Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will any country that had not normalised relations with Israel by 1 January 2027 sign a normalisation agreement with Israel between 1 January and 31 December 2027?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 69%.

69%chance of yes

Yes 69%No 31%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The saved forecast is 69.3% Yes and 30.7% No. At least one qualifying agreement during 2027 is more likely than none because the opportunity extends beyond new Arab partners to countries restoring severed diplomatic relations.

Key evidence

  • Venezuela offers a concrete restoration route. The August 2026 arrangement resumed consular services rather than full diplomatic relations, leaving a potential further step that could qualify. A Venezuelan delegation’s November visit shows continuing official engagement, but neither development establishes a signing commitment (Reuters; Israeli Foreign Ministry).
  • Kuwait has a positive signal, not a confirmed deal. The Council for a Secure America’s October assessment cites an Israeli ambassador’s prediction. That supports the existence of an opening, but is not evidence of Kuwaiti consent or an agreed signing date (CSA assessment).
  • Syria and Lebanon have diplomatic channels with narrower immediate goals. Syrian talks focus on security and withdrawal. Lebanon’s framework establishes a process, while subsequent reporting describes stalled implementation. Neither automatically leads to diplomatic normalisation (Syrian presidency; Congressional Research Service).
  • Israeli political change creates an opening without settling policy. Gadi Eisenkot’s government-formation mandate is a concrete development, but does not establish a durable coalition or agreement on Palestinian policy (Israeli presidency).

Uncertainties

The decisive distinction is between diplomatic activity and a signed agreement explicitly establishing or restoring full relations. Consular services, security cooperation and intentions to negotiate do not qualify.

Timing also cuts both ways. A leading candidate that completes normalisation before 2027 ordinarily leaves the eligible pool; an agreement delayed beyond 2027 misses the window. Sudan’s starting diplomatic status remains an eligibility question.

Finally, the opportunities share obstacles. Regional escalation and unresolved Palestinian-statehood conditions can block several tracks together. The forecast therefore rests on several credible routes, not on treating every headline as a separate confirmation or assuming any single agreement is assured.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The saved forecast is 69.3% Yes and 30.7% No for at least one qualifying normalisation agreement signed during 2027. The strongest reason for Yes is the worldwide range of opportunities, including restoration of severed relations rather than only expansion of the Abraham Accords. The central risk is that diplomatic progress stops at consular or security cooperation and never reaches a qualifying signature within the year.

Context

This question measures a narrow legal and diplomatic event: a signed agreement explicitly establishing or restoring formal diplomatic relations. The country must be an eligible UN member or permanent observer without normalised relations immediately before 1 January 2027. Implementation can follow later. Recognition alone, an embassy milestone, a security arrangement or an announcement of negotiations does not suffice.

As of the forecast date, several channels are active but none of the leading routes described here has a jointly confirmed qualifying signing timetable. Venezuela has resumed limited cooperation; Kuwait has attracted predictions of an opening; Syria and Lebanon have security-focused negotiating processes. At the same time, Israel’s unfinished government-formation process creates scope for policy change without establishing what that policy will be (Israeli presidency).

Evidence

Historical experience supports looking beyond major Arab peace treaties. A broad historical review covering 2010–2025 identified positive years in 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020 and 2025: Guinea, Nicaragua, Chad, the 2020 agreements and Bhutan, and Bolivia, respectively. This is an incomplete reference class, not a verified census under the question’s exact signature rules. In particular, the separately signed instrument for Nicaragua’s restoration was not established. Guinea’s restoration illustrates the broader pattern of renewed relations outside the Arab world (Guinea precedent).

The clearest lesson is that agreements can cluster, and that both new relationships and restorations matter. The Abraham Accords established or advanced several relationships in 2020, while Bhutan established relations through exchanged diplomatic notes on 12 December 2020. Bolivia signed a restoration agreement on 9 December 2025 (Abraham Accords; Bhutan Foreign Ministry; Bolivian Foreign Ministry). These precedents establish plausible routes, not a dependable annual frequency.

