Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Will the Suez Canal average more than 50 ship transits a day in 2027?
As of 15 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 63%.
63%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
The forecast is 62.6% Yes and 37.4% No that Suez Canal traffic will average more than 50 completed transits a day during calendar 2027. Official traffic is already near the threshold, and operational carrier returns support further recovery, but security risks prevent a strong-confidence Yes.
Key evidence
- The latest official baseline is close to the target. The Suez Canal Authority reported 1,490 passages in October 2026, equivalent to 48.0645 per day. Approximately 4.03% additional traffic from that rate would bring activity to the threshold’s vicinity; October’s rate alone remains insufficient (SCA statement).
- The threshold does not require a complete return to pre-crisis traffic. Official annual passages were 26,434 in 2023, 13,213 in 2024 and 12,758 in 2025. Yes requires at least 18,251 passages—approximately 43% above 2025, but well below 2023 (SCA annual report).
- Carrier returns are more than expressions of interest. Maersk’s November 2 notice restores its ME1 rotation through Suez in both directions, conditional on regional stability. The SCA also confirmed Evergreen’s completed return passage on November 8 (Maersk; SCA).
- Aggregate recovery is less impressive than container headlines suggest. Lloyd’s List Intelligence describes container-led improvement alongside exceptional tanker routing. Its figures cover cargo-carrying vessels above 10,000 deadweight tonnes, not the full official vessel population (Lloyd’s List Intelligence).
Uncertainties
The largest risk is sustained rediversion around Africa. JMIC’s November 12 assessment retained a SUBSTANTIAL threat rating for the southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb, despite a quiet latest reporting window (JMIC).
There is also a measurement gap: October’s PortWatch estimate was 1,335 passages, below the official 1,490. These series cannot safely be joined using a fixed adjustment (PortWatch). Some announced returns are already reflected in current traffic, and others remain conditional. Finally, the question concerns the whole calendar year: crossing 50 per day late in 2027 will not by itself deliver a Yes.
Read the full report
TL;DR
The forecast is 62.6% Yes and 37.4% No that the Suez Canal will average more than 50 completed ship transits a day in 2027. Official traffic is already close to the threshold, and returning carrier services support further gains. The decisive issue is whether those gains last across the full year despite Red Sea security risks and uneven recovery outside containers.
Context
The canal is recovering from the diversions that followed attacks on commercial shipping near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The latest official monthly count is much closer to the question’s threshold than the depressed annual totals suggest: the SCA reported 1,490 passages during October 2026 (SCA statement). Carrier routing notices and completed return passages show that recovery is operational, not just an aspiration.
The resolving measure is completed vessel passages in both directions during January 1–December 31, 2027. Yes requires at least 18,251; exactly 18,250 resolves No. Ship size, cargo capacity, revenue and fiscal-year results do not determine the answer. The official full-calendar-year SCA count takes precedence over tracking estimates, and every calendar day counts, including disruption days.
Evidence
The historical backbone shows two distinct traffic regimes. Before the shipping crisis, the canal exceeded this question’s threshold for five consecutive years. It then fell far below it. The full available annual history is shown below, using the current SCA report edition (SCA annual report).
| Calendar year | Completed transits |
|---|---|
| 2019 | 18,880 |
| 2020 | 18,830 |
| 2021 | 20,694 |
| 2022 | 23,851 |
| 2023 | 26,434 |
| 2024 | 13,213 |
| 2025 | 12,758 |
This history establishes feasibility, not a mechanical success rate. The years share security conditions and routing decisions; they are not independent trials. Reaching the threshold requires approximately 43% growth over 2025, but still leaves traffic well below 2023. The canal does not need full normalization to resolve Yes (SCA annual report).
The more useful starting point is recent official traffic. In its November 5 statement, the SCA reported 1,490 October 2026 passages, against 1,128 in October 2025. The latest count equals 48.0645 passages per day. From that daily rate, approximately 4.03% additional traffic is needed to reach the threshold’s vicinity. This is the strongest evidence favoring Yes. It also has a clear limit: maintaining October’s rate would still fall short (SCA statement).
Tracking data confirm improvement but do not measure an interchangeable population. PortWatch estimated 14,070 passages in calendar 2025 and an average of 41.0288 per day during January 1–November 8, 2026. Its October estimate was 1,335 passages, or 43.0645 per day; November 2–8 totaled 311, or 44.4286 per day (PortWatch dataset). PortWatch therefore exceeded the official count in 2025 but fell below it in October 2026. A fixed conversion between the two would be unreliable.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 1,228 passages in September and 1,338 in October. Its container counts rose from 315 to 426, while the implied noncontainer counts were almost unchanged at 913 and 912. Its coverage is restricted to cargo-carrying vessels above 10,000 deadweight tonnes, and it reports extensive AIS-dark container movements. These figures corroborate the direction of recovery, not the exact official total (Lloyd’s List Intelligence).
