Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will a military coup succeed in any African country in 2027?
As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 74%.
74%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 74.1% Yes and 25.9% No for at least one qualifying successful military coup in Africa during 2027. Recent takeover frequency and persistent military divisions favor Yes, while successful defenses of incumbent governments keep No a substantial possibility.
Key evidence
- The recent wave is broad enough to matter. The published event history records 11 successful African coups during 2020–2025, including Chad’s disputed succession. Excluding Chad leaves 10 successes, with at least one in five of those six years. The question requires only one qualifying event anywhere in the continent (Global Coups).
- The older baseline is lower, but not negligible. A published historical review reports eight successful African coups in 2000–2009 and another eight in 2010–2019. This argues against treating the recent peak as permanent, but also against treating coups as exceptional events (Coface).
- Military governments remain exposed. Niger’s August 2026 revolt failed, but it demonstrated an organized challenge to an existing junta. Russian assistance helped the incumbent survive. The same episode therefore supports both continuing coup risk and stronger barriers to success (Associated Press).
- Political stress persists, while deterrence is uneven. Guinea-Bissau postponed its planned election, and Madagascar’s proposed 2027 electoral timetable remains conditional. The European Parliament’s assessment also finds uneven implementation of anti-coup rules (Reuters; Madagascar timetable; EPRS).
Uncertainties
The strongest contrary signal is the absence of a verified successful takeover in 2026 through the research cutoff. That finding remains provisional: Powell’s dataset page describes its August 29 update as tentative and subject to revision (Powell).
Foreign intervention and stronger loyalist forces could sustain a quieter period. Conversely, purges, security failures and transition disputes could produce new challengers. Public allegations of plots do not establish overt attempts, and civil-war gains do not independently qualify. A Yes requires military-led unconstitutional displacement of the national executive, followed by at least seven consecutive days of effective control.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 74.1% Yes and 25.9% No for at least one successful military coup in Africa during 2027. The recent history of takeovers, continuing military divisions and unsettled transitions make Yes the planning case. The decisive counterweight is demonstrated incumbent protection: outside forces and loyalist units have stopped recent attempts.
Context
The forecast, dated November 17, 2026, covers operations beginning between January 1 and December 31, 2027, across all 54 sovereign African states. A qualifying event requires military participation in an unconstitutional removal of the incumbent national executive and at least seven consecutive days of effective national executive control. Coups against existing military governments count. Failed mutinies, unexecuted plots, constitutional successions and rebel territorial gains do not independently qualify.
Africa enters this period after a renewed wave of takeovers. The recent history includes Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon, followed by Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau in 2025 (Global Coups). The central question is whether that elevated risk persists into 2027 or gives way to a more durable period of incumbent consolidation.
Evidence
The historical backbone supports a meaningful annual risk even before the recent wave. Coface’s published review reports eight successful African coups from 2000–2009, out of 22 attempts, and eight from 2010–2019, out of 17 attempts. That is 16 successful events over 20 years. These are event counts, not the number of years with a coup, and they provide a longer-run reference rather than a direct reading of current conditions (Coface).
The full annual comparison history available for 2010 onward is below. The earlier decade comes from the military-coup event history; the recent period comes from the published Global Coups listing. Chad is shown separately because its classification matters under this question’s incumbent-removal requirement (CAM event table; Global Coups).
| Year | Successful events in the comparison history | Classification note |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 1 | Niger |
| 2011 | 1 | Egypt |
| 2012 | 2 | Mali and Guinea-Bissau |
| 2013 | 1 | Egypt |
| 2014 | 1 | Burkina Faso |
| 2015 | 0 | — |
| 2016 | 0 | — |
| 2017 | 1 | Zimbabwe |
| 2018 | 0 | — |
| 2019 | 1 | Sudan |
| 2020 | 1 | Mali |
| 2021 | 4 published; 3 excluding Chad | Chad, Mali, Guinea and Sudan |
| 2022 | 2 | Burkina Faso twice |
| 2023 | 2 | Niger and Gabon |
| 2024 | 0 | — |
| 2025 | 2 | Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau |
| 2026 through the November research cutoff | 0 verified | Provisional, incomplete-year finding |
The recent concentration is the strongest evidence for Yes. The published history contains 11 successes during 2020–2025, or 10 when Chad is excluded. Either way, five of those six completed years contained at least one success. Several events occurred in the same country, so neither total should be read as a distinct-country count (Global Coups).
