Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?

TL;DR

The forecast is 23.6% Yes and 76.4% No, as of October 6, 2026. Treat No as the base case: recorded traffic remains far below the threshold, and June’s reopening failed to reach it. Watch implemented access and ordinary, visible ship movements—not oil-export headlines—because only one qualifying week is needed.

Context

The title asks whether traffic returns to normal. The contract asks something narrower: whether IMF PortWatch publishes a seven-day moving average of at least 60 qualifying transit calls for any eligible date through December 31, 2026. The counted categories are container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. For an ordinary seven-day arithmetic average, the threshold means 420 recorded calls across one week. A temporary surge qualifies; lasting peace and sustained normal traffic do not have to follow. (Resolution source; market rules)

Physical trade and recorded traffic have diverged. Oil exporters are using bypass routes, dark tanker shuttles, and offshore transfers while attacks and commercial restrictions continue. Negotiations offer a route out of this regime, but a proposal is not an operational opening. The decisive sequence is safer access, commercial uptake, visible movements, and then a qualifying published average. (Kpler; IMO)

Evidence

The historical baseline shows that 60 calls/day is attainable under ordinary conditions. From January 1, 2024 through February 27, 2026, daily traffic averaged 86.83 calls across 789 observations. Of the 783 complete seven-day windows within that interval, 92.7% reached the threshold. Calendar 2025 averaged approximately 85.5 calls/day, and 331 rolling-average dates reached 60. These overlapping windows describe the normal operating regime; they are not independent trials or a recovery probability. (Official PortWatch series)

Late-year weakness complicates that baseline. November 2025 averaged 67.37 calls/day, December 55.55, January 2026 58.45, and February 78.29. The December comparisons across 2019–2025 support winter weakness, but December 2025 was unusually depressed. I read this as a reason to avoid assuming an immediate return to the annual average, not as a permanent ceiling on recovery. Monthly means also do not settle a contract that needs just one busy week. (PortWatch data)

June is the closest reopening analogue. The June agreement generated a rebound before breaking down. Between June 17 and July 8, 514 calls were recorded across 22 days, averaging 23.36/day. The highest post-creation seven-day average was 31.857143 on June 29. That is substantial movement, but far short of 60. The episode establishes that ships can return quickly and that partial reopening can stall below the contractual target. It is one relevant episode, not a large reference class. (Congressional Research Service account; traffic series)

The weekly sequence makes the failure clear: averages were 30.43 for the week ending June 28, 23.14 for July 5, 14.00 for July 12, 6.29 for July 19, and 3.57 for July 26. These are dependent observations from the same rebound and reversal. The monthly history likewise shows no sustained recovery. The following means use the September 29 data edition; September is incomplete. (Official daily data)

2026 period	Daily observations	Mean calls/day
March 1–31	31	3.19
April 1–30	30	7.13
May 1–31	31	3.94
June 1–30	30	12.93
July 1–31	31	10.19
August 1–31	31	4.71
September 1–27	27	3.70

The available official history contains 2,827 daily observations from January 1, 2019 through September 27, 2026. Its latest seven daily counts are shown below. They total 22 and yield an average of 3.142857 calls/day, versus the required 60. The needed weekly total is approximately 19.09 times the latest recorded total. No qualifying post-creation observation appears in this data edition; the last average at or above 60 was 63.285714 on March 2, before market creation. (PortWatch series and metadata; market page)

September 2026 date	Recorded calls
21	2
22	3
23	4
24	5
25	3
26	4
27	1

The strongest positive operational evidence comes from cargo movement. Kpler’s September 29 assessment, covering September 1–28, estimated at least 16.5 million barrels/day of regional crude-and-condensate exports excluding Iran. It estimated that 40% bypassed Hormuz, compared with 17% before the war, while about 9.9 million barrels/day crossed the strait. Dark movements and offshore tanker transfers were central to that recovery. These are commodity-volume estimates, not PortWatch vessel counts. (Kpler)