The composition of the earlier traffic loss explains why this distinction matters. Containers were a large part of the decline, but most lost passages came from other categories. The official comparisons are below (SCA 2023 report; SCA 2025 report).
| Vessel category | 2023 passages | 2025 passages |
|---|---|---|
| Tankers | 8,435 | 4,991 |
| Bulk carriers | 7,186 | 3,423 |
| Container ships | 5,847 | 1,840 |
| General cargo | 2,056 | 1,333 |
| LNG carriers | 819 | 282 |
| Car carriers | 1,077 | 179 |
| Remaining categories | 1,014 | 710 |
Recent tracking data show the same unevenness. PortWatch’s container daily average increased from 9.1613 in July 2026 to 13.1935 in October. Total traffic rose much less, from 41.8710 to 43.0645 per day. Noncontainer traffic consequently declined from 32.7097 to 29.8710 per day. Container returns are real, but they do not translate one-for-one into equal growth in aggregate traffic (PortWatch).
Carrier behavior supplies the main forward-looking evidence. Maersk’s November 2 notice restored ME1 through Suez in both directions, while explicitly conditioning routing on continued regional stability. It named initial loading-port departures on November 4 and November 13; those dates are not completed canal passages (Maersk notice). The SCA separately confirmed EVER EON’s completed passage on November 8 and ONE CONTINUITY’s passage on November 15. The latter release also described three further Premier services scheduled to return (Evergreen passage; ONE passage).
These signals support further recovery without proving an industry-wide timetable. A reported full Maersk return by March 2027 was qualified by the company: no comprehensive return schedule had been announced (Riviera). Some services are already embedded in current counts, alliance partners can share the same physical loop, and one-direction returns must not be counted twice.
The commercial incentive favors shorter routes. Maersk’s third-quarter report attributed part of reduced fuel consumption to its partial Suez return. That supports the durability of returns when security permits, but does not establish extra vessel passages by itself (Maersk management review).
Security remains the central counterweight. JMIC’s November 12 assessment retained a SUBSTANTIAL threat rating for the southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb and a MODERATE rating for the northern Red Sea/Suez. It reported no confirmed southern-area attacks in its latest reporting window, while describing retained Houthi capability and selective targeting. A quiet window is evidence of current conditions, not durable safety (JMIC assessment).
What's non-obvious
The key insight is that the recovery hurdle depends on the starting measure. Comparing the threshold only with 2025 makes the task look like a fresh increase of approximately 43%. Comparing it with the latest official monthly rate shows that much of that recovery has already occurred. The remaining hurdle is modest; the durability hurdle is not. October is one month, not a guaranteed floor for the following year.
The opposite mistake is to read container-service headlines as proof that the threshold is secured. A large ship still counts as one passage. Shorter voyages can reduce the fleet needed to maintain a weekly service without increasing its crossing frequency. Meanwhile, exceptional tanker routing supports some current activity and can unwind. The evidence therefore supports a modest Yes advantage, not automatic normalization (Lloyd’s List Intelligence).
Uncertainties
The largest uncertainty is whether security permits sustained returns throughout the measurement year. Renewed attacks, selective targeting or carrier risk decisions can reverse progress. The annual nature of the question makes timing consequential: a strong finish cannot erase an extended weak start without enough compensating passages.
Measurement differences remain unresolved. The official and AIS series disagree in both size and direction across periods. The current annual report’s original publication and replacement history are unspecified. Repeated official monthly counts, reconciled with vessel-category detail, would show whether the near-threshold starting point is persistent and how much of the discrepancy reflects coverage rather than traffic.
