Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will marine war risk premiums for Red Sea transits fall below 0.3% of hull value by 30 June 2027?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 82%.

82%chance of yes

Yes 82%No 18%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The forecast is 81.5% Yes and 18.5% No for at least one representative southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb transit premium strictly below 0.30% between November 17, 2026, and June 30, 2027. The central case is persistence or recurrence of competitive pricing for ordinary vessels, not a permanent end to regional conflict.

Key evidence

  • The latest relevant pricing evidence is below July’s peak. Reuters’ September 24 assessment, citing four industry sources, put typical premiums for tankers without Saudi connections at 0.20%–0.30%, with additional discounts discussed separately. The range has a 0.25% midpoint under the resolution rule. It predates the eligible window and is not an unambiguous all-merchant, southern-transit benchmark. (Reuters republication)
  • Subthreshold pricing has historical precedent. S&P Global reported approximately 0.20% on December 4, 2025, versus 0.50% before the October ceasefire. This establishes feasibility, not a dependable timetable for repricing. (S&P Global)
  • Recent security conditions support differentiated risk, not safety. JMIC’s November 15 assessment recorded no confirmed southern-corridor attacks or disruptions in the preceding 72 hours while retaining a SUBSTANTIAL threat rating. (JMIC)
  • Commercial behavior supports the prospect of normalization. Maersk’s November 16 announcement committed three additional services to planned trans-Suez returns. These are routing commitments, not completed passages or insurance quotations. (Maersk)

Uncertainties

The decisive gap is a fresh, representative quotation for an ordinary merchant vessel making a southern-corridor transit, before discretionary discounts or rebates. September’s tanker range is encouraging but cannot simply be carried forward or generalized across vessel classes and affiliations.

Renewed attacks could reverse price compression. Reports of Houthi consolidation near the strait reinforce that risk. (AP)

Only one qualifying observation is needed; later increases do not undo Yes. Conversely, exactly 0.30% does not qualify. Sparse or geographically ambiguous evidence can lead to annulment rather than No; the forecast assumes a substantive resolution.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The forecast is 81.5% Yes and 18.5% No that representative additional war risk premiums for a standard southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb transit fall strictly below 0.30% at least once between November 17, 2026, and June 30, 2027. The central case is persistence or recurrence of low ordinary-vessel pricing, not a comprehensive regional peace agreement. The decisive test is a dated, broadly representative southern-transit quotation, not a favorable individual discount.

Context

The question concerns the additional hull-and-machinery war premium for a single transit through the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. It does not concern cargo insurance, annual insurance costs, Hormuz-only quotations, or northern Red Sea calls that avoid the strait. Exactly 0.30% fails; a representative range is evaluated using its midpoint. One qualifying date is enough, even if premiums later rise.

As of the forecast date, no verified eligible observation establishes Yes. The strongest recent pricing evidence is Reuters’ September assessment of non-Saudi-connected tankers. It points toward a lower ordinary-transit pricing regime than July’s headlines suggest, but its date, vessel population and route coverage prevent treating it as a resolution observation. (Reuters republication)

Evidence

The historical backbone shows repeated easing and sharp reversals. Subthreshold pricing is not unprecedented. Neither is underwriting resistance after an announced pause. The record consists of irregular market assessments, not a standardized daily index. Its broad rate history is set out below; different vessel populations and quotation conventions must remain distinct.