Venezuela is the most consequential overlooked route. Reuters reported on 11 August 2026 that Venezuela and Israel agreed to resume consular services after a prolonged diplomatic break. Contemporary reporting explicitly distinguished the arrangement from restoration of diplomatic relations. The evidence therefore supports treating Venezuela as a potential future restoration, not as a relationship already fully normalised (Reuters; El País).

The next signal was an official Venezuelan professional delegation visiting Israel on 16 November 2026, the first such visit since the 2009 rupture. The Israeli Foreign Ministry connected it to the earlier consular arrangement. This is tangible government-to-government engagement. I read it as stronger evidence of a viable channel than an outside suggestion that two countries might reconcile. It does not establish that full diplomatic restoration is being negotiated or scheduled (Israeli Foreign Ministry).

Kuwait supplies a different kind of evidence. In September 2026, Israeli ambassador Yossi Shelley suggested that another country, possibly Kuwait, could join the Abraham Accords within four to six months. That projected window reaches into early 2027. The Council for a Secure America’s 8 October assessment subsequently ranked Kuwait first among prospective regional entrants, citing the ambassador’s prediction (ambassador’s remarks; CSA assessment).

The weakness is the absence of bilateral confirmation. Reporting distinguished security contacts from substantive discussion of full diplomatic relations. The ranking also repeats the ambassadorial signal rather than independently confirming an authorised Kuwaiti normalisation process. Kuwait is therefore a credible opening, but its prominence in headlines exceeds the strength of the disclosed commitment (security-contact reporting).

Syria has an active channel with a clear sequencing problem. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s September account described talks focused on Israeli withdrawal and a security agreement, with longer-term discussions following if that first stage succeeds. A successful security agreement would matter politically, but would not itself answer this question unless it explicitly established diplomatic relations. The evidence supports a route to normalisation, not a nearly finished normalisation treaty (Syrian presidency).

Lebanon presents a similar distinction. An official US record confirms the 26 June 2026 trilateral framework signing. The subsequent Congressional Research Service assessment describes a conditional security and disarmament process whose implementation had not expanded beyond the initial pilot zones. Willingness to sign a framework is meaningful. Stalled implementation shows why a further step to full diplomatic relations cannot be assumed (signing record; CRS assessment).

Saudi Arabia and Indonesia broaden the opportunity but face explicit political conditions. Saudi Arabia’s published position links diplomatic relations to Palestinian statehood. Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry likewise said that participation in the Board of Peace did not constitute normalisation, while its stated condition remained Israeli recognition of an independent Palestinian state. Diplomatic participation is not a substitute for resolving these conditions (Saudi Foreign Ministry; Indonesian statement reported by Antara).

Israeli political change could affect several channels at once. Eisenkot received the government-formation mandate on 8 November 2026, but parliamentary recommendations were not a completed coalition. A different government creates room for different negotiating choices; it does not itself settle withdrawal disputes or Palestinian-statehood policy (Israeli presidency). This shared exposure matters: several apparent opportunities can advance together, but they can also stall together.

Eligibility removes some tempting examples. Colombia’s Foreign Ministry dates restored relations to 11 August 2026, while Bolivia’s restoration agreement was signed in December 2025. Neither is an ordinary prospective restoration for this window. Kazakhstan’s Accords announcement also does not represent newly established relations: it has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel since 1992 (Colombian Foreign Ministry; Bolivian Foreign Ministry; AP on Kazakhstan).

What's non-obvious

The question is broader geographically but narrower legally than the headline suggests. A restoration with Venezuela can count just as much as a first agreement with Saudi Arabia. Conversely, a prominent new Abraham Accords participant can fail to count if it already has diplomatic relations. The useful distinction is not whether a development is called historic, but whether an eligible country signs the required diplomatic commitment.

