Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will the Federal Reserve raise the federal funds target range at any FOMC meeting between 1 January and 31 December 2027?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 82%.

82%chance of yes

Yes 82%No 18%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The forecast is 82.3% for Yes and 17.7% for No. Renewed tightening, persistent inflation, and recent policy communications favor at least one increase during 2027, but December 2026 tightening could reduce the need for another move.

Key evidence

  • The Fed has already resumed tightening. The September 16 increase lifted the target range by 25 basis points to 3.75%–4.00% (FOMC statement). October’s hold drew two dissents favoring another increase, so the pause did not establish that tightening was finished.
  • Inflation remains persistent. Core CPI increased 0.3% in each of August, September, and October (BLS). September headline PCE inflation was 3.6% year over year, with core PCE at 3.1% (BEA).
  • Officials have signaled further increases. Waller supported additional tightening, principally in December 2026 (speech). Musalem’s expectation of several increases before spring 2027 speaks more directly to continuation across the calendar-year boundary (remarks). Neither statement commits the Committee.
  • Demand has not collapsed. October payrolls rose by 165,000 and unemployment was 4.1% (employment report). The latest retail report was mixed: nominal sales increased 0.2%, within a ±0.4-percentage-point sampling margin, while sales excluding autos and gasoline rose 0.5% (Census).

Uncertainties

The strongest counterweight is the Fed’s September projection of the same 4.1% median year-end rate midpoint for 2026 and 2027, alongside lower projected inflation (projections). That supports a credible path in which tightening ends before January. It does not exclude an increase during 2027 followed by cuts.

Rapid disinflation, weaker hiring, or financial stress could prevent another increase. Conversely, a single early increase would settle the question Yes even if the economy weakened later. The revised calendar contains seven planned policy decisions, with October reserved for strategy discussion; additional meetings can also qualify (schedule).

Read the full report

TL;DR

The forecast is 82.3% for Yes and 17.7% for No. Renewed tightening, persistent inflation, and recent policy communications favor at least one qualifying increase during 2027. The key distinction is that one increase settles the question Yes, even if later cuts leave rates unchanged or lower over the full year.

Context

As of November 17, 2026, the federal funds target range is 3.75%–4.00%, following September’s 25-basis-point increase (September statement). The FOMC held that range in October, with two members preferring another increase. The starting point is therefore a renewed tightening phase followed by a contested pause, not an established easing cycle.

The question concerns an increase announced at a meeting concluding during calendar 2027. Both target-range bounds must rise. December 2026 tightening does not count, and later cuts do not erase a qualifying increase. The revised calendar provides seven planned policy decisions; the October gathering is reserved for strategy discussion, and no regular December meeting is scheduled (revised schedule). Additional qualifying meetings remain possible.

Evidence

History supports continuation after recent tightening, but the reference class is small. Across 1994–2025, 14 of 32 calendar years contained at least one increase. That broad count mixes tightening, easing, and long periods without changes, making it a weak guide to the current situation (historical policy record).

A closer comparison looks at November snapshots with a hike in the preceding four calendar months and no subsequent cut. The complete set supplied for 1990–2025 contains seven observations. Their outcomes favor further tightening in the next calendar year, but include clear failures (historical tables):

Snapshot year Hikes through November 17 Hikes in the following calendar year
1994 6 1
1999 3 3
2004 4 8
2005 7 4
2018 3 0
2022 6 4
2023 4 0

Five of the seven were followed by another hike. Yet these observations represent only five broader tightening cycles, and most had accumulated several increases before the snapshot. Earlier episodes also involved a point target rather than today’s two-bound range. There is no exact historical match in the supplied research for an isolated late-year restart followed by a pause. History supports the direction of the forecast, not certainty (historical record).

The current policy evidence strengthens that historical starting point. September’s increase was unanimous and raised the range to 3.75%–4.00% (FOMC statement). October’s hold passed 10–2, with Lisa Cook and Beth Hammack preferring another 25-basis-point increase. Those dissents matter because they show pressure to continue tightening even at the meeting that produced a pause.

Recent communications point in the same direction, with a crucial timing distinction. Waller supported further tightening and consideration of a 50-basis-point December move if monthly core CPI remained around 0.3% or higher. His argument supports an active tightening cycle, but a December decision would fall outside this question (November 10 speech). Musalem’s expectation of several increases before spring 2027 reaches across the calendar boundary and is therefore more directly relevant (November 17 remarks). These are individual views, not a secured Committee majority.

Inflation supplies the economic reason for further action. Core consumer prices increased 0.3% in each of August, September, and October. Producer-price inflation was more volatile, but did not disappear after September’s jump. The full supplied monthly histories for these two series are below (consumer prices; producer prices).

