Prolepsia forecastYes / no
Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?
As of 20 November 2026, Prolepsia puts the chance of yes at 3%.
3%chance of yes
How Prolepsia reasons
The report Prolepsia wrote with this forecast.
How forecasts are made · Track record
TL;DR
Probability of Yes: 2.5%. Probability of No: 97.5%. The latest reported week was far below the threshold, and the main path to Yes is an early December reopening that ships can actually use, followed by one unusually busy week.
Key evidence
- The gap is large. The November 17 IMF PortWatch release recorded 16 calls for November 9–15, down from 27 the previous week. Even the June reopening peaked at 223 calls over June 23–29. The market needs 420 calls in a single seven-day window ending by December 31. An eligible December observation can be published in January.
- Diplomacy has not produced a restart date. Oman’s November 17 readout discussed maritime corridor security without announcing when ships could use the corridor. Maersk’s November 18 update still offered conditional service rather than a broad restart. The November 20 war-risk insurance disclosure concerned an October 12 memo, not a fresh change in coverage.
- Other passage counts do not settle the market. JMIC reported 106 U.S.-facilitated passages on November 15–18 and still rated the threat severe. Its count shows that some ships are moving, but it covers a different set of passages from PortWatch and cannot be added to the official total.
Uncertainties
A workable two-way safety arrangement, voyage insurance that shipowners can secure, and firm dispatches would change the picture. A backlog could produce one qualifying week before regular schedules recover. The available PortWatch series also does not preserve every earlier release, so it cannot rule out every prior qualifying publication. The most useful new evidence would be a dated operating notice followed by repeated ordinary commercial crossings and a sustained rise in PortWatch’s daily counts.
Read the full report
TL;DR
Probability of Yes: 2.5%. Probability of No: 97.5%. IMF PortWatch recorded 16 calls in its latest reported week against 420 required, and the main path to Yes is a usable reopening followed by one sharp surge in recorded crossings.
Context
The market asks whether IMF PortWatch publishes a seven-day moving average of at least 60 transit calls for any eligible date through December 31, 2026. The market opened May 11. Container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo and tanker calls count. Passage reports from other sources do not. December 31 is the last observation date, not the last publication date. If the final date is still missing on January 14, 2027 ET, the market settles on the data published by then. A later downward revision generally does not erase a qualifying print, subject to the obvious-error rule.
As of November 20, mediation continued, but Oman’s November 17 readout gave no operating date for a maritime corridor. JMIC’s November 19 advisory still rated the threat severe. Some vessels were moving. The evidence did not show ordinary commercial traffic returning at scale.
Evidence
The threshold is attainable under normal operations, but the annual average makes it look easier than it is in winter. PortWatch averaged 85.53 calls per day in calendar 2025 and 68.00 across the seven Decembers from 2019 through 2025. December 2025 averaged only 55.55 calls per day, yet still qualified late in the month. All seven historical Decembers reached 60 on December 31 itself. That is a seasonal benchmark, not a success rate for reopening after a conflict (IMF PortWatch data).
| December | Mean calls/day | Peak seven-day average | December dates at or above 60 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 57.13 | 67.29 | 8 |
| 2020 | 60.13 | 69.00 | 12 |
| 2021 | 78.52 | 88.00 | 31 |
| 2022 | 79.06 | 91.86 | 31 |
| 2023 | 74.94 | 81.57 | 31 |
| 2024 | 70.65 | 74.14 | 31 |
| 2025 | 55.55 | 62.57 | 4 |
Hormuz’s own reopening attempts are more useful than the prewar baseline for judging the speed of a rebound. The April reopening announcement was reversed the next day. After the June 17 memorandum and JMIC’s June 18 opening advisory, crossings rose within days, but the best week, June 23–29, reached only 223 calls, or 31.86 per day. Traffic then fell back. June shows that a real initial response can still fall short. It does not establish a ceiling for a durable reopening, because the recovery was interrupted (IMF PortWatch data).
Suez gives a fast case, not a close analogy. After the March 29, 2021 refloat of the Ever Given, the recorded series regained its pre-blockage average in five days. A short physical obstruction left a queue ready to move. In the Red Sea, by contrast, seven-day peaks after the May and October 2025 de-escalation points were 41.29 and 42.57 calls per day at Bab el-Mandeb, against a pre-disruption baseline of 74.74. Neither episode was a clean reopening. The contrast shows why clearing a route and restoring shipowners’ willingness to use it are different problems (IMF PortWatch data).
The current gap is wider than the June gap. The November 17 PortWatch release recorded 27 calls on November 2–8 and only 16 on November 9–15. The June peak of 223 was the highest eligible week in that release. November 16 onward was not yet published; those dates were not zeros (IMF PortWatch data).