LNG offers a smaller but useful breadth signal. Kpler reported 20 LNG-tanker crossings through September 23: 10 QatarEnergy-linked and 10 ADNOC-linked movements. QatarEnergy-linked crossings had been zero in August. This shows another segment returning, but does not demonstrate the mixed commercial traffic needed for 420 recorded calls in a week. Maersk’s September 11 advisory also described landbridge access and booking restrictions, showing why restored cargo service to Gulf destinations need not mean restored ocean transits through Hormuz. (Kpler LNG assessment; Maersk)

Diplomacy provides a credible route to broader access. Qatar confirmed continuing mediation on September 29, and Reuters described work on a phased exchange of reopening for blockade relief. Reporting on the subsequent proposal identified sequencing as a central dispute. That is more substantive than generic optimism: there is a possible bargain, but neither side wants to surrender leverage first. Iran’s October 4 position still made reopening conditional on its demands. (Qatar Foreign Ministry; Reuters; October 4 account)

Security evidence weighs against rapid commercial acceptance. IMO’s October 5 register documented continuing vessel damage. Seatrade’s October 5 report described a projectile strike causing an engine-room fire and a tanker turnback following an IRGC threat; several other warnings concerned earlier incidents. Trump’s September 28 interview, published October 1, also left post-election bombing possible. These facts support continued disruption risk rather than a settled path to reopening. (IMO; Seatrade; TIME interview)

Insurance is a constraint, not an absolute barrier. Lloyd’s announced new capacity in June, while the Lloyd’s Market Association identified safety as a principal reason for reduced traffic. Sanctions and transit-payment conditions can still make a physically available route commercially unusable. An operator’s June assessment anticipated several weeks, potentially about a month, for navigation to take shape. I read these as reasons to expect a lag between implemented access and enough recorded traffic, while retaining a fast-restart possibility. (Lloyd’s; LMA safety statement; transit-fee condition; MOL interview)

What's non-obvious

Recovered barrels are not recovered calls. Large cargoes, dark shuttles, and bypass pipelines can sustain exports with fewer qualifying recorded movements. The same workarounds that demonstrate operational resilience can reduce pressure for a broad reopening. Oil-export recovery therefore supports physical feasibility without making the contractual threshold close. (Kpler; Windward)

The reverse distinction also matters. The market does not demand durable normality. Restored visibility or a concentrated release of waiting vessels could produce one qualifying week before commercial networks fully recover. That keeps Yes meaningful despite the depressed series. There is no verified ready-to-sail backlog sufficient to establish this as the base case. The strongest positive signal would be an implemented access protocol followed by ordinary AIS-visible movements across several vessel categories, not another reopening announcement.

Uncertainties

The largest gap is political implementation: private negotiating positions, reciprocal sequencing, and whether operational actors honor an arrangement. Public mediation confirms a channel, not a timetable. A verified implementation schedule and evidence that turnbacks and attacks have stopped would narrow this uncertainty.

Recovery speed and measurement are separate gaps. Current evidence does not establish October voyage-specific insurance uptake, protected-route capacity, or the number of ordinary ships ready to return. Successive PortWatch releases, visible commercial voyages, and recurring ocean services would show whether improved access is converting into qualifying calls.

The official observations end nine calendar days before the forecast date. The current data edition is not a complete archive of past publications, so it cannot conclusively rule out a qualifying value subsequently revised downward. No such earlier qualification was established. The precise chart-average alignment also remains unverified, which matters most near the year-end boundary rather than for today’s large shortfall.

Finally, publication and shipping deadlines differ. Eligible December observations can be published after year-end under the 14-calendar-day fallback, but January activity cannot qualify. A legitimate qualifying publication is protected against later downward revision under the stated rules. These issues add uncertainty; they do not replace the central judgment that a large, timely, recorded commercial recovery remains the minority outcome. (Market rules)