Chad illustrates why headline totals require care. The military succession followed President Idriss Déby’s death in combat rather than an unambiguous military removal of a living incumbent. The European Parliament’s October 26, 2026 briefing distinguishes this contested succession from other military takeovers. Excluding it is a conservative comparison for the question’s narrower definition, not evidence that the wider coup resurgence disappears (EPRS).
The quiet 2026 observation points the other way. No qualifying success was verified through the research cutoff. But this is not a certified, complete November census. Powell’s project page still labels its August 29 update tentative and warns of revisions. The published event listing classifies Niger’s August 2026 attempt as failed (Powell; Global Coups). The right inference is that a quieter period is real evidence against simply extrapolating the recent peak, while its completeness remains uncertain.
Niger supplies the clearest current example of the forces pulling in both directions. Armed challengers threatened an existing junta, and loyalists regained control with Russian assistance. This was not merely an alleged conspiracy. It showed organized military willingness to challenge the executive. It also showed that such willingness does not guarantee a successful seizure of power (Associated Press; Reuters).
Benin provides another concrete defense success. Nigeria’s presidency documented aircraft and ground-force assistance against the December 2025 attempt, while ECOWAS ordered an immediate deployment supporting the government. These cases establish that outside backing can protect particular incumbents. They do not establish equivalent protection across the continent (Nigerian presidency; ECOWAS statement).
The underlying sources of military dissatisfaction have not disappeared. Crisis Group’s October 2026 assessment describes equipment grievances, battlefield setbacks and divisions in Niger’s armed forces. The UN’s regional reporting describes intensified attacks and contested state authority in the Sahel. These conditions support continued concern about military cohesion, though insecurity alone does not establish that a coup will occur (Crisis Group; UN regional report).
Political transitions add specific pressure points. Guinea-Bissau postponed its planned December 2026 election without a replacement date in the cited report. Madagascar’s proposed June 2027 referendum and October presidential election remain conditional plans. Delays can sharpen bargaining over authority and military influence, but neither a missed election nor continued junta rule is itself a qualifying coup (Reuters; Madagascar timetable).
Institutional deterrence is mixed. The European Parliament’s assessment finds uneven implementation of anti-coup rules and accommodation of some former coup leaders after elections. I read this as evidence against assuming a uniform regional barrier to new seizures, not as proof that sanctions have no effect (EPRS).
What's non-obvious
A country already governed by soldiers remains in the risk pool. The question counts a new military seizure that forcibly replaces an incumbent junta leader. Niger’s failed revolt makes that distinction concrete: consolidation of military rule and stability of the particular military executive are different things (Associated Press). The apparent end of civilian-to-military transitions would therefore not, by itself, settle this forecast.
The second distinction is between fewer attempts and fewer successful attempts. Foreign support can reduce challengers’ chances of winning without removing the grievances that produce challenges. The recent failures in Niger and Benin support stronger incumbent protection, but they do not provide a representative continent-wide measure of deterrence (Reuters; Nigerian presidency). That is why the recent coup wave and the quieter 2026 both belong in the assessment.
Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is persistence. The recent wave is a short, clustered history. A lasting improvement in loyalist cohesion, intelligence or external response would make 2027 quieter than that history suggests. Further security failures, contested transitions or ruptures inside ruling military coalitions would point the other way. Public reporting does not reveal military loyalties well enough to settle this balance in advance.
The current event record also remains incomplete and revisable. A fully updated coup history through the end of 2026 would clarify whether the apparent zero-success year holds. More reliable information on military command cohesion and the availability of foreign intervention would help distinguish durable consolidation from temporary suppression. Allegations of plots, arrests and purges cannot substitute for a comparable record of overt attempts.