Seasonally adjusted monthly change August 2026 September 2026 October 2026
Core CPI 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Final-demand PPI 0.4% 1.4% 0.3%

Producer prices excluding food, energy, and trade services rose 0.5% in both September and October. That suggests pressure beyond immediate energy-price changes, though producer prices do not pass mechanically into consumer inflation (BLS producer-price release). September PCE inflation was 3.6% year over year, with core inflation at 3.1%; monthly increases were 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively. The same release showed essentially unchanged real consumption and a 0.3% decline in real disposable income. Inflation persistence and demand restraint are present together (BEA release).

Employment still gives the Fed room to respond to inflation. Payroll gains were 186,000 in August, 60,000 in September, and 165,000 in October, averaging 137,000 per month. October unemployment was 4.1%. These are not evidence of a demand collapse, although recent payroll figures remain preliminary (employment report).

The latest retail release also resists a simple recession reading. September-to-October nominal, seasonally adjusted sales increased 0.2%, with a 90% sampling margin of ±0.4 percentage point. Sales excluding autos and gasoline rose 0.5%. The headline estimate is too imprecise to establish much growth, but it does not establish contraction either (Census retail report).

Business surveys add a useful warning against treating inflation as uniformly accelerating or uniformly fading. Expected selling-price measures rose in New York services and Richmond manufacturing, while falling in New York manufacturing. Their complete supplied histories are shown below. The New York figures are diffusion indexes, not inflation rates; Richmond reports expected price growth over the following twelve months. The levels are not directly comparable (New York services; New York manufacturing; Richmond manufacturing).

Expected selling-price measure August September October November
New York services index — — 38.9 43.5
New York manufacturing index — — 48.0 41.2
Richmond manufacturing growth 3.69% 3.84% 4.30% —

Wages and credit provide counterweights. Civilian wages rose 3.1% over the year through September, while total compensation rose 3.4%. That does not establish a wage-price spiral (Employment Cost Index). Bank lending surveys showed more respondents reporting weaker than stronger business-loan demand, although substitution toward other funding sources complicates the interpretation (loan officer survey). Housing construction weakness also cuts both ways: slower supply delivery can limit future rent relief, while weaker construction restrains demand (construction release).

The clearest evidence against continued tightening is the Fed’s own projected path. September’s projections showed a 4.1% median year-end rate midpoint in both 2026 and 2027. Median core PCE inflation was projected to decline from 3.4% in 2026 to 2.5% in 2027. Those are conditional projections, not observations, but they describe a coherent path in which further increases become unnecessary (September projections).

What's non-obvious

A flat year-end rate projection is not a forecast of no hikes. The question asks whether the rate rises at any qualifying meeting, not whether it finishes the year higher. An early increase followed by a later cut produces Yes while remaining consistent with an unchanged year-end midpoint. Anonymous year-end projections also cannot be paired to reconstruct each participant’s intended path (projection materials).

December tightening has two opposing implications. It demonstrates concern about inflation, but it can also bring forward action that would otherwise occur in 2027. Waller’s remarks are therefore less direct evidence for this question than they first appear (speech). The calendar boundary, rather than the eventual peak rate alone, is central to the forecast. Likewise, seven scheduled decisions are seven opportunities for one policy process to evolve, not seven independent chances to hike.

Uncertainties

The main No path is tightening completed before January, followed by enough disinflation to keep the Fed on hold or move it toward cuts. An early downturn or financial disruption provides another path. Timing remains decisive: weakness arriving after one qualifying increase would not change a Yes outcome.

Individual hawkish remarks do not establish future voting support. Musalem does not gain a regular vote in 2027, and Hammack rotates off; the rotating voting membership changes (FOMC membership). Persistent inflation must still persuade the Committee as a whole.

Several data gaps limit confidence. Most usual October CPI twelve-month comparisons were unavailable because October 2025 observations were missing (BLS release). Current new-tenant rents, a current national supply-chain-pressure reading, and a quantified prospective energy-supply shock remain unverified. Further readings on inflation breadth, hiring, and real demand would clarify whether price pressure is spreading or fading. Until then, December front-loading, successful disinflation, and early economic weakness remain credible reasons to retain the 17.7% probability of No.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 82% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
82% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statementwww.federalreserve.gov
  2. Remarks on the U.S. Economy and Monetary Policy - Alberto Musalemwww.stlouisfed.org
  3. Consumer Price Index Summary - 2026 M10 Resultswww.bls.gov
  4. Personal Income and Outlays, September 2026 | U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)www.bea.gov
  5. Census retail reportwww.census.gov
  6. Business Leaders Surveywww.newyorkfed.org
  7. Fifth District Survey of Manufacturing Activity, October 27, 2026www.richmondfed.org
  8. Manufacturing Business Outlook Survey (MBOS) - October 2026 Reportwww.philadelphiafed.org
  9. Fed's Musalem: US likely needs several rate hikes by spring to control inflationwww.streetinsider.com