The diplomatic signals do not yet give shipowners a date to plan around. Qatar confirmed continued mediation on November 17. The proposed two-day timetable concerned what could happen after acceptance, not when an agreement would be reached or when ships would sail. The carrier notices tell a similar story. Maersk’s November 18 update retained a conditional feeder option with a $1,000-per-container surcharge for Hormuz routing. Hapag-Lloyd was still handling calls selectively. The November 20 disclosure about war-risk insurance concerned an October 12 memo, not a fresh change in coverage. Selective service shows that some operators can move cargo. It is not a schedule for a broad return.
What's non-obvious
A qualifying week is not the same as normal traffic. The market can resolve Yes on one short surge, even if regular liner schedules remain disrupted. JMIC reported roughly 234 stationary commercial vessels east of the strait on November 19. That is not a departure manifest, but it shows why a usable agreement could produce a fast first wave of sailings. The timing still matters: after two days at three calls per day, the other five days in the same window would need to average 82.8 (JMIC advisory; market rules).
The other distinction is between ships moving and ships counting. JMIC reported 106 U.S.-facilitated passages on November 15–18 while describing traffic visible through the Automatic Identification System as single digits to low double digits per day. The two measures cover different movements and use different reporting methods. Neither is interchangeable with PortWatch. Better visibility could lift the official count during a reopening, but there is no reliable conversion from facilitated passages to qualifying calls.
Uncertainties
The largest unknown is when a reopening becomes usable in practice. An announcement is not the same as a two-way passage arrangement that shipowners, crews and insurers will act on. A dated operating notice, firm carrier schedules and repeated ordinary crossings would narrow that uncertainty. There is no verified fleet-wide picture of which ships could obtain cover and sail immediately, so the size and speed of a first wave remain uncertain.
The other gap is in the publication record. The current PortWatch series shows no qualifying market-period week, but it does not preserve every earlier release. An archive of those releases would resolve whether any earlier print qualified before revision. For the remaining weeks, the clearest evidence would be a rise in PortWatch’s own counts alongside a broad restart. Another diplomatic statement or a higher count from a different tracker would not establish either.
What changed since the last forecast
This forecast is not compared to the previous run because the answer shape, model stack, or engine settings changed. Treat it as a fresh baseline.
Forecast history
| Date | Forecast |
|---|---|
| 3% chance of yes | |
| 7% chance of yes | |
| 11% chance of yes | |
| 12% chance of yes | |
| 15% chance of yes | |
| 13% chance of yes | |
| 16% chance of yes | |
| 17% chance of yes | |
| 22% chance of yes | |
| 24% chance of yes |
Sources Prolepsia read
- chokepoint6portwatch.imf.org
- market opened May 11polymarket.com
- Minister meets with Iranian Foreign Minister | fm.gov.omwww.fm.gov.om
- Microsoft Word - JMIC_Advisory_Update_115_FINALwww.ukmto.org
- Layer: Daily_Chokepoints_Data (ID:0)services9.arcgis.com
- Microsoft Word - JMIC Advisory Note 009-26 (SoH open)wwwcdn.imo.org
- March 29, 2021 refloat of the Ever Givenwww.suezcanal.gov.eg
- Advisor to Prime Minister, Foreign Ministry Official Spokesperson: Qatar's Mediation Continues, Meeting with Iranian Side Expectedmofa.gov.qa
- Middle East Operational Update 55 | Maerskwww.maersk.com
- Hapag-Lloydwww.hapag-lloyd.com
The question
Imported from Polymarket. This yes/no question comes from a single Polymarket market.
How it resolves
This market will resolve to “Yes” if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (“Arrivals of Ships”) for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 for any date between market creation and December 31, 2026. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. Daily transit calls include container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. Ships not reported by IMF Portwatch will not be considered. This market will resolve as soon as IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above the specified level, or once data has been published for the final date in the specified period and no such value has been published. If no data has been published for the final date of the specified period within 14 calendar days (ET) after the end of that period, this market will resolve based on data published up to that point. Revisions to previously published data points made within this market’s timeframe will be considered. However, they will not disqualify a previously published data point from qualifying. Revisions to previously published data points after data is published for December 31, 2026, however, will not be considered. In case of obvious data integrity issues (i.e., erroneous data), the market may remain open until the end of the third calendar day (ET) after the date on which such data is first released to allow for corrections. Data integrity issues refer only to clerical or other similar errors in the underlying data, and do not include cases where IMF Portwatch differs from alternative sources. The resolution source for this market will be IMF Portwatch, specifically the transit calls data published for the Strait of Hormuz at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730, both in the chart and through downloadable files.
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