Prolepsia forecastYes / no

Will the average daily number of tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz in December 2027 be at least 80% of the 2025 daily average, according to IMF PortWatch?

As of 17 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 29%.

29%chance of yes

Yes 29%No 71%
Prolepsia forecast made

How Prolepsia reasons

The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.

How forecasts are made · Track record

TL;DR

The forecast is 29.1% Yes and 70.9% No. Recovery remains possible, but the question requires a sustained rebound in IMF-recorded tanker crossings—not simply higher oil exports or an announced reopening.

Key evidence

  • The threshold is demanding. The current official series records 17,585 tanker crossings in 2025, averaging 48.1780821918 per day. That implies a provisional threshold of 38.5424657534 per day, or at least 1,195 crossings during December 2027. Both periods remain subject to resolution-date revisions (official dataset).
  • The starting point is extremely low. October 2026 recorded 23 tanker crossings; November 1–15 recorded 11. These are reported crossings, not a census of physical movements (official dataset).
  • Oil recovery and recorded-traffic recovery differ. The IEA estimated October Gulf crude exports at 82% of prewar volume. Its shipping monitor also warns that AIS suppression, jamming and spoofing obscure tanker movements. Pipelines and offshore transfers further weaken the link between barrels exported and crossings recorded (oil report; shipping monitor).
  • December adds a separate hurdle. December traffic was below its own annual average in six of the seven years from 2019–2025. December 2025 itself fell below the question’s threshold (historical series).

Uncertainties

The strongest challenge to the No forecast is a durable settlement early enough for owners, insurers, loading schedules and AIS broadcasting to normalize. Oman–Iran talks provide a diplomatic route, while the IMF’s October outlook assumes substantial normalization during 2027; neither establishes that it will occur (Oman statement; IMF outlook).

There is no reliable tanker-specific estimate of future AIS detection, retained bypass use or post-reopening traffic. The seven-year December pattern is descriptive, not a proven seasonal law. Sustained increases in PortWatch tanker counts would be stronger evidence of progress than export-volume headlines alone.

Read the full report

TL;DR

The forecast is 29.1% Yes and 70.9% No. Treat failure to reach the threshold as the planning case: this question requires recorded tanker crossings to recover, not just oil exports. Watch sustained PortWatch tanker counts and safe AIS broadcasting, not reopening announcements.

Context

As of November 17, 2026, the starting point is continued disruption rather than an established commercial recovery. Reporting describes renewed attacks on US facilities and another tanker attack, while maritime guidance continues to warn of severe navigation risks (AP reporting; JMIC advisory). There is time for conditions to improve before the target month, but a political announcement alone does not restore ordinary shipping.

The outcome depends on December 2027’s average daily tanker crossings reaching at least 80% of the full-year 2025 average in IMF PortWatch. Both directions and repeat crossings count. Cargo volume, vessel size and other commercial vessel categories do not substitute for the specified tanker series (resolution dataset).

Evidence

The historical record gives two useful anchors: ordinary traffic has varied substantially, and December has usually been weaker than its own year’s average. It does not provide a calibrated base rate for recovery from this conflict. The complete annual and December history supplied for the official series is below; displayed means are rounded (official historical series).

Period Recorded tanker crossings Daily average December daily average
2019 15,325 41.986 35.452
2020 16,460 44.973 38.323
2021 18,229 49.942 50.097
2022 21,070 57.726 48.129
2023 20,249 55.477 44.935
2024 19,478 53.219 39.677
2025 17,585 48.178 30.419
2026, January 1–November 15 2,782 8.721 —

December was below its own annual average in six of those seven completed years. Four historical Decembers—2021 through 2024—exceeded the current absolute threshold for this question. December 2025 did not, despite preceding the conflict. That makes the calendar comparison consequential, but it does not prove a stable seasonal discount. Changing trade patterns or measurement conditions could explain part of the pattern (official historical series).

