strength of the inference (input-pricing study). Another study found stronger post-pandemic transmission from oil prices to core inflation across five advanced economies. Its stronger-transmission exercise put mid-2027 core inflation about 0.6 percentage point above the pre-pandemic specification, but the authors called this an upper-bound exercise, not a central U.S. forecast (oil-price study).

Finally, the calendar makes timing consequential. The revised schedule lists policy decisions on January 27, March 17, April 28, June 9, July 28, September 15, and November 17, 2027. October is reserved for strategy and no December decision is scheduled. Under that calendar, an ordinary two-cut sequence must begin by September; a first cut in November needs an additional unscheduled decision or a schedule revision (revised schedule).

What's non-obvious

The key distinction is between a policy endpoint and a policy path. Unchanged projected year-end rates support a restrained easing outlook, but they do not rule out two cuts offset by increases. Conversely, a large fall in the year-end rate could come from one decision and fail to satisfy the question. The anonymous projections cannot be paired into individual paths, so their distribution is not a direct count of policymakers expecting multiple cuts (projection materials).

The October hold is also less dovish than the headline sounds. The disagreement was over whether to raise rates, not whether to cut them (October statement). Read alongside the shorter calendar, this shifts attention from “Will rates eventually fall?” to “Will the case for repeated reductions emerge soon enough?” Faster disinflation can answer that question without recession, but the current data do not yet show that transition.

Uncertainties

The largest uncertainty is how inflation and employment evolve together. Productivity gains could permit easing while growth continues. Alternatively, reduced labor utilization could spread into layoffs, or financial stress could trigger emergency action. Either route can produce repeated cuts despite today’s tightening bias. A late shock, however, can still produce only one qualifying announcement.

Several evidence gaps remain. October annual CPI comparisons are unavailable, recent new-tenant rent data were not verified, and the productivity estimates are preliminary (CPI release, rent-series information, productivity release). Further inflation readings, productivity revisions, and consistent evidence across payrolls, hours, claims, and hiring would clarify whether the softer signals are spreading. Historical comparisons also have limits because earlier records mix announcement and effective dates and span different policy regimes.

Policy before 2027 can change the opening rate, and the meeting schedule remains tentative. Those uncertainties preserve a substantial route to Yes. They do not overturn the central conclusion: fewer than two qualifying cuts remains the more likely outcome.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 30% on 15 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
30% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statementwww.federalreserve.gov
  2. Consumer Price Index News Release - 2026 M10 Resultswww.bls.gov
  3. Personal Income and Outlays, September 2026 | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)www.bea.gov
  4. News Releasewww.dol.gov
  5. Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy (Chain-Type Price Index) (PCEPILFE) | FRED | St. Louis Fedfred.stlouisfed.org

The question

This question asks whether the United States Federal Reserve, acting through the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), will implement at least two separate reductions in its target federal funds rate during the calendar year 2027, from January 1 through December 31, 2027, inclusive. Each separate monetary policy decision that lowers the target federal funds rate counts as one cut, regardless of the magnitude of the reduction. As of November 15, 2026, the FOMC's target range for the federal funds rate is 3.75%–4.00%. The Fed increased its target range by 25 basis points in September 2026 and maintained that range at its October 28 meeting. Inflation remains elevated, and the direction of monetary policy in 2027 remains uncertain. On November 12, 2026, the Federal Reserve announced a revised tentative FOMC meeting schedule for 2027, including seven meetings expected to produce monetary policy decisions and an October meeting dedicated to broader monetary policy strategy. Additional unscheduled meetings or emergency policy decisions are also possible. The question concerns the number of separate rate-cut decisions during 2027, rather than the cumulative size of rate reductions or the difference between the federal funds rate at the beginning and end of the year. Sources: Federal Reserve policy rate data (https://www.federalreserve.gov/economy-at-a-glance-policy-rate.htm), September 2026 FOMC statement (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm), and November 12, 2026 FOMC schedule announcement (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261112a.htm).

How it resolves

The question resolves YES if the Federal Open Market Committee announces at least two distinct monetary policy decisions during the period January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2027, inclusive, each of which reduces the target federal funds rate relative to the target immediately preceding that decision. When the Fed specifies a target range, a cut is defined as a reduction in both the lower and upper bounds of that range. For example, a reduction from 4.00%–4.25% to 3.75%–4.00% counts as one cut. A single decision that reduces the target range by 50 or 75 basis points still counts as only one cut, regardless of its size. The question resolves NO if fewer than two qualifying rate-cut decisions are announced during 2027, including if the Fed maintains or raises rates throughout the year or announces exactly one qualifying cut. Rate increases between cuts do not invalidate earlier cuts, and any subsequent qualifying reduction counts separately. Both regularly scheduled FOMC meetings and unscheduled or emergency policy decisions qualify. Decisions are counted according to their official announcement dates in U.S. Eastern Time, not their implementation or effective dates. A decision announced in December 2026 but implemented in January 2027 does not count, whereas a decision announced in December 2027 but implemented in January 2028 does count. The primary resolution sources will be official Federal Reserve FOMC statements and monetary policy implementation announcements published at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm and https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases.htm. The Federal Reserve's historical target-rate records at https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm will serve as a supplementary verification source. Resolution will occur after December 31, 2027, once the official record of policy decisions announced during 2027 is available. If the Federal Reserve adopts a single-point federal funds rate target instead of a target range, each separate announced reduction in that target will count as one cut. If the federal funds rate target is discontinued or replaced during 2027, qualifying reductions announced before the discontinuation will still count, but changes to a different policy instrument will not be treated as federal funds rate cuts. If the Fed's target is discontinued before two qualifying cuts occur, the question will resolve NO unless the Fed reinstates the target and announces enough qualifying reductions by December 31, 2027. If authoritative records are temporarily unavailable, resolution will be deferred until the decisions can be verified; if the records remain permanently insufficient to establish the outcome, the question will be annulled.

Fine print

Each distinct FOMC policy decision counts at most once, irrespective of the number of basis points by which the target is reduced. Two separate 25-basis-point reductions count as two cuts, while a single 50-basis-point reduction counts as one cut. A reduction of any positive magnitude qualifies; there is no minimum 25-basis-point threshold. The question measures the gross number of rate-cut decisions rather than the net change in rates over the calendar year. For example, if the Fed raises rates twice and subsequently cuts rates twice during 2027, the question resolves YES even if the target rate at year-end is equal to or higher than its level at the beginning of the year. Changes to the interest rate on reserve balances, discount rate, overnight reverse repurchase agreement rate, or effective federal funds rate do not independently qualify unless accompanied by a qualifying reduction in the FOMC's announced federal funds rate target. Statements indicating that future cuts are anticipated, projections of lower rates, and individual policymakers' preferences do not count as actual policy decisions. If the FOMC announces multiple reductions in a single calendar day through separate, independently issued policy decisions, each distinct decision counts separately. The relevant date is the Federal Reserve's official announcement date, regardless of when financial markets react.