Period or assessment Reported Red Sea pricing and qualification
Late December 2023; January 5, 2024 Stand-alone transit indications moved from 0.30%–0.50% to 0.30%–0.35%; bonuses were discussed separately. (Lloyd’s List)
February 2024 Most ships faced 0.50%–0.75%, while Chinese-linked quotations were as low as 0.35%, illustrating affiliation-based differences. (Bloomberg Law)
Later 2024, around the Sounion attack Approximately 0.40% before the attack, roughly 0.75% afterward, and subsequently 0.50%–0.75%. (The Insurer)
September 2024 Approximately 0.70% at the start of September; quotations reached 2% on September 19. S&P reported 0.50%–1.00% on September 25. These are different assessments, not a matched series. (Reuters republication; S&P Global)
January 2025 Approximately 0.50% on January 15, down from 0.80%; 0.40%–0.50% on January 16; a broad 0.50% reference on January 22. (Lloyd’s List; The Insurer; Lloyd’s List)
February–March 2025 Argus observations included 0.30%–0.50% and 0.20%–0.50%. Reuters reported 0.70% for some February voyages, while many leading underwriters were still at 0.75% in March. (Argus; Reuters republication; Lloyd’s List)
June 2025 Marsh reported 0.25%–0.30%, previously 0.20%–0.25%. June 25 reporting included 0.25%–0.45% and an approximately 0.30% description. (S&P Global; Lloyd’s List)
July–August 2025 At least 0.70% on July 9, versus 0.30% before renewed attacks; approximately 1% on July 11; 0.30%–0.60% on August 7, excluding several targeted-country exposures. (S&P Global; Bloomberg Law; Lloyd’s List)
October–December 2025 Approximately 0.50% before the October ceasefire and 0.20% by December 4. (S&P Global)
March–April 2026 Argus reported 0.65%–0.75%, versus approximately 0.60%; an April interview put Bab el-Mandeb around 0.75%. (Argus March assessment; Argus April interview)
June 2026 Reuters reported approximately 0.30%. (Reuters republication)
July 20–30, 2026 Reuters reported 0.30% rising to 0.75%; Marsh put Bab el-Mandeb at 0.50% on July 22; subsequent southern-transit indications exceeded 1%, reaching a 1%–2% range by July 30. (Reuters July 20 report; S&P Global; Reuters July 23 report; Reuters July 30 report)
September 24, 2026 Non-Saudi-connected tankers typically paid 0.20%–0.30%, with further discounts mentioned separately. (Reuters republication)

The strongest historical analogue is the decline to approximately 0.20% by December 2025. It proves that reported market pricing can move below the threshold after an improvement in security. It does not reveal the exact crossing date or establish a reliable compression timetable. Earlier ceasefire conditions produced slower and uneven responses, so an announced pause alone is not enough. (S&P Global December assessment; S&P Global February assessment)

September’s assessment carries the most weight for the starting position. Reuters cited four industry sources for the typical non-Saudi tanker range. The same report described approximately 3% for Saudi-linked Yanbu calls and quotations reaching 7% farther south. Those prices cover different exposures. They show segmentation, not disagreement about one uniform market rate. The ordinary-transit range has a 0.25% midpoint, but it remains tanker-specific and does not fully establish the required southern-route, pre-rebate benchmark. (Reuters republication)

There is no fresh November price confirmation in the evidence. SEKO’s guide repeats the low range but dates its insurance inputs to August–September. A recent publication date does not turn that into a new market observation. (SEKO Logistics)

Security evidence supports the distinction between ordinary and targeted vessels, while preserving a serious downside. UKMTO’s November 13 report, covering observations through November 11, recorded no reported shipping attacks since August 24, but also noted an unexplained November 6 explosion. JMIC’s November 15 assessment reported no confirmed southern-corridor attacks or disruptions in its preceding 72 hours and retained a SUBSTANTIAL threat rating. These are reported-incident observations, not proof of safety. (UKMTO; JMIC)

Commercial behavior adds support. Maersk announced planned trans-Suez returns for three additional services, with initial Asian loading dates in December and January. These are concrete network commitments, but not completed strait passages or disclosed insurance prices. WTW also described available capacity and cautious competition, with rates easing during inactivity and reacting quickly to incidents. The inference is that quiet periods can translate into lower quotations without complete political normalization. (Maersk; WTW)

Other developments are weaker signals. A Saudi-interest insurance pool exists, but the reviewed regulatory material supplies no representative premium or demonstrated pricing effect. Diplomatic engagement and naval protection support continued access; they do not establish insurable safety or a qualifying rate. (Saudi Insurance Authority; Oman Foreign Ministry; Council of the EU)