A related caution comes from another chokepoint. The IMF reported that Bab el-Mandeb traffic remained around half its pre-attack level more than two years after attacks began. Hormuz has different geography and fewer equivalent rerouting options, so this is not a matched statistical reference class. It does show that large economic costs do not guarantee a quick return to normal traffic (IMF analysis).

The current 2025 baseline is 48.1780821918 recorded tanker crossings per day, based on 17,585 crossings across all 365 days. The implied threshold is 38.5424657534 per day, requiring at least 1,195 crossings during the target month. These are provisional calculations because resolution uses the stipulated later dataset release for both periods (official series and field definitions).

The full supplied monthly history for 2026 shows how far the recorded series has fallen. It also shows that occasional improvements have not become a sustained recovery (official daily series).

2026 period Daily observations Mean recorded tanker crossings/day
January 31 31.13
February 28 43.46
March 31 0.94
April 30 3.17
May 31 1.29
June 30 5.40
July 31 4.77
August 31 1.87
September 30 1.13
October 31 0.74
November 1–15 15 0.73

October contained 23 recorded tanker crossings and November 1–15 contained 11. The latest observations therefore describe an extremely depressed reporting regime. They should not be extrapolated mechanically through the target month, but they establish that recovery has not already arrived in the resolving series (official daily series).

Recorded recovery is not physical recovery. The IEA’s shipping monitor warns that vessels increasingly switch off AIS and that jamming and spoofing obscure movements. UKMTO reported 308 combined crossings during November 5–11, compared with 82 AIS-observed crossings. Those counts cover different populations from PortWatch tankers and include facilitated movements that are not fully independently verified. They demonstrate a measurement gap, not a usable tanker-detection multiplier (IEA monitor; UKMTO overview).

Commercial adaptation cuts both ways. Windward identified nearly 230 tankers supporting Gulf exports through a dark shuttle and ship-to-ship-transfer system. That indicates functioning logistics and committed vessels. It does not establish a return to normal AIS reporting. Larger cargoes and offshore transfers can restore barrels without restoring the same number of recorded crossings (Windward assessment).

There is real evidence for further economic recovery. The IEA estimated October Gulf crude exports at 15 million barrels per day, or 82% of prewar levels, and projected an additional 5.3 million barrels per day of Gulf production in 2027. Refined-product and LPG exports remained around half their earlier levels. These differences matter because a crude-led recovery need not restore the broader tanker mix (IEA November report).

Bypass routes weaken the link further. The EIA’s November outlook attributes prospective recovery partly to pipelines, offshore transfers and additional UAE bypass capacity. Those are routes to restored supply without proportional growth in Hormuz crossings. Announced capacity is not assured throughput, however, and project schedules can slip (EIA outlook). Production restoration is also plausible: ADNOC Gas guided to full Habshan restoration in the second quarter of 2027. That supports recovery potential, not a direct tanker-count estimate (company update).

Security remains the binding commercial constraint. INTERTANKO welcomed clearance of recognized shipping lanes but warned that clearance alone was insufficient. The Swedish Club continued to discourage nonessential passage. Insurance availability therefore should not be confused with owners accepting the voyage risk (INTERTANKO statement; Swedish Club guidance). The IEA’s operational assessment allowed at least two to three months after clearance to restore steady exports, including vessel repositioning and loading schedules. That is a conditional lag, not a clock already running (IEA assessment).

The strongest evidence against the No outcome is the prospect of a workable settlement. Oman and Iran discussed practical arrangements for unhindered navigation. The IMF’s October outlook assumes reopening resumes in March 2027 and broad prewar conditions return by October 2027. That timetable leaves room for recovery, but it is a projection assumption rather than an implemented agreement (Oman statement; IMF outlook). A commercially usable arrangement also needs legal clarity: OFAC has warned that designated Iranian passage or insurance services can create sanctions exposure (OFAC alert).