Progress can also reduce the chance of the specified event. If Venezuela or another leading candidate completes normalisation before 2027, that development ordinarily removes a route rather than satisfying the question. Meanwhile, an agreement signed during 2027 counts even if embassies open later. This makes the timing and wording of the signed instrument more decisive than the volume of diplomatic activity.

Uncertainties

The largest substantive gap is whether Venezuela’s cooperation advances to full relations. The known steps establish engagement, not a verified full-restoration draft or signing appointment. Kuwait has a different gap: an Israeli prediction has not been matched by a jointly acknowledged diplomatic commitment. Authorised negotiating mandates, published diplomatic language or confirmation from both governments would make these channels easier to assess.

Security-to-normalisation sequencing remains unresolved for Syria and Lebanon. The public evidence establishes security discussions and a framework process, but not an agreed transition to diplomatic relations. Regional escalation, territorial disputes and Palestinian-statehood conditions can obstruct several routes simultaneously. Private negotiations may exist; the absence of public confirmation does not establish their absence.

Starting status also needs care. Sudan’s earlier declarations and incomplete process leave its eligibility dependent on the documented position immediately before 2027. Belize’s original measures withdrew accreditation and suspended consular functions without expressly declaring a full diplomatic rupture, so improved ties there would not automatically qualify (Sudan background; Belize government notice).

Finally, the historical record is incomplete and the decisive documents for future agreements do not yet exist. The signing date controls, not the announcement or implementation date. Verification through 31 March 2028 allows delayed confirmation, but does not extend the 2027 signing window. These constraints leave a substantial No outcome even with several credible diplomatic routes.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 69% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
69% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. President Herzog Tasks Gadi Eisenkot with Forming a Government - Presidentwww.president.gov.il
  2. After 49 years, Israel renews diplomatic ties with Guinea | The Times of Israelwww.timesofisrael.com
  3. Joint Press Statement on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Kingdom of Bhutan and the State of Israel – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Tradewww.mfa.gov.bt
  4. Bolivian Foreign Ministrycancilleria.gob.bo
  5. Venezuela and Israel resume consular services after 17-year diplomatic breakwww.streetinsider.com
  6. El Paíselpais.com
  7. Venezuelan delegation visits Israel for International Emergency and Disaster Preparedness Conference Ministry of Foreign Affairswww.gov.il
  8. שגריר ישראל באמירויות הכריז: "בקרוב תצטרף מדינה נוספת להסכמי אברהם" | האזינו | וואלה חדשותwww.walla.co.il
  9. CSA Report Ranks Kuwait Most Likely to Join Abraham Accords; Lebanon and Syria Follow; Saudi Normalization Cooled Since Iran War - Council for a Secure Americacouncilforsecureamerica.org
  10. News1 | האיום האירני מקרב: ישראל וכווית מקיימות שיח ביטחוני חשאיwww.news1.co.il

The question

As of 17 November 2026, several countries have not established formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and the potential expansion of normalisation agreements remains an important issue in international diplomacy. The 2020 Abraham Accords established or advanced normalisation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, although implementation of the Sudan-Israel normalisation process has remained incomplete. Kazakhstan announced its accession to the Abraham Accords in November 2025, but it had already maintained diplomatic relations with Israel since 1992. Israel also formally recognised Somaliland in December 2025. Potential future normalisation partners include Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Indonesia, among others. However, diplomatic obstacles remain significant, particularly concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional security. An October 2026 assessment by the Council for a Secure America identified Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria as potential candidates for future normalisation, while Saudi Arabia's prospects have become more uncertain. Sources: U.S. Department of State (https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/), Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (https://www.gov.il/en/pages/israel-recognizes-the-republic-of-somaliland-as-an-independent-and-sovereign-state-26-dec-2025), Council for a Secure America (https://councilforsecureamerica.org/press-release/csa-ranks-kuwait-most-likely-to-join-abraham-accords/). This question asks whether at least one country that had not formally normalised diplomatic relations with Israel before 1 January 2027 will sign a formal bilateral or multilateral normalisation agreement with Israel during the calendar year 2027, from 1 January through 31 December 2027, inclusive. The question concerns the signing of an agreement rather than its subsequent implementation, ratification or the establishment of embassies. It is not restricted to the Middle East, Arab countries or the Abraham Accords framework; any qualifying country worldwide may satisfy the conditions.