There is also no comprehensive, verified inventory of all vessel-type returns, no binding industry-wide normalization timetable, and no verified contemporary insurance quotation establishing the cost of a representative return voyage. Those gaps are not evidence that recovery will stop. They limit confidence in its speed and breadth. The most informative evidence would be sustained official traffic above the threshold, completed two-way service returns, and gains beyond containers rather than announcements or capacity measures alone.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 63% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- SCA statementwww.suezcanal.gov.eg
- Daily Chokepoints Dataportwatch.imf.org
- Red Sea Brief: 12 November 2026www.lloydslistintelligence.com
- ME1 Gemini Service Moves to Suez Route | Maerskwww.maersk.com
- Maersk weighs further Suez Canal transits amid ongoing security considerations - News Content Hub - Rivierawww.rivieramm.com
- Management Review | Oceaninvestor.maersk.com
- Microsoft Word - JMIC_Advisory_Update_113_FINALwww.ukmto.org
- KADMAR Circular No. 63/2026 - Strong Recovery In Suez Canal Transits And Resumption Of Services By Major Shipping Lines | KADMAR SHIPPING EGYPTkadmar.com
- Ocean Shipping Freight Market Update | C.H. Robinsonwww.chrobinson.com
- https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/content/dam/website/downloads/pdf/HLAG_Investor_Presentation_9M_2026.pdfwww.hapag-lloyd.com
The question
This question asks whether the average number of ships transiting Egypt's Suez Canal will exceed 50 per day during the 2027 calendar year, from January 1 through December 31, 2027, inclusive. The average will be calculated by dividing the total number of completed ship transits during 2027, in both directions combined, by 365 days. A ship transit is counted each time a vessel completes passage through the canal, regardless of vessel type, cargo, size, or direction. The question concerns actual vessel movements rather than shipping capacity, cargo tonnage, or canal revenue. The Suez Canal is a major international shipping route connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Before the Red Sea shipping crisis began in late 2023, the canal routinely handled approximately 70–80 vessels per day. Attacks on commercial shipping near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait subsequently caused many shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. According to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA), annual traffic fell from approximately 26,400 vessels in 2023 to 13,213 in 2024 and 12,758 in 2025, equivalent to daily averages of approximately 72.4, 36.1, and 35.0 vessels, respectively. The SCA reported signs of recovery during the first half of its 2025/2026 fiscal year, while ship-tracking estimates indicated that approximately 44 vessels per day were passing through the canal during the week ending November 8, 2026. Sources include the [Suez Canal Authority's 2025 annual report](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf) and [SCA's February 2026 statement](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Sca_8-2-2026.aspx). ([suezcanal.gov.eg](https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Downloads/DownloadsDocLibrary/Navigation%20Reports/Annual%20Reports%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8B/2025.pdf)) As of November 15, 2026, the question is therefore whether shipping activity will recover sufficiently during 2027 to exceed an annual average of 50 vessel transits per day. This would require at least 18,251 completed transits during the year, representing an increase of approximately 43% over the 2025 total. The outcome will depend on factors including maritime security in the Red Sea, shipping companies' decisions to resume Suez Canal routes, global trade conditions, canal toll policies, and potential disruptions to navigation.
How it resolves
The question resolves YES if the total number of vessel transits through the Suez Canal during the calendar year January 1–December 31, 2027, inclusive, exceeds 18,250. This is equivalent to an annual average strictly greater than 50 transits per day, calculated using 365 calendar days. Therefore, 18,251 or more transits are required for a YES resolution. The question resolves NO if the total number of vessel transits during the same period is 18,250 or fewer, corresponding to an annual average of 50 or fewer ships per day. The primary resolution source will be the Suez Canal Authority's official annual navigation statistics for calendar year 2027, specifically its reported total number of transiting vessels. The official figure covering the full calendar year will take precedence over estimates derived from ship-tracking data, media reports, or partial-year statistics. If the SCA publishes a revised annual figure before resolution, the latest available official figure will be used. If the SCA does not publish complete calendar-year statistics by December 31, 2028, the resolution will instead use the best available complete-year estimate from the International Monetary Fund's PortWatch platform, which derives vessel transit estimates from Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. The daily observations for January 1 through December 31, 2027, will be summed to determine the annual count. If PortWatch is unavailable or lacks sufficient coverage, another reputable maritime traffic dataset may be used, provided its methodology consistently counts completed vessel passages through the Suez Canal in both directions over the entire year. The source and any relevant differences in vessel coverage must be documented. If neither official statistics nor sufficiently complete and reliable alternative data are available to determine whether the threshold was exceeded, the question will be annulled rather than assigned an unsupported YES or NO outcome. Resolution should occur after publication of the SCA's complete 2027 calendar-year statistics, normally expected during 2028, or after the fallback deadline of December 31, 2028.
Fine print
The measurement period is the 2027 calendar year, not Egypt's fiscal year or the Suez Canal Authority's financial reporting year. All 365 calendar days are included, regardless of whether the canal operates normally, experiences temporary closures, or suffers prolonged disruptions. Days with no completed transits contribute zero to the annual total. Northbound and southbound passages are counted equally. Each completed passage counts as one transit, so a vessel that passes through the canal multiple times during 2027 contributes multiple transits. Vessel movements confined to part of the canal without completing a through-transit are excluded. The count includes commercial and other vessel categories recognized in the SCA's official aggregate transit statistics. The threshold is strictly greater than 50 ships per day. An annual total of exactly 18,250 transits resolves NO, while 18,251 resolves YES. Published daily averages rounded to whole numbers or decimal places will not determine the outcome when an underlying annual count is available. A permanent canal closure, major geopolitical disruption, or sustained rerouting of commercial shipping does not automatically annul the question. Such events affect the actual number of transits and are part of the forecasted uncertainty. The question will be annulled only if reliable data cannot establish the result. When using the primary source, the SCA's classification and counting methodology will be accepted. When using a fallback source, the resulting count must refer to actual vessel passages, not cargo volume, vessel capacity, or shipping movements through the wider Red Sea region. Later revisions published after the question has been resolved will not retroactively change the outcome.
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