What's non-obvious

The tempting shortcut is to read recovering oil exports as recovering tanker traffic. This question breaks that shortcut twice. First, pipelines, larger shipments and transfers change how many crossings are needed per barrel. Second, AIS behavior changes how many physical crossings are recorded. My reading is that substantial export recovery can coexist with a No outcome without any contradiction.

The reverse also matters. Restored broadcasting could lift recorded counts sharply without a matching surge in cargo. Today’s low counts therefore do not imply that an equivalent physical fleet expansion is required. The decisive combination is safe passage, ordinary reporting and enough December activity—not any one reopening headline. The historical December weakness makes that final condition harder than a generic return-to-normal question.

Uncertainties

The largest uncertainty is whether a durable maritime arrangement becomes operational early enough. A late agreement leaves less time for ships, insurance, payments and loading schedules to normalize. Continued attacks can also preserve incentives to sail dark after major hostilities ease.

There is no defensible tanker-specific AIS capture estimate for the target month. Nor is there a verified inventory of future charters, a comprehensive current mine survey, or a reliable estimate of how much bypass use persists after security improves. Better evidence would include repeated voyages by ordinary owners, actual insurance placement, sanctions-compatible operating arrangements and sustained increases in PortWatch tanker counts.

The historical December sample is small and not a set of independent recovery episodes. Tanker subtype shares, future cargo sizes and the relationship between production restoration and crossings remain uncertain. Those gaps limit confidence in the size of the recovery, rather than establish that recovery cannot occur.

Finally, the baseline and comparison month will use the same resolution-date dataset version. Revisions can affect the threshold. Missing observations are not zeros; unresolved missing data or a noncomparable series can lead to postponement or annulment under the question’s rules. The forecast concerns a valid resolution on the specified PortWatch metric, not an alternative estimate of physical shipping activity.

Forecast history

How Prolepsia’s forecast has movedOne forecast so far: 29% on 17 Nov 2026.
DateForecast
29% chance of yes

Sources Prolepsia read

  1. Iranian drone attack targets US radar facility in Bahrain | AP Newsapnews.com
  2. Microsoft Word - JMIC_Advisory_Update_114_FINALwww.ukmto.org
  3. Daily Chokepoints Dataportwatch.imf.org
  4. official historical seriesservices9.arcgis.com
  5. Global Disruptions Are Testing How the World Moves Goods and Peoplewww.imf.org
  6. Middle East Maritime Chokepoints Shipping Monitor - IEAwww.iea.org
  7. The Arab Dark Fleet Keeping Hormuz Oil Flowing | Windwardwindward.ai
  8. November 2026www.eia.gov
  9. ADNOC Gas Delivers Q3 Rebound with $1.34 Billion Net Income - Gaswww.adnocgas.ae
  10. Press / General Releasesmail.intertanko.com

The question

This question asks whether the average daily number of tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz during December 1–31, 2027, inclusive, will reach at least 80% of the corresponding daily average for the full 2025 calendar year (January 1–December 31, 2025), as measured by the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) PortWatch Daily Chokepoints dataset. As of November 17, 2026, tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted by the conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel that began on February 28, 2026. Before the conflict, the strait carried approximately one-fifth of global oil supplies and was a critical route for liquefied natural gas shipments. IMF reporting from April 2026 documented tanker crossings falling to approximately 0–5 vessels per day during parts of March and early April, dramatically below historical levels. Shipping disruptions and attacks on tankers have continued into November 2026. The question therefore measures whether tanker traffic will have recovered to at least 80% of its pre-conflict 2025 level by December 2027. The measurement will use the IMF PortWatch Daily Chokepoints dataset, specifically the Strait of Hormuz (chokepoint6) and its daily tanker transit count. The metric counts recorded tanker crossings, not unique vessels, cargo volumes, oil production, or tanker deadweight tonnage. Both inbound and outbound tanker crossings are included. The 2025 reference average is calculated by summing daily tanker transit counts over all 365 calendar days of 2025 and dividing by 365. The December 2027 average is calculated by summing daily tanker transit counts over all 31 calendar days of December 2027 and dividing by 31. The question resolves YES if the December 2027 average is greater than or equal to 80% of the 2025 average. Otherwise, it resolves NO. Background sources include the IMF's April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East and Central Asia, the IMF PortWatch Daily Chokepoints dataset, and November 2026 reporting by the Associated Press.