The question

This question asks whether the United States Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will announce at least one increase in the target range for the federal funds rate at a meeting held between January 1, 2027, and December 31, 2027, inclusive. The question is assessed as of November 17, 2026, and concerns any increase during the specified calendar year, regardless of the size of the increase, the number of increases, or whether other meetings during the year result in rate cuts or unchanged rates. The federal funds target range is the Federal Reserve's principal monetary policy interest rate target. The FOMC determines this range at its monetary policy meetings and communicates decisions through official statements. As of November 17, 2026, the target range is 3.75%–4.00%, following a 25-basis-point increase announced on September 16, 2026. The FOMC maintained this range at its October 28, 2026, meeting. Inflation pressures have recently strengthened, contributing to expectations of additional monetary tightening. However, the target range in effect at the beginning of 2027 may differ from its November 2026 level because the FOMC could make further changes before the end of 2026. Sources: Federal Reserve September 16, 2026, FOMC statement (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm) and Federal Reserve policy rate information (https://www.federalreserve.gov/economy-at-a-glance-policy-rate.htm). On November 12, 2026, the Federal Reserve published a revised tentative schedule of FOMC meetings for 2027. The scheduled meetings are January 26–27, March 16–17, April 27–28, June 8–9, July 27–28, September 14–15, October 26–27, and November 16–17. The October meeting is designated for discussion of broader monetary policy strategy rather than a regular policy decision. The schedule is tentative and may change. Additional unscheduled meetings may also occur. Source: Federal Reserve announcement dated November 12, 2026 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261112a.htm). The forecast concerns whether at least one qualifying rate increase is announced at an FOMC meeting concluding during calendar year 2027. It does not ask whether the federal funds target range at the end of 2027 is higher than at the beginning of the year. A rate increase at any qualifying meeting is sufficient, even if subsequent reductions reverse that increase.

How it resolves

The question resolves YES if the FOMC announces, as the monetary policy decision of at least one meeting concluding between January 1, 2027, and December 31, 2027, inclusive, an increase in the federal funds target range relative to the target range immediately preceding that decision. To qualify, both the lower and upper bounds of the target range must increase by a positive amount. Any increase qualifies, including increases of 25, 50, or more basis points. There is no minimum increase beyond a strictly positive change in both bounds. The question resolves NO if no FOMC meeting concluding during the specified period produces a qualifying increase. This includes scenarios in which the FOMC maintains or reduces the target range throughout 2027, even if the range at the end of the year remains higher than it was at some earlier historical date. The primary resolution source will be the Federal Reserve Board's official FOMC monetary policy statements, published through its meeting calendar (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). The Federal Reserve's official implementation notes and historical record of open market operations (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) will serve as secondary sources if the wording of a statement is ambiguous or a numerical change requires confirmation. Each policy decision will be compared with the target range in effect immediately before that decision. The announcement date, rather than the effective date of the resulting target range, determines whether the decision falls within the 2027 observation window. An increase announced at a meeting concluding on December 31, 2027, therefore qualifies even if implementation begins in January 2028. Conversely, an increase announced in December 2026 does not qualify merely because it remains in effect during 2027. Both regularly scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meetings qualify, provided that the meeting concludes during 2027 and results in an official decision increasing the target range. Changes announced outside an identifiable FOMC meeting do not qualify under this specification. The question may resolve YES as soon as the Federal Reserve officially announces a qualifying increase. If no qualifying increase has occurred, resolution to NO will take place after December 31, 2027, once the Federal Reserve's official records establish that no qualifying decision occurred during the observation period. If the Federal Reserve's official statements are temporarily unavailable, resolution will be deferred until official records become accessible. If the Federal Reserve permanently discontinues the federal funds target range before any qualifying increase occurs, the question will be annulled if the remaining observation period cannot be evaluated under the original definition. If the FOMC continues using an explicitly defined federal funds target range, the question remains resolvable even if its monetary policy framework or operating procedures change.

Fine print

The observation period is January 1 through December 31, 2027, inclusive, using the calendar date in Washington, D.C. (U.S. Eastern Time). A qualifying increase is assessed separately for each FOMC meeting. The question does not require a net increase over the year. For example, if the target range is reduced by 50 basis points at an earlier meeting and subsequently increased by 25 basis points at a later meeting in 2027, the question resolves YES despite the net reduction. Changes to the interest rate paid on reserve balances, the overnight reverse repurchase agreement offering rate, the discount rate, or other administered rates do not independently qualify unless the FOMC also increases both bounds of the federal funds target range. If the FOMC changes only one boundary of the target range while leaving the other unchanged, the decision does not qualify. This definition avoids treating a technical adjustment to the width of the range as a conventional monetary policy rate increase. Changes to the effective federal funds rate resulting from market conditions, without an official increase in the target range, do not qualify. A scheduled meeting that is cancelled or postponed does not itself affect resolution. Any replacement meeting held within 2027 will qualify if it produces a qualifying rate increase. An FOMC meeting beginning in 2027 but concluding in 2028 is excluded. The Federal Reserve's revised November 12, 2026, schedule does not include a regular December 2027 monetary policy meeting. The question nevertheless covers the entire 2027 calendar year, including any additional meetings subsequently scheduled or convened.