How it resolves

The question resolves YES if, between 1 January 2027 and 31 December 2027, inclusive, Israel and at least one qualifying country formally sign a bilateral or multilateral agreement that explicitly establishes, restores or normalises diplomatic relations between Israel and that country. A qualifying country must be a sovereign state recognised as a United Nations member state or permanent observer state as of 1 January 2027 and must not have maintained formally normalised diplomatic relations with Israel immediately before that date. Countries that previously maintained diplomatic relations with Israel but severed them before 1 January 2027 are eligible if they sign an agreement formally restoring those relations during 2027. An eligible agreement must explicitly provide for the establishment or restoration of formal diplomatic relations, mutual diplomatic recognition where previously absent, or an equivalent comprehensive normalisation of bilateral relations. Agreements signed under the Abraham Accords or another international framework qualify if they explicitly establish or restore normalised relations between Israel and an eligible country. A signed agreement qualifies even if implementation, ratification, ambassadorial appointments or embassy openings are scheduled for a later date, provided the agreement represents a formal commitment to normalisation rather than merely an intention to negotiate it. The question resolves NO if no qualifying agreement is signed during 2027. Official statements, published agreement texts and press releases from Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the foreign ministry or government of the other signatory country, and any government formally facilitating the agreement will serve as primary evidence. United Nations documentation and reporting from established international news organisations, including Reuters and the Associated Press, may provide corroboration. Where sources disagree, the text of the signed agreement and official confirmation from both signatory governments will take precedence. The signing date, rather than the announcement, publication, ratification or implementation date, determines whether the agreement falls within the specified period. The question will be assessed using information available through 31 March 2028 to allow for delayed publication or verification of agreements signed during 2027. If credible evidence establishes that a qualifying agreement was signed during 2027, the question resolves YES even if the agreement is subsequently suspended or abandoned. If no qualifying agreement can be verified by 31 March 2028, the question resolves NO rather than being annulled, unless extraordinary circumstances make reliable determination of the outcome impossible.

Fine print

For this question, normalisation means the formal establishment or restoration of diplomatic relations between two states that did not maintain such relations immediately before 1 January 2027. Recognition of Israel without a formal commitment to diplomatic normalisation does not independently qualify. Likewise, a ceasefire, peace negotiation, non-aggression pact, security arrangement, trade agreement, humanitarian cooperation agreement or agreement to exchange liaison offices does not qualify unless it also explicitly establishes or restores formal diplomatic relations. Informal diplomatic contacts, public endorsements of normalisation, declarations of interest in joining the Abraham Accords and announcements of future negotiations do not qualify without a signed agreement. A country that already maintained formally normalised diplomatic relations with Israel before 1 January 2027 does not qualify merely by signing an additional cooperation agreement or joining the Abraham Accords during 2027. Countries whose relations with Israel were temporarily strained, whose ambassadors were recalled, or whose embassies were closed without a formal rupture of diplomatic relations are not considered previously unnormalised. Sudan's eligibility will depend on the documented status of its diplomatic relations with Israel immediately before 1 January 2027, taking account of its earlier normalisation declarations and any subsequent agreements. Only sovereign states that are UN members or permanent observers at the start of 2027 are eligible; disputed territories and entities outside this definition are excluded. An agreement signed on 31 December 2026 does not qualify, even if publicly announced or implemented in 2027. An agreement signed on 31 December 2027 qualifies even if announced in 2028. For determining the date of signing, the calendar date at the location where the signing ceremony occurred will be used. If multiple eligible countries sign a single multilateral agreement with Israel, one qualifying signature is sufficient for a YES resolution.