How it resolves

The primary resolution source will be the IMF PortWatch Daily Chokepoints dataset, using the Strait of Hormuz observation identified as chokepoint6 and the dataset's tanker transit count variable (n_tanker, or its officially documented equivalent if the variable name changes). The dataset is available through the IMF PortWatch platform at https://portwatch.imf.org/. Resolution will occur after January 31, 2028, once the December 2027 daily observations have had time to be published and updated. Both the 2025 baseline and December 2027 measurements will be extracted from the same dataset version, using the most recent available IMF PortWatch release as of January 31, 2028. Let A equal the sum of daily tanker transit counts from January 1 through December 31, 2025, divided by 365. Let B equal the sum of daily tanker transit counts from December 1 through December 31, 2027, divided by 31. Calculate the recovery ratio R = B / A. The question resolves YES if R is greater than or equal to 0.80, and NO if R is less than 0.80. Equivalently, the question resolves YES if B is greater than or equal to 0.80 × A. Comparisons will use the underlying numerical values without intermediate rounding. A daily observation explicitly reported as zero will count as zero. Missing observations, unavailable dates, or null values must not be interpreted as zero. If IMF PortWatch has not published all 396 required daily observations by January 31, 2028, resolution will be postponed until March 31, 2028, to allow for delayed publication. If the necessary observations remain unavailable on March 31, 2028, the question will be annulled rather than resolved using incomplete data. If IMF PortWatch renames, relocates, or reorganizes the dataset while retaining an officially identifiable equivalent series, that equivalent series will be used. If the relevant tanker transit metric is permanently discontinued or its definition changes so substantially that comparable 2025 and December 2027 measurements cannot be obtained, the question will be annulled. Third-party shipping trackers or alternative tanker transit estimates will not replace IMF PortWatch as the resolution authority. If the 2025 baseline A is zero or unavailable, the question will be annulled because the specified recovery ratio cannot be meaningfully calculated. Sources: IMF PortWatch Daily Chokepoints dataset (https://portwatch.imf.org/datasets/3da2b9ca97684916b75c4013f95d18ab_0/about) and the IMF PortWatch platform (https://portwatch.imf.org/).

Fine print

The question concerns tanker transit counts rather than total commercial vessel traffic. Container ships, dry bulk carriers, general cargo ships, and roll-on/roll-off vessels are excluded unless IMF PortWatch classifies them as tankers. The IMF PortWatch tanker category will be used as published; the calculation will not attempt to distinguish crude oil tankers, petroleum product tankers, chemical tankers, or gas carriers beyond the dataset's existing classification. Each recorded transit counts separately, including repeat crossings by the same vessel. The measurement includes vessels traveling in either direction through the Strait of Hormuz. Calendar dates follow the daily reporting convention used by IMF PortWatch, ordinarily UTC. The 2025 reference period is the entire calendar year, not December 2025 or the final months before the February 2026 conflict. The December 2027 measurement is a monthly average, not the number of tankers crossing on December 31 or a rolling average ending that day. The 80% threshold is inclusive: a recovery ratio of exactly 0.800000 resolves YES. Because PortWatch relies on Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel-position information, recorded transits may differ from actual physical crossings when vessels disable AIS, experience signal interference, or are otherwise not detected. The question concerns the IMF PortWatch reported figures, not an independent estimate of actual tanker movements. Revisions incorporated into the dataset by the specified resolution date will be reflected in both the baseline and comparison period. Subsequent revisions will not alter the resolved outcome. Military developments, a formal reopening or closure announcement, the lifting of sanctions, and changes in oil prices do not independently determine resolution; only the specified tanker transit ratio matters.