What's non-obvious

The key distinction is between regional danger and the price charged to an ordinary ship. High premiums for specially targeted affiliations can coexist with much lower transit premiums elsewhere. Starting from July’s peak and assuming that every vessel still faces that rate misses September’s evidence. Equally, treating every non-Saudi quotation as representative goes too far: ownership, flag and corporate-fleet associations can create other targeting exposures. (Reuters republication; MARAD advisory)

The event also requires only one qualifying observation, not lasting normalization. A temporary competitive rate can settle Yes before renewed escalation. Nor must the corridor first lose its high-risk designation: the Joint War Committee identifies risk areas but does not set premiums. That makes market pricing, rather than formal delisting or a peace declaration, the decisive evidence. (Lloyd’s Market Association)

Uncertainties

The largest gap is the current representative gross transit rate. There is no standardized transaction-weighted series, matched-vessel panel, or verified fresh quotation meeting every specification. A dated assessment drawing on several underwriters, explicitly covering ordinary merchant vessels through Bab el-Mandeb before discretionary rebates, would close much of that gap. The existing September report is strong forecasting evidence, not an eligible observation. (Reuters republication)

Escalation remains the main economic threat. Reports of government-aligned withdrawals and Houthi consolidation near the strait point against easy normalization. A broader targeting policy, serious casualty, or coverage withdrawal could keep ordinary-vessel premiums elevated. The territorial reports establish heightened concern, not a new insurance quotation. (AP)

Resolution uncertainty is separate from price uncertainty. A favorable individual discount, a northern-port rate, or exactly 0.30% does not qualify. Coverage refusal is not a zero premium. If public evidence remains too sparse or ambiguous, the rules call for annulment rather than automatic No. The forecast assumes a substantive resolution; its central claim is that a qualifying representative rate will occur, not that regional maritime risk will disappear.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 82% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
82% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Saudi oil export strategy hits new hurdle as Red Sea insurance costs soar | Internationalwww.devdiscourse.com
  2. Red Sea war risk rates soften as insurers price in Prosperity Guardian :: Lloyd's Listwww.lloydslist.com
  3. Bloomberg Lawnews.bloomberglaw.com
  4. Red Sea war risk rates fall on prospect of Israel-Gaza ceasefire | The Insurerwww.theinsurer.com
  5. Red Sea Insurance Costs Skyrocket Amid Rising Houthi Shipping Threatswww.marinelink.com
  6. S&P Globalwww.spglobal.com
  7. Argusview.argusmedia.com
  8. Red Sea insurance rates to stay firm as US airstrikes raise fears for ships | MarketScreenerwww.marketscreener.com
  9. Red Sea AWRP up after Houthi attack on Israel | Latest Market Newswww.argusmedia.com
  10. Iranian proxy Houthis declare total ban on Israeli ships in Red Seawww.bairdmaritime.com

The question

This question asks whether the indicative market rate for additional marine war risk insurance premiums (AWRP) for commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, including the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, will fall strictly below 0.30% of insured hull and machinery value per transit at any point between November 17, 2026, and June 30, 2027, inclusive. The question concerns the prevailing commercial insurance market rate for a standard merchant vessel without special risk characteristics, rather than the lowest individually negotiated quotation. War risk premiums are additional charges imposed by insurers to cover risks arising from war, terrorism, missile attacks, drone strikes, and related hostilities. They are generally expressed as a percentage of a vessel's insured hull and machinery value per voyage through a designated high-risk area. The Red Sea shipping corridor has experienced substantial disruption since Houthi attacks on commercial vessels began in late 2023. Insurance premiums have fluctuated significantly in response to changes in regional security conditions. In December 2025, S&P Global reported that additional Red Sea war risk premiums had declined to approximately 0.2% of hull value. However, renewed hostilities in 2026 reversed this improvement. Reuters reported that indicative premiums rose from approximately 0.3% to 0.75% in July 2026 following a Houthi announcement of a naval blockade targeting Saudi Arabia. Subsequent attacks pushed premiums for southern Red Sea voyages to approximately 1%–2% of vessel value by late July 2026. The broader regional conflict involving Iran and continued instability around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have maintained significant uncertainty for shipping insurers. As of November 17, 2026, the latest publicly available evidence reviewed does not establish a single authoritative, continuously updated benchmark for prevailing Red Sea war risk premiums. The forecast therefore concerns whether market pricing will return to below 0.30% at least once before the deadline, rather than whether premiums will remain below that threshold permanently. Relevant background sources include Reuters reporting from July 20 and July 30, 2026, S&P Global's December 4, 2025, assessment, and Lloyd's List reporting on marine war risk underwriting practices.