Finally, future events can be difficult to classify. The controlling facts are military participation, unconstitutional displacement of the incumbent executive and effective national authority for seven consecutive days—not international recognition or the label used in initial coverage. An operation beginning late in December 2027 can reach that threshold in January 2028. These uncertainties preserve a substantial No outcome without changing the saved forecast.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 74% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- Global Coups | Global Coupswww.globalcoups.com
- AVRIL 2024 LES PUBLICATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES DE COFACEwww.coface.fr
- table outputmilitarycoups.org
- EPRSresearch.europarl.europa.eu
- Global Instances of Coups, 1950 – Present – Jonathan Powell, Ph.D.jonathanmpowell.com
- Inside the 24-hour mutiny that threatened Niger's ruling junta and how Russian forces intervenedapnews.com
- Niger, with Russia's help, regains control of key airbase after soldiers mutiny – ThePrint – ReutersFeedtheprint.in
- PRESIDENT TINUBU COMMENDS NIGERIA’S ARMED FORCES FOR PROTECTING DEMOCRACY IN BENIN REPUBLIC - The State House, Abujastatehouse.gov.ng
- ECOWAS statementstatehouse.gov.sl
- International Crisis Group (Author): “Niger Wrestles with the Aftermath of a Military Revolt”, Document #2145940 - ecoi.netwww.ecoi.net
The question
This question asks whether at least one successful military coup d'état will occur in any sovereign African country between January 1, 2027, and December 31, 2027, inclusive. A military coup is defined as an illegal and overt attempt by members of a country's armed forces, including military officers, soldiers, or military-controlled security units, to remove the incumbent national executive from power and assume effective control of the national government. A coup is considered successful if its perpetrators remove the incumbent executive and establish effective control over the national government for at least seven consecutive days. This definition follows the widely used framework developed by political scientists Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne. As of November 16, 2026, Africa has experienced a significant resurgence of military coups since 2020, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel. Countries affected include Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, and Sudan. More recently, successful military takeovers occurred in Madagascar in October 2025 and Guinea-Bissau in November 2025. The African Union has suspended several countries following unconstitutional changes of government. An October 2026 European Parliament Research Service report identified the continued prevalence of military coups and political instability across the continent. International IDEA has also highlighted persistent risks of further military interventions in African politics. These developments provide the historical context for forecasting whether another successful military coup will occur during 2027. Relevant background sources include the European Parliament Research Service (https://research.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS_BRI(2026)797000), International IDEA (https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/region/africa-and-western-asia-2), and the Powell-Thyne coup dataset (https://jonathanmpowell.com/coups/).
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if at least one military coup begins between January 1, 2027, and December 31, 2027, inclusive, in a sovereign African country and succeeds in removing the incumbent national executive, with the coup perpetrators subsequently maintaining effective control of the national government for at least seven consecutive days. The seven-day requirement may extend into January 2028 for coups initiated during the final days of December 2027. The question resolves NO if no qualifying military coup initiated during 2027 meets these conditions. A qualifying coup must involve active participation by members of the country's military or military-controlled security forces in forcibly removing or displacing the incumbent executive through unconstitutional means. Success requires the incumbent executive to have been displaced and the coup perpetrators or their appointed government to exercise effective national executive authority for at least seven consecutive days. Formal international recognition, constitutional legitimacy, or recognition by the African Union is not required. Coups against existing military governments qualify if they replace the incumbent national executive through a new military seizure of power. Failed coup attempts, mutinies that do not displace the national executive, military rebellions that do not establish national executive control, and ordinary changes of government through elections or constitutional succession do not qualify. The primary reference for classification will be the Powell-Thyne global coup dataset, provided it has been updated to cover 2027. Supporting evidence will come from the African Union Peace and Security Council, International IDEA, and established international news organizations such as Reuters, Associated Press, and BBC News. If the Powell-Thyne dataset has not been updated sufficiently, the outcome will be determined using the other sources and the operational definition above. Where sources disagree, priority will be given to documented evidence of who exercised effective national executive authority and for how long, rather than whether individual commentators characterize the event as a coup. The outcome should ordinarily be finalized no earlier than January 8, 2028, allowing time to evaluate coups initiated on December 31, 2027. If a qualifying event remains disputed, resolution may be delayed until sufficient reliable evidence is available. The question will be annulled only if extraordinary circumstances make it impossible to determine whether any qualifying event occurred, even after reasonable efforts to establish the facts from independent sources.
Fine print
Geographic scope includes all 54 internationally recognized sovereign African states, including countries in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and African island nations. Western Sahara and other territories without broadly recognized independent sovereignty are excluded. A coup's date is the calendar date on which the overt military operation to remove the incumbent executive begins, using the local time of the affected country. An attempted coup beginning before January 1, 2027, does not qualify even if it succeeds during 2027. A coup beginning during 2027 qualifies even if its seven-day success threshold is reached in January 2028. A military takeover that installs a civilian figurehead qualifies if the military perpetrators effectively control the national executive. Conversely, a military-backed political transition that proceeds through established constitutional mechanisms without an unconstitutional seizure of executive power does not qualify. A coup within an existing military junta qualifies if it forcibly replaces the incumbent national executive and meets the seven-day requirement. Assassinations, resignations, mass protests, civil wars, foreign invasions, and seizures of territory by nonstate armed groups do not independently qualify unless they also involve a military-led unconstitutional removal of the incumbent national executive satisfying the stated criteria. An African Union suspension is supporting evidence but is neither necessary nor sufficient for a YES resolution. Only one qualifying successful coup is required for the question to resolve YES, regardless of how many countries experience coups during the year.
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