How it resolves

The question resolves YES if credible, dated evidence establishes that the prevailing indicative additional war risk insurance premium for a standard commercial merchant vessel transiting the southern Red Sea, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, was strictly below 0.30% of insured hull and machinery value per transit on at least one date between November 17, 2026, and June 30, 2027, inclusive. The evidence must refer to a broadly representative commercial market rate rather than an exceptional discount for an individual vessel, shipping company, nationality, or specific insurance arrangement. Acceptable evidence includes contemporaneous market assessments or reporting from Reuters, Lloyd's List, S&P Global Commodity Insights, Argus Media, or established marine insurance brokers such as Marsh, provided the reporting clearly identifies the relevant rate and geographic coverage. An explicitly identified representative market estimate below 0.30% qualifies. Where a reported market range is provided, the midpoint of that range will be used if the source presents the range as representative of the general market. For example, a prevailing range of 0.20%–0.35% has a midpoint of 0.275% and qualifies, whereas a range of 0.25%–0.40% does not. Where multiple credible assessments for the same date disagree, preference will be given to assessments based on broader market participation and multiple independent underwriting sources. If no assessment clearly dominates, the median of the available representative point estimates, including midpoints of representative ranges, will determine the rate for that date. The question resolves NO if sufficient credible market evidence covering the relevant period establishes that the prevailing rate never fell strictly below 0.30% by June 30, 2027. Evidence published after the deadline may be used if it explicitly documents pricing during the eligible period. If the available evidence is too sparse, inconsistent, or geographically ambiguous to establish whether the threshold was crossed, the question will be annulled rather than automatically resolving NO. The initial resolution assessment should occur after June 30, 2027, allowing reasonable time for delayed publication of insurance market information.

Fine print

The threshold is strictly less than 0.30%; a premium of exactly 0.30% does not qualify. The relevant rate is the additional war risk premium charged for a single transit, not the vessel's total annual insurance expenditure, cargo insurance premium, freight rate, or an accumulated charge covering multiple voyages. Rates should be evaluated before discretionary no-claims rebates, individually negotiated discounts, or refunds, unless a source explicitly identifies a net rate as the prevailing market benchmark. The geographical scope is the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb shipping corridor, rather than the Strait of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf. A quotation covering a substantially broader regional risk zone qualifies only if the source identifies it as representative of Red Sea transit insurance costs. Premiums specific to vessels with elevated exposure due to ownership, flag, trading history, sanctions, or links to particular countries should not independently determine the outcome. Likewise, unusually favorable premiums offered to low-risk vessels do not establish that the general market has crossed the threshold. A single qualifying observation is sufficient for YES; the rate need not remain below 0.30% for any minimum duration. A temporary reduction followed by renewed increases still qualifies. If war risk premiums cease to be charged because coverage is routinely included without an additional transit premium, this counts as a 0% additional premium only if credible insurance market evidence confirms that this arrangement has become generally available to ordinary commercial merchant vessels. The disappearance of quotations because insurers refuse to provide coverage does not count as a reduction in premiums. All deadline references use UTC calendar dates. Background sources: S&P Global, December 4, 2025 (https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/shipping/120425-maritime-war-risk-premiums-fall-in-red-sea-rise-in-black-sea-amid-changing-security-dynamics); Reuters, July 20, 2026 (https://www.fidelity.com/news/article/default/202607201312RTRSNEWSCOMBINED_L1N43M0ME_1); Reuters, July 30, 2026 (https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/london-insurers-widen-red-sea-high-risk-zone-after-houthi-attacks-ce7f50dad88ff522); Lloyd's List, March 4, 2026 (https://www.lloydslist.com/-/media/lloyds-list/daily-pdf/2026/03-march/dailypdf